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Marriage and the Income Tax Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow: A Primer and Legislative Scorecard
Ann F. Thomas·

INTRODUCTION

Over the past three years, in the 10S th Congress and the first
session of the present 106th Congress, members on both sides of the
aisle introduced bil1s that offered a wide range of solutions to the
much discussed problem of marriage penalties in the federal income
tax. These proposals vary substantial1y in concept and in impact,
representing a sometimes-inconsistent array of ideas about the
taxation of married couples. Some attempt a more comprehensive
reversal of the marriage penalty - the term now used to describe the
additional income tax burden that most dual income couples bear
when they are married. Other bil1s confine themselves to addressing
only one of the many features of the penalty issue. But the various
congressional initiatives to reduce marriage penalties al1 have a
significant point in common. All of the anti-penalty proposals would
preserve marriage bonuses the income tax cut experienced
predominantly by sole earner couples who are married. Indeed, some
of the anti-penalty legislation would likely augment total marriage
bonuses even more than it would reduce total marriage penalties.
This article examines the trends in the proposals for income
tax marriage penalty relief introduced in the 10S th and 106th
Congresses and the different concepts of the unit of taxation for
couples that these proposals represent. Part I is a primer on income
tax marriage penalties and bonuses, for readers unfamiliar with the
technical and historical sources and the political background for the
current proposals. Part II examines the anti-penalty bills introduced in
the 10S th and the first session of the 106th Congress, including the
vetoed Taxpayer Refund and Recovery Act of 1999, and develops a
frame of reference for analysis of the policy content of the bills that
• Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. The author would
like to thank Richard C.E. Beck and William P. LaPiana, colleagues at New York Law
School, for their comments and Kim C. Arestad, NYLS '99, for her assistance in
compiling the anti-penalty bills in the I05th Congress for use as materials for the
Symposium.
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can also be used to assess trends in future congressional proposals for
marriage penalty relief.
Four tables mapping the trends in
sponsorship support for proposals over the three years, which are
described in Part II, can be found in the Appendix. Part II itself
includes a table scoring the scope and marriage penalty relief impact
of the various proposals. In conclusion, this article suggests that as a
cross section of attitudes among policy makers toward the taxation of
married couples, the anti-penalty proposals of the lOSth and l06 th
represent two different and apparently parallel trends.
The proposals evidence consistent support for traditional
marriage values and a strong preference for the sole earner married
couple family structure. Support for the traditional family structure of
sole earner and homemaker is apparent in the tendency to favor
solutions that would have a broad impact in reducing the tax for
married couples in general rather than focussing more narrowly on
techniques for reversing marriage penalties. But at the same time,
proposals are being advanced to allow married couples to elect to be
taxed, in part, as individuals and these ideas have won significant
bipartisan support. This trend suggests that there is now substantial
uncertainty among policy makers about the fairness of imposing the
joint return on all married couples and a questioning of the tax equity
imperatives that have linked marriage and the joint return since 1948.
The anti-penalty bills are noteworthy not only for their place
in the contemporary history of the theory of the unit of taxation, but
they obviously also belong to the real time world of developing tax
policy. To date, none of these proposals have been enacted into law.
In the lOSth Congress, anti-penalty provisions gained enough support
to be included in major bills in each chamber. 1 In the I06 th Congress,
I House Bill 4579, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1998, which was introduced
by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer (R-TX) and passed in the
House on September 26, 1998, included as section 10 1 of the bill a provision that would
have eliminated the marriage penalty effect in the standard deduction for both joint filers
and married separate return filers. See <http://THOMAS.loc.gov/> (visited Nov. 4,
1999). Also in the 105th Congress, on June 10, 1998 the Senate agreed to add an antipenalty amendment proposed by Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) to the Universal Tobacco
Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Congo (1997). See S. Amdt. 2689, 105th Congo (1998);
see also 144 Congo Rec. S6012, S6031 (June 10, 1998). Gramm's amendment was "to
eliminate the marriage penalty reflected in the standard deduction, to ensure the earned
income credit takes into account the elimination of such penalty." Id. The tobacco
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provIsIons identified as offering marriage penalty relief had a
significant place in the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, the
$792 billion Republican sponsored tax cut bill vetoed by President
Clinton on September 23, 1999. Marriage penalty relief proposals
also figured in the Democratic alternative tax cut bills that failed to
supplant the Republican bil1. 2 Income tax marriage penalty relief is
already on the list of campaign promises of the leading presidential
candidates Gore, Bush, Bradley and McCain? With penalties being
reported by the Congressional Budget Office as exceeding $28 billion
a year for joint filers, the issue remains one of lively interest to
taxpayers, politicians and tax scholars. 4 The anti-penalty proposals
presented in the 10S th Congress and the first session of the 106th
remain of current interest.·
settlement bill itself did not pass. See <thomas.loc.gov!> (visited Nov. 4, 1999). For a
discussion of House Bill 2488, the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, vetoed by
President Clinton on September 23, 1999, see infra notes 281-84, 302-308 and
accompanying text.
2 Although representing only $9.337 billion of the $155.863 billion tax cut
projected over the first five years of the amendments proposed by the bill, the impact of
the marriage penalty relief provisions would have risen to $112.881 billion by the year
2009, representing 14.25 percent of the ten year projection of $792 billion. Compare
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SUMMARY AND REVENUE ESTIMATES FOR CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT ON H.R. 2488, TAXPAYER REFUND AND RELIEF ACT OF 1999, reprinted in
BNA TEXT SUPP. August 6,1999 at S-31-32 & 42-43, pts. I & XV [hereinafter 1999 JOINT
COMM. CONF. BILL SUMMARY AND REVENUE ESTIMATES). See text accompanying notes
262,266-267,270 and 275 for discussion of minority views and proposals.
3 See George W. Bush Presidential Campaign Website, (visited Nov. 7, 1999)
<http://www.gerogewbush.com>; AI Gore Presidential Campaign Website, (visited Nov.
7, 1999) <http://www.algore2000.com>; Bill Bradley Presidential Campaign Website,
(visited Nov. 24, 1999) <http://www.billbradley.com>; Jim McCain Presidential
Campaign Website, (visited Nov. 24, 1999) <http://www.mcain2000.com>. McCain's
materials call the marriage penalty "obscene." Id.
4 CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, xiv-xv (1997) [hereinafter CBO STUDY]. An aggregate marriage
penalty of $32 billion is projected for all married persons including those using the status
of married filing separately. See I.R.C. § I(d»; CBO STUDY, tbl. C-4 .
• As this article goes to press, President Clinton, in his State of the Union
address on January 27, 2000, has for the first time called for legislation to reduce the
income tax marriage penalty. In the same speech, he also stressed the importance of
reducing the Earned Income Tax Credit [EITC] marriage penalty, linking it to his welfare
reform efforts and pointing to the necessity of "making sure that it rewards marriage just
as it rewards work." President Clinton's support makes it very likely that some form of

6

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XVI

marriage penalty relief will be enacted in the Second session of the 106th Congress. The
President's proposal takes an approach not seen in any of the anti-penalty bills in the past
three years although it shares certain features with a number of them. A brief and
necessarily preliminary analysis follows.
The Clinton Administration has not yet proposed specific language for the
legislation that it will seek but the summary of the proposal released by the White House
before the President's speech indicates that the Clinton Administration will call for an
increase in the standard deduction for two-income married couples to double the amount
allowed an unmarried individual. The total increase for dual income married couples
would be $2,150 and would reduce the income tax marriage penalties of 9.1 million
couples. A separate increase in the standard deduction of $500 for single-income married
couples and $250 for single filers will also be sought. The reported revenue cost (loss)
for all three increases is $45 billion over 10 years. The summary did not include any
information about the President's E1TC marriage penalty relief plan although a general
EITC increase costing $21 billion is described. See The White House, Office of Press
Secretary, President Clinton's Tax Agenda for Community. Opportunity. and
Responsibility, January 27, 2000, reprinted in 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 19-16, (2000).
The President's proposal for a doubled deduCtion for dual income couples has
a substantially more efficient marriage penalty relief focus than did the across the boards
doubling for all joint return filers that was in the Republican tax cut bill that the President
vetoed on September 23, 1999. It represents an important step toward recognizing the
economic significance of individual incomes of spouses. While it is paired with a general
increase in the standard deduction, the Clinton proposal directs more resources toward
removing an important structural source of marriage penalties.
But the Clinton proposal would leave much of the marriage penalty intact and
apparently would have no impact on the majority of the 20.9 million marriage penalty
couples. Structured as a "below the line" deduction through I.R.C. § 63 (1999), an
increase In the standard deduction does not provide any relief from the phaseout marriage
penalties based on adjusted gross income [AGI] found in numerous provisions, including
the exclusion for social security old age benefits and the child tax credit. Further, it
would not help couples who itemize deductions. Restricting marriage penalty relief to
couples who elect the standard deduction may be a surrogate for imposing an income
ceiling on such relief, as did the Moynihan dual earner deduction proposal in 1999.
However, relying on the standard deduction for this purpose produces erratic and
presumably unintentional results. There are significant geographic as well as income
differences in taxpayer use of the standard deduction. Although only about 18% of filers
itemize in Texas, a state with low taxes, New Yorkers, who live in a high state tax
environment, itemize at twice that rate, with about 36% itemizing.
Moreover,
approximately 2.8 million low income returns (under $30,000 AGI) itemize in order to
deduct medical expenses. Restructuring the marriage penalty relief deduction for two
income couples as an "above the line" adjustment through I.R.C. § 62 (a) (1999) would
make it available to all marriage penalty couples and also reduce most phaseout marriage
penalties. (The Gramm proposals in 1998 used such a structure.) Of course such a
restructuring would increase the revenue cost.
One important detail in the President's proposal for a dual income deduction
that requires immediate clarification is whether community property law is to apply in
determining the income of each spouse. All married couples in community property
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I . MARITAL ST ArUS AND THE INCOME TAX

For the vast majority of adult couples in the United States,
marital status is a significant determinant of federal income tax
liability. But while the impact of marital status on taxation is felt by
upwards of 50 million American couples, both married and
unmarried, the changes in taxation that changes in legal marital status
produce are neither uniform nor unidirectional. 5 Marriage no longer
confers a tax cut on the large majority of couples as it did in the past.6
states are dual income couples for federal income tax purposes according to Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), because that marital property regime gives each spouse an
equal interest in all income of the marriage. The dual earner deduction in the 1980s and
the recent proposals to re-enact it specified that community property laws would be
disregarded in determining each individual spouse's earnings. Unless the legislation for
the dual income standard deduction repudiates the Poe v. Seaborn principle for both
earnings and property income, the old community property controversy will be re-opened
and married couples in the common law states will again be paying higher taxes than
those in the community property law states.
5 See CBO STUDY supra note 4, at tbl. C-4 (showing for 1995 that 48.52
million married couples had either penalties or bonuses and 2.35 million unmarried
couples would have had penalties or bonuses if they had filed joint returns). Statistical
and quantitative data on marriage penalties and bonuses used in this article is largely
drawn from the important study of marriage penalties and bonuses published in 1997 by
the Congressional Budget Office. See id. The study was undertaken at the request of
then-Congresswoman Barbara Kennelly (D-CT) of the House Ways and Means
Committee while the CBO was under the directorship of Dr. June O'Neill, an economist
with substantial expertise in the taxation of marriage and of women. The 1997 CBO
study is regarded as the authoritative source of quantitative information about the
incidence, distribution and magnitude of marriage penalties and marriage bonuses and is
relied upon in the literature. It also draws together the results of the ground breaking
economics research of the 1990s on the behavioral impact of marriage penalties and
marriage bonuses. In addition, the CBO study provides generic revenue estimates for five
different proposals to reduce income tax marriage penalties.
Dr. O'Neill gave the keynote address at the New York Law School Journal of
Human Rights Symposium, the publication of which includes this article. See June
O'Neill, Keynote Address: Marriage Penalties and Bonuses in the Federal Income Tax,
16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM RTS. 119 (1999). Symposium panelists Diana Furchtgott-Roth
and C. Eugene Steuerle also contributed to the CBO Study. See Preface to CBO STUDY.
6 See· CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 37-46 and tbl. 18 (showing 64% of
married couples with bonuses in 1969 and 48% in 1996). Different simulations included
in the CBO study produce different estimates for the current period. See, e.g., id, at tbl.
C-4 (showing 39% of all married couples had bonuses and 49% had penalties in 1995);
also id at Summary tbl. 1 (showing in 1996, 51 % of joint return filing married couples
had bonuses and 42% had penalties). However, the trend toward a higher proportion of
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Indeed, for as many as 47 percent of joint return filers in a recent year
marriage meant an increased tax burden. These are the marriage
penalty couples; the income tax marriage penalties that they paid in
1996 alone are estimated to have ranged between $28.8 billion and
$42 billion. At the same time, about 49 percent of joint return filing
couples found that marriage reduced their taxes. These marriage
bonus couples saved about $32 billion in federal income taxes in 1996
simply because they were entitled to file joint returns. 7
The distinguishing characteristic of marriage penalty couples
is that each of the spouses has some individual income. Typically this
means that both husband and wife are working in paid employment. 8
The more the incomes of the two partners are in parity, the more
likely the couple is to trigger marriage tax penalties. Couples in
which the wife earns at least half as much as the husband does, and
vice versa, are the most likely to experience marriage penalties. In
1996 some 90 percent of the joint returns in this category showed
marriage penalties and the couples filing those returns paid a total of
$15 billion in additional tax because they were married. About twothirds of dual earner couples with less equal incomes also incurred
marriage penalties in that year. Overall, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) study that is the leading source of quantitative
information on the subject indicates that 76 percent of all two earner
joint return couples paid marriage penalty taxes in 1996.9
penalty couples and a lower proportion of bonus couples is well documented. E.g., James
AIm & Leslie A. Whittington, The Rise and Fall and Rise . .. of the Marriage Tax, 49
NAT. TAXJ. 571 (1996).
7 See CBO STUDY supra note 4, at tbl. 4. Five different measures of marriage
penalties and bonuses are presented in Table 4. The statistics used in the text are drawn
from the "Broader Measure" and the "Basic Measure." Differences arise from the
assumptions made about the basis on which the married couples would be able to report
their incomes as unmarrieds, including such issues as allocation of children, choice of
itemized or standard deduction and presence or absence of Earned Income Tax Credit, as
well as head of household provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. The CBO's basic
measure allocates itemized deductions between the spouses proportionately, and its
broader measure gives all itemized deductions to the high earner and claims a standard
deduction for the low earner. See id. at 29, 30.

8 See id. at tbl. 7, p. xv. The CBO simulation reported here assumed all
income was from earnings but extended its observations to incomes generally.
9 1d. at tbl. 7, pp. 35·36. Table 7 shows 27.5 million joint returns (or married
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While the marriage of two wage earners tends to result in .
marriage tax penalties, the pairing of a wage earner and a fulltime
homemaker produces marriage tax bonuses. Marriage bonus couples
tend to be couples in which the spouses have very unequal money
incomes. Married couples in which only one of the spouses works in
paid employment receive the greatest share of marriage bonuses.
Although these sole earner couples represented only 44 percent of
joint returns filed, more than three-quarters of them received marriage
bonuses in 1996. . Indeed, in 1996 the 19.4 million sole earner
marriage bonus couples saved a total of $28.5 billion by reason of
their marital status. \0 Overwhelmingly, sole earner married couples in
the United States are couples in which it is the husband who is the
market earner and the wife who is the homemaker. 1I In 1996 a total
of 25.3 million couples received marriage bonuses and 20.9 million
paid penalties. 12
For the 2.7 million reported unmarried adult couples in the
United States in 1995, the penalty and bonus profiles are somewhat
different. About 56 percent were likely to have owed more income
tax if they had been married and 33 percent would have owed less.
Overall, marital status is estimated to affect the tax liability of about
89 percent of unmarried couples. Of the 54.7 million married couples,
the eBO Study projected that 88 percent are affected by marital
status, experiencing either penalties or bonuses.13 Thus marriage
penalties and marriage bonuses can be said to have an impact on some
50.7 million adult couples, or more than 100 million individuals.
couples) in the two earner categories, with 20.9 million paying marriage penalties.
10 See id. at tbls. 7-8, p. 35.
II See id. fig. 5, at 37 (showing that in approximately 25 % of married
couples the husband was the sole earner and in 5% the wife was the sole earner; hence in
more than 80% of sole earner couples, the husband was the earner).
12 See id. at tbl. 7.

13 These statistics are for 1995 and are drawn from the CBO 1997 Study.
The CBO Study defines unmarried couples as unmarried adults self-identified as partners
in the March 1996 Current Population Survey and notes that 3 percent of the unmarried
couples so identified were same-sex couples. See id. at tbl. 2, n.18, p. 13. The CBO
Study gives two different totals for the number of unmarried couples. Tables C-I and C4 show 2,650,000 unmarried couples in 1995 and table 2 reports 2,700,000, also in 1995.
See id. at tbls. 2 & C-4.

10

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XVI

Marriage penalties and marriage bonuses are important for
several reasons. With increasing intensity since 1993, the marriage
penalty effects of the federal income tax have been criticized on
behavioral, feminist, moral and religious grounds. Observers have
questioned whether penalties and bonuses of the magnitude now being
seen are affecting marriage decisions and other life choices involving
work and family, especially for women. The empirical research on
these questions is mixed at this time, although beginning to show that
marriage penalties are affecting marriage behavior.
For many
policymakers and taxpayers, the idea that the tax system discourages
marriage and perhaps encourages divorce is politically unacceptable
and morally repugnant. But marriage penalties and marriage bonuses
are also important for another reason. As the value laden vocabulary
in which the issue is now universally discussed indicates, something is
going on in the taxation of married couples that we are finding to be
anomalous and inconsistent with our ideas of fairness in taxation.
In order to evaluate this policy debate and the numerous
legislative initiatives in the three most recent Congresses aimed at
reducing or eliminating the marriage penalty, some background in the
technical aspects of the issue is necessary. The combined effects of
many provisions of the Internal Revenue Code impose the regime of
marriage penalties and marriage bonuses. It derives from a number of
tax policy decisions, including the long standing policy choice to tax
married couples on a unitary basis through the income splitting joint
return. The sections that follow provide an overview of the statutory
sources of the marriage penalty and the marriage bonus in the federal
income tax and the development of the joint return. 14
14 There is an extensive tax literature that discusses marriage penalties and
bonuses. The trends and major contributions in this body of scholarship are discussed
infra at notes 78-89 and 153-58. Marriage penalty and marriage bonus effects are also
seen in the Social Security system and numerous other transfer programs at the federal
and state levels. See, e.g., Symposium: Panel IV: The Social Security System and Women
Today, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 217 (1999); Symposium: Panel V: Social Security
Reform: The Impact on Women, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 253 (1999); Eugene
Steuerle, The Uncertain Support Behind 'Marriage Penalty' Relief, 84 TAX NOTES 1539
(1999). For a discussion of the joint and several liability consequences of joint return
filing, arguably a penalty that particularly burdens women, see Amy Christian,
Unintended Consequences of Marriage Penalty Relief The Effect on the Married
Couple's Choice of Filing Status, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUMAN RIGHTS 172 (1999).
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The Joint

There is, of course, no actual marriage tax, nor marriage
penalty and bonus section or subtitle in the Internal Revenue Code.
The technical source of both marriage penalties and marriage bonuses
in the income tax is what might be called the joint return system for
the taxation of married couples. Its central feature is the joint return
itself, which requires husband and wife to aggregate their incomes and
compute their tax liability on a more or less unitary basis. ls The
Different than the marriage penalties and bonuses discussed here are the singles penalties.
Singles penalties are measured by the income tax benefits that are allowed all couples
whose marriages are recognized for tax purposes and denied all couples whose marriages
or domestic partnerships are not so recognized. One of the more apparent examples of
this is I.R.C. section 1041 (1999), a provision which allows spouses to transfer or
exchange property incident to divorce without recognition of gain or loss. Couples who
are not treated as married for tax purposes generally are subject to tax on property
settlements in palimony situations. Another potentially sizable, but as yet unmeasured,
singles penalty exists in the area of employee benefits and fringe benefits. Substantial
amounts of income are excluded as employee benefits or fringe benefits by numerous
sections of the Internal Revenue Code. For example, the tax the expenditure budget
shows that the tax saved (revenue lost) by the exclusion of employer paid medical
insurance premiums and medical care costs (pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 105 & 106 (1999)) was
$ 76.2 billion for 1999. The tax saved/revenue lost from the exclusion that I.R.C. section
119 (1999) creates for employer provided meals and lodging in 1999 was $ 680 million.
See Tax Expenditure Chapter from the President's Fiscal 1999 Budget, 78 TAX NOTES
911, 922, tbls. 5-2 (1998). Many of the statutory exclusions of employee benefits and
fringe benefits encompass the value of benefits given to the employee's spouse. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 119 (a) (1999) (excluding from gross income food and lodging provided by
employer "to [the employee], his spouse, or any of his dependents").; I.R.C. § 105 (b)
(1999) (excluding from gross income reimbursement of amounts attributable to medical
care for "taxpayer, his spouse, and his dependents"). Same-sex couples and other couples
who cannot marry are taxed on the value of employee benefits extended to partners, an
increasingly common practice in some parts of the United States and now in the European
Union. See Kate Hilpern, Tide Begins to Turn in Favour of Gay Employees;
Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexuality May Soon be a Thing of the Past, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 31, 1999, at 3 (discussing the trend among employers
toward extending benefits to same sex partners even when not required by law). I would
like to thank my colleague Arthur Leonard for bringing this issue to my attention.
For purposes of measuring the impact of marriage on taxation, the excluded
spousal employee benefits and fringe benefits would. be a consistent enhancement of the
tax benefits of marriage. At an individual level, such tax benefits may be seen to
outweigh marriage penalties for particular couples.
15

See I.R.C. § 6013 (a), (d) (3) (1999).
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Internal Revenue Code's joint return system is further reflected in the
distinctions made between joint return filers and other taxpayers in the
progressive tax rate tables, the standard deduction, the rules for
utilization of personal exemptions, the taxation of social security
benefits and certain transfers of property, as well as in a growing array
of credits and deductions that utilize income-based phaseouts,
including, notably, the earned income tax credit ["EITC,,].16
Once a couple is married, husband and wife cannot escape the
marriage penalty and marriage bonus effects of the joint return
system. 17 While married couples are not literally obligated by the
Internal Revenue Code to file a joint return, the only alternative
available to them, unless they are divorced or legally separated, is the
filing status of "married individuals filing separate returns.,,18
Married persons are not permitted to use either of the two filing
statuses applicable to unmarried people - the "unmarried individual"
status and the "head of household" status· assigned to unmarried
taxpayers with dependents in the home. 19
The married separate filing status is generally a more onerous
version of the joint return status on which it is based. Its primary
advantage to taxpayers is that it permits couples to avoid the joint and

16 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ I (rate tables); 63 (standard deduction); 151 (a)
(personal exemptions); 86 (partial exclusion of old age benefits); 21 (child care credit); 24
(child credit); 25A (education credits); 267 (losses, etc. in transactions between related
taxpayers); 1041" (transfer of property incident to divorce); I.R.C. § 32 (1999) (earned
income tax credit). See also, CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 15-26; Hearing on the
Marriage Penalty Before the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 105th Congo (1998)
(statement of David Lifson, Vice Chair, Tax Executive Comm., American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants).

17 The words "husband and wife" are used advisedly here. The Internal
Revenue Service recognizes only formal, legally valid male-female marriages for tax
purposes. See, e.g., Ronnie Cohen & Susan B. Morris, Tax Issues from 'Father Knows
Best'to 'Heather Has Two Mommies " 84 TAX NOTES 1309 (1999).
18 Divorced or legally separated spouses are not considered married. See
I.R.C. § 7703 (1999).
19 I.R.C. § I (a)-(d) (1999) specifies the rate tables applicable to each of the
four filing statuses. The CPI adjusted version of these tables applicable for 1999 can be
found infra note 42. For the definition of head of household see I.R.C. § 2 (b); for marital
status rules see I.R.C. §§ 2(b)(2), (c), & 7703 (1999).
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several liability imposed by the joint return?O The tax brackets for
married persons filing separately are half as wide as those for joint
return filers,21 the standard deduction for this status is also half the
amount allowed a married couple,22 and married couples who file
separately are disqualified from using many tax deductions and
credits, including the child and dependent care credit. 23 In terms of
marriage penalties and bonuses, separate filing by a married couple
would typically tum a marriage bonus into a marriage penalty or
simply increase the marriage penalty that would otherwise be imposed
by the joint return. 24 No more than five percent of married couples

20 For married couples in the common law jurisdictions, the choice of the
married filing separately status can insulate a spouse from the joint and several liability
for tax on the other partner's income that attaches when a joint return is filed. See I.R.C.
§ 6013(d)(3) (1999). For married couples who are residents of community property law
states, filing separate returns does not eliminate tax liability for shared marital income. A
statement declaring the intention to end the marital community is required as well. See
I.R.C. § 66 (1999); Richard C.E. Beck, Joint Return Liability and Poe v. Seaborn Should
Both Be Repealed, 49 TAX NOTES 457, 464-66 (1990). The primary advantage of the
married filing separate returns status for the Treasury may be that it provides a basis for
distinguishing the joint return system of the federal income tax from the joint return
system of the Wisconsin income tax that the U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional in
Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206 (1931). See Ann F. Thomas,
Taxing Women's Lives: Taxation and the Economic Identity of Married Women (Nov.
1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).

21 Compare I.R.C.

§ I(a) and (d)(1999).

22 The standard deduction specified in the Internal Revenue Code for joint
return filers is $5,000; it is $2,500 for married filing separately. Again unmarried
individual filers are assigned yet another amount - $3,000. These are the statutory
values, unadjusted for the Consumer Price Index [hereinafter CPI]. Compare I.R.C. §§
63 (c) (2) (A), (C) and (D) (\999).

23 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 21 (\ 999); see also Christian, supra note 14 for a fuller
description of the penalty effects of the choice of the married filing separately tax status
and the impact of this status on women.

24 For example, the ceiling of the bottom bracket of 15% is $36,900 for joint
returns; $18,450 for married filing separately; $22,100 for unmarried. (These are the
statutory amounts provided in I.R.C. § 1 (\999), without adjustment for inflation). See
infra note 42 (containing the 1999 tax rate tables with CPI adjustment.) A sole earner
spouse with taxable income of $40,000 in the married filing separately status, would have
a tax of $8,802. By filing a joint return, the tax on the same $40,000 would be reduced to
$6,403. An unmarried individual with $40,000 of taxable income would owe $8,327.
Here the joint filer has a marriage bonus, as compared to the unmarried sole earner, and
the married separate filer who pays the most tax of all three, has a marriage penalty
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made use of the married separate filing status. Professor Amy
Christian estimates that in 1993, some 95 percent of married couples
filed joint returns. 25
The joint return system is then the necessary focus if the
taxation of married couples is to be understood. The five key
elements of the statutory framework of the joint return system are
described below: 1) the standard deduction; 2) the personal
exemptions; 3) the income tax rate tables; 4) the earned income tax
credit; and 5) phaseouts.
1. The Standard Deduction
The standard deduction, which is an important factor in
determining tax liability for all individuals, is also an important part of
the joint return system. Its design and its function in the taxation of
couples illustrate how distinctions based on joint return filing status
create marriage penalty and marriage bonus effects.
After
determining adjusted gross income [AGI], taxpayers are permitted
certain deductions in arriving at taxable income, the amount that will
be the basis for computing their personal tax liability. In addition to
personal exemptions, taxpayers generally may choose to claim either
the permitted itemized deductions or the standard deduction?6 Some
70 percent of tax returns use the standard deduction. 27
In 1999, the standard deduction for married couples filing a
joint return is $7,200 and the standard deduction for unmarried
individuals is $4,300. 28 An unmarried wage earner might view the
instead. A dual earner.couple with $20,000 of income a piece would have the same total
tax on a joint return or filing separately ($3,201.50 times 2 or $6,403). If they were
allowed to file as unmarried individuals, their tax burden would be only $3,000 each or
$6,000 total. Their marriage penalty is not increased or reduced by separate filing after
marriage. But any division of income between the two spouses other than an equal split
tends to increase tax unless there is an unusual matching of spousal income and, for
example, medical expenses that become deductible when the absolute dollar amount of
the 7.5% floor diminishes by reference to the lower income of one spouse. See, I.R.e. §
213 (1999).
25

26
27

See Christian, supra note 14.
See I.R.e. §§ 1,62,63 (1999).
SEE

CBO

STUDY,

supra note 4, at 15.

28 I.R.e. section 63(c)(2) provides for standard deductions of $5,000 and
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$2,900 difference between his smaller deduction and the larger
deduction given to married couples as a tax benefit that they have and
he would like to get.29 This potential tax reduction would indeed
become real for him, if he got married and the wife with whom he
filed a joint return had no income of her own. As husband and wife,
the sole earner and his spouse would enjoy, in effect, a tax bonus.
The amount of the tax bonus would depend on his marginal tax
bracket. If as an unmarried filer, this $2,900 of income would have
been subject to tax at the rate of 28 percent, marriage has saved him
$812 in tax, in effect a marriage tax bonus.
If the new wife has income of her own, however, and it
exceeds $2,900, the marriage bonus would tum into a marriage
penalty.30 In their unmarried state, the taxpayer and his partner are
each permitted a standard deduction of $4,300. If they each have at
least that much income, they are able to use their combined standard
deductions to exclude a total of $8,600 from taxation. Marriage
reduces the combined standard deductions of the dual income couple
from $8,600 to $7,200, a difference of $1,400. Hence marriage
imposes tax on $1,400 more of their income than was taxed before. If
this previously untaxed $1,400 is placed in the 28 percent bracket by
their joint return, the dual income couple will have a marriage tax
penalty of $392. The term marriage penalty thus refers to increases in
tax that occur when a couple changes from filing as two unmarried
taxpayers to filing a joint return. This example and the one in the
$3,000, respectively, for joint filers and unmarried individuals but allows adjustments for
CPI which have brought the joint filer and unmarried individual standard deductions for
1999 to the levels stated in the text. I.R.C. section 63(c)(2) tracks all four filing statuses
of section I, providing a different standard deduction for unmarried persons who are
heads of household ($4,400 in the statute and $6,350 with the CP1 adjustment) and a
fourth one for marriea persons fiI ing separate returns ($2,500 in the statute and $ 3,600
with the CPI). See Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-52 IRB 18, for the 1999 amounts with CPI
adjustments.
29 A comparison of the unmarried individual standard deduction of $3.000
with the standard deduction of $2,500 allowed a married person filing separately shows
that the unmarried individual status has the advantage if a joint return is not filed by the
married taxpayer. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

30 They have neither penalty nor bonus if the wife has an individual income
equal to $2,900. These examples assume that there is $2,900 of additional income to deal
with after giving effect to any applicable personal exemptions for the wife.
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preceding paragraph are typical as well as illustrative. Sole income
couples experience marriage bonuses and dual income couples with
relatively equal incomes tend to incur marriage penalties. 3 )
The penalties and bonuses do not occur because the sole
earner and dual earner married couples filing joint returns are
distinguished from each other in any way. The same standard
deduction is allowed to all joint return filers; no distinction is made
between married couples in that sense. If in one couple, one spouse
earns $50,000 and the other spouse has no income at all, the joint
return will treat this couple as having adjusted gross income of
$50,000, just as it will treat a married couple in which each spouse
earns $25,000 as having adjusted gross income of $50,000. The joint
return requires husband and wife to aggregate their incomes and only
takes notice of the sum and not the parts. Assuming their personal
exemptions are the same, these two couples will have equal taxable
incomes as well, after the joint filers' standard deduction is applied.
That in one couple there is only one earner and there are two earners
in the other couple is inconsequential to the joint return computations
and the determination of the applicable standard deduction. Indeed,
this homogeneity of tax outcomes for married couples with different
income configurations but the same aggregate income is the essence
of the joint return. But the existence of individual incomes within the
marriage, the factor that the joint return ignores, is the essence of the
marriage penalty/marriage bonus phenomenon.
Looking again at the standard deduction examples, it can be
seen that the penalties and bonuses discussed above were the result of
the proportional relationship between the amount of the standard
deduction for joint filers and the amount of the standard deduCtion for
unmarried individuals. The relationship between the two can be most
simply described as being more-than-one, but less-than-two.
For the sole earner couple, it is the "more-than-one" part of
the relationship that causes the marriage bonus when the joint return
status can be used. In the unmarried status, the couple gets to use one
standard deduction for an unmarried individual and no more. The sole
earner claims and uses his "one" to offset some of his income. But
3)

See. e.g., CBO

STUDY,

supra note 4, at tbl2.
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the standard deduction of the non-earner partner (assuming she has no
other income) cannot be used by either of them. She has no income to
reduce and she cannot transfer her unused deduction to him except by
marriage. The married joint filers' standard deduction at present is
1.67 times greater than that allowed an unmarried individual. 32
Marriage allows the sole earner to use about 67 percent of what would
have been the non-earner's individual standard deduction.
For the dual earner couple, it is the "Iess-than-two" part of the
relationship between the standard deductions for the joint return. and
the unmarried individual that causes the penalty. The married
couple's deduction is larger than the standard deduction allowed to
one unmarried individual, but it is smaller than the two deductions
that the dual earners could claim as two unmarried individuals with
equal incomes. To dual earners the joint filers' deduction represents
only about 84 percent of the total of the two deductions that they
could claim if unmarried. 33 · The more-than-one, less-than-two
relationship between filing statuses means that marriage adds to the
sole earner couple's useable tax deductions and takes away a portion
of the deductions that dual earner couples would be able to use if they
were filing as unmarried individuals.
2. Personal Exemptions
In addition to the standard deduction, the Internal Revenue
Code generally allows taxpayers to claim a personal exemption that
also reduces the amount of income subject to tax. At present the
amount of the personal exemption, after giving effect for inflation
adjustments, is $2,750. 34 The amount of the personal exemption does
not vary with marital status, but marriag'e can. change its value
significantly. The impact of the joint return system on personal
exemptions is seen in the utilization rules that vary with marital status.
Further, marital status also has an impact on the phaseout of the
32 See I.R.C. § 63 (1999). The ratio is constant between the
amounts (5,000/3,000) and the CPI adjusted amounts (7,200/4,300).

statut~ry

33 See I.R.C. § 63 (1999). Two unmarried individual standard deductions
would add up to $8,600 and the joint return deduction is $7,200 (7,200/8,600 = .8372).
34 See Rev. Proc. 98-61; I.R.C.

§ 151 (1999).
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personal exemption that is set at different income levels for joint
return filers and those in the unmarried filing statuses.
Each tax return filer is permitted one personal exemption for
himself or herself and additional personal exemptions for qualifying
dependents, including children. Hence an unmarried individual with
no dependents is allowed one personal exemption. Each partner in a
dual earner couple is allowed one personal exemption when filing in
the unmarried status. Filing a joint return does not alter their
entitlement to the same two personal exemptions. Both joint filers are
individuals "computing taxable income," which is the statutory basis
for the taxpayer's claim to the personal exemption. 35 Thus for the
dual earner couple, marriage appears to impose no penalties on the
utilization of their personal exemptions.
For a sole earner couple, the joint return confers a marriage
bonus in the form of an extra personal exemption. In an unmarried
sole earner couple, the earner uses his own personal exemption in the
normal course; the non-earner's personal exemption goes unused
because she has no income. But the joint return aggregation concept
allows the married non-earner to transfer her personal exemption to
the marital unit, as she did with a portion of her individual standard
deduction. Marriage converts the valueless personal exemption of the
non-earner into an additional personal exemption that can be applied
to reduce the sole earner's taxable income. The value of the
transferred personal exemption will be measured by the marginal rate
at which this $2,750 would have been taxed to the sole earner in his
unmarried filing status. From this point of view, the marital status
differential for the utilization of personal exemptions appears to have
only a positive effect, all marriage bonus. The relationship between
the joint return status and the unmarried individual status here is that
more than one and up to two individual personal exemptions may be
used in the joint return, depending on whether the aggregate income
of the couple can absorb both exemptions.
But another way to think about this marriage bonus is that it is
a tax incentive or tax subsidy to the married couple to continue to
have one spouse out earning in the labor force and the other at home,

35 See I.R.C. § 151 (a) (1999); see also I.R.C. § 6013 (a) (1999).

1999]

APRlMER

19

engaged in home production, which is a valuable but untaxed
economic activity.36 Looked at from this point of view, the marriage
bonus that the transfer of the non-earner's personal exemption creates
contains in it a tax disincentive to enter or remain in paid
employment. The issue that the transfer of the standard deduction and
the personal exemption from the non-earner to the marital unit poses
is the apparent cost of recapturing these tax benefits.
If the non-earner begins to work, her income will either be
seen as being fully subject to tax without the benefit of these
reductions, or as recapturing these valuable income exclusions that her
husband has been using. Whichever way it is viewed, the highest
marginal tax rate applicable to the first earner's income, the rate at
which his last dollar of income is taxed, would seem to apply to the
first dollar of income that the former non-earner now produces. There
is considerable concern about the impact of this tax disincentive on
married women, who are still much more likely to be the non-earner
spouse in the marriage, engaged for longer or shorter periods in
fulltime homemaking or child rearing?7 The transfer of her tax
benefits to her husband through the joint return, in effect, imposes a
higher effective tax rate on all of her income when she re-enters paid
employment. 38
36 Home production is a term that economists use to' describe the value of
goods and services created within the household for consumption by members of the
household. Tax theory generally describes this economic income as imputed income
although it may be barter to the extent that there is an exchange between household
members. By long tradition it is not taxed in the federal income tax. For a thorough
discussion of the exclusion from income of the value of housework, see Nancy Staudt,
Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L. J. 1571 (1996) (arguing that the productive and political
value of women 's housework should be taxed in order to make its value more visible).
37 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at pp. xv, xiv; see also discussion of
secondary worker issue and sources, infra note 39.

38 During the 1990s, both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands adopted
individual taxation for husbands and wives but included mechanisms that permit the
transfer of personal exemptions between the spouses. The Netherlands adopted its new
system as part of an effort to remove tax disincentives to market employment for married
women. At the time, the labor force participation of married Dutch women was reported
to be the lowest in Northern Europe. The Netherlands now allows the transfer of personal
tax exemptions within the common household, defined as a registered adult household of
more than 18 months duration. See HETTIE A. POTT-BuTER, FACTS AND FAIRY TALES
ABOUT FEMALE LABOR, FAMILY AND FERTILITY 1, 25-34, 256 (1993); COMPARATIVE
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For example, if she could earn $10,000, with her $2,750
personal exemption and the $2,900 of standard deduction that she
appeared to bring to the marriage, these earnings would result in a
taxable income of $4,350. If the aggregated taxable income of this
married couple put them into the 28 percent bracket on the joint
return, her income would bear a tax of $1,218. The simpler and
probably more conventional view of her new $10,000 income is that it
comes in on top of her husband's income, and is fully subject to tax at
the applicable marginal rate at that level. Assuming that this
aggregation of incomes does not push the new $10,000 into a higher
bracket, it would bear a tax of 28 percent or $2,800. By contrast, if
she were unmarried and could use her full standard deduction of
$4,300 as well as her personal exemption and the unmarried
individual rates, her tax would be only $443. This is an example of
what is commonly called the secondary earner or stacking problem.
Both marriage bonus and marriage penalty outcomes can be
seen in the phaseout formula applicable to personal exemptions since
1988. 39 The Internal Revenue Code now limits many credits,
deductions and exclusions through the application of means tested
phaseout rules. Phaseouts limit the use' of these tax benefits to
particular income categories but also have the result of raising the
INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 274 (Hugh J. AuIt ed., 1997). In the United
Kingdom, husband and wife each receive a personal exemption, which is not transferable,
and a married couple's exemption, which can be shifted. The U.K. Treasury announced
its new tax system of transferable allowances as a program that would enable wives to
stay out of the labor market without loosing tax benefits. The new U.K. system ended the
longstanding rule that made the husband the taxpayer for the marital unit. See
CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, GREEN PAPER: THE REFORM OF PERSONAL TAXATION
chap. 2 (March 1986); INLAND REVENUE, IR 80 INCOME TAX AND MARRIED COUPLES
(Nov. 1997) (instruction for taxpayers) (on file with author). In 1997, press reports
described the anticipated announcement by the government of John Major of a plan to
extend the transferability of allowances to include the transfer of the personal exemption
from a non-earner spouse to the earner spouse as a "radical plan by the Conservatives"
and a tax reform "encouraging couples to marry and also giving a strong fiscal incentive
for married women to stay home and look after their children." Robert Preston, Tories
Plan Radical Tax Break: Married Women WOllid Get Incentive to Stay at Home,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), April 2, 1997, at § I, p.1.
~
.
See I.R.C. § 151 (d) (3) (1999) and STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, GENERAL Ex PLANA TION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, JCS-10-87, at 23
(1987). [Hereinafter 1986 JOINT COMM. GENERAL EXPLANATION)'
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effective tax rates for upper income taxpayers without altering the
stated rates in the tax tables. 40
In the current year, the phaseout of the personal exemption·
begins at $126,600 for an unmarried individual filer and is completed
at $249,100. Following the pattern of more-than-one, but less-thantwo, the phaseout for joint return filers starts at $189,950 of
aggregated adjusted gross income and the exemptions are eliminated
entirely at $312,450. In other words, the joint return phaseout begins
at 1.5 times the income at which the unmarried individual starts to
reduce her personal exemptions. For a sole earner couple this
represents a marriage bonus. But it also creates a marriage penalty for
dual earners. The partners in an unmarried equal earner couple with a
combined income of $312,450 - the point at which the personal
exemption has been reduced to zero for the joint return - would stiII
have 75 percent of their personal exemptions. 41 Indeed, for dual
income married couples, if the income of each of the spouses is in the
range of $95,000 to $126,600, the joint return will result in the
reduction of personal exemptions that would have remained intact if
the spouses had been able to file as two unmarried individuals.
3. The Rate Tables
When the progressive tax rate tables of the federal income tax
are added to the picture, the marriage penalty and marriage bonus
effects for dual income and sole income couples become more
pronounced. Current law encompasses five stated marginal tax rates:
15 percent, 28 percent, 31 percent, 36 percent and 39.6 percent. Tax
tables ordaining the income levels, or brackets, at which these
marginal rates apply are assigned to each of the filing statuses. The

40 See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING
TO INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVE MARGINAL RATES, JCB-3-98, at 93- 102 (1998) [hereinafter
1998 EFFECTIVE MARGINAL RATE STUDY)'
41 See Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-52 IRB 18, § 3.08, for the personal exemption
phaseouts for 1999. The unmarried equal earner couple with $156,225 each of adjusted
gross income will have reduced their two personal exemptions by about 24%. The
phasesout occurs at the rate of 2% per $2,500 in excess of adjusted gross income of
$156,225 over the threshold of $126,600 applicable to them. See I.R.C. § 151(d)(I)
(1999).
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brackets are different for the different filing statuses, except at the top
rate.
The marginal tax brackets for joint return filers are more
generous than those assigned to other taxpayers. The more-than-one,
less-than-two relationship between the joint return and the unmarried
individual filing statuses seen in the standard deduction is largely
maintained. Except in the top two rates when they converge, the
breakpoints for the joint return brackets are set at income levels that
are higher than, but not twice as high as those for unmarried
individuals.42 The two examples presented below demonstrate how
42 Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code provides different rate tables for
each of the four income tax filing statuses. Section 1(f) requires an annual cost of living
adjustment. I.R.C. § 1 (1999). Rev. Proc. 98- 61, 1998-52 IRB 18, announced the
adjustments and tables for 1999. They are as follows:
TABLE 1- § 1 (a). MARRIED INDIVIDUALS FILING JOINT RETURNS
AND SURVIVING SPOUSES
If taxable income is:
The tax is:
Not over $43,050
15% of the taxable income
Over $43,050
$6,457.50 plus 28% of
but not over $104,050
the excess over $43,050
Over $104,050
$23,537.50 plus 31 % of
but not over $158,550
the excess over $104,050
Over $158,550
$40,432.50 plus 36% of
but not over $283,150
the excess over $158,550
$85,288.50 plus 39.6% of
Over $283,150
the excess over $283,150
TABLE 2 - § l(b). HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS
If Taxable Income Is:
The Tax Is:
Not Over $34,550
15% of the taxable income
. $5,182.50 plus 28% of
Over $34,550
but not over $89,150
the excess over $34,550
$20,470.50 plus 31 % of
Over $89,150
but not over $144,400
the excess over $89,150
Over $144,400
$37,598 plus 36% of
but not over $283,150
the excess over $144.400
Over $283.150
$87,548 plus 39.6% of
the excess over $283,150
TABLE 3 - § l(c). UNMARRIED INDIVIDUALS (OTHER THAN
SURVIVING SPOUSES AND HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS)
If Taxable Income Is:
The Tax Is:
Not Over $25,750
15% of the taxable income
Over $25,750
$3,862.50 plus 28% of
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the joint return system is expressed in the present structure of the tax
rate tables.
Married couples filing a joint return are assigned a rate
schedule that allows the first $43,050 of their aggregated taxable
income to. be taxed at the 15 percent rate. But for unmarried
individuals, the 15 percent bracket ends at $25,750 and the 28 percent
bracket begins at $25,751. This means that for the sole earner,
marriage and the joint return will pull an additional $17,300 out of the
28 percent bracket and into the 15 percent bracket. For a sole earner
with taxable income of $50,000, marriage will reduce income tax
liability from $10,653 to $8,404 - a marriage bonus of $2,249. 43
On the other hand, a dual earner couple with $25,000 each of
taxable income finds that marriage adds $903.50 to their tax burdens.
Computed using the tax brackets for unmarried individuals, each
partner would owe tax of $3,750. Adding their tax bills together
would show a total liability of $7,500 for the couple. But, if taxed on
the basis of a joint return, like the sole earner couple above, they
but not over $62,450
Over $62,450
but not over $130,250
Over $130,250
but not over $283,150
Over $283,150
TABLE 4 - § I(d).

the excess over $25,750
$14,138.50 plus 31% of
the excess over $62,450
$35,156.50 plus 36% of
the excess over $130,250
$90,200.50 plus 39.6% of
the excess over $283,150
MARRIED INDIVIDUALS FILING SEPERA TE

RETURNS
If Taxable Income Is:
Not Over $21,525
Over $21,525
But not over $52,025
Over $52,025
But not over $79,275
Over $79,275
But not over $141,575
Over $141,575

The Tax Is:
15% of the taxable income
$3,228.75 plus 28% of
the excess over $21,525
$11,768.75 plus 31% of
the excess over $52,025
$20,216.25 plus 36% of
the excess over $79,275
$42,644.25 plus 39.6% of
the excess over $141,575
43 Applying the table 3 rate schedule for unmarried individuals, the tax due
on taxable income of $50,000 would be $3,863 + 28% (50,000-25,750) or $10,653.
Applying the table I rate schedule for joint return filers, the tax due on $50,000 would be
$6,458 + 28% (50,000- 43,050), or $8,404. See supra note 42.
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would instead owe $8,404. 44 Filing as unmarried taxpayers would
keep the entire income of each partner within the 15 percent bracket.
The joint return, which requires them to aggregate their incomes,
pushes $6,950 of income into the 28 percent bracket.
The breakpoints for the four bottom tax rates are consistently
higher for joint return filers than for unmarrieds, allowing more of the
aggregated income of married taxpayers to be taxed at lower rates.
These wider brackets - the more-than-one factor - reduce tax for
sole earner couples. But the penalty effects of the less-than-two factor
are also seen. Although joint return brackets are wider than those for
unmarried individuals they are still not capacious enough to contain
twice the income allowed to unmarried individuals in each marginal
bracket.
The 15 percent bracket ends at $25,750 for unmarrieds and at
$43,050 for joint filers, placing 1.67 times more income into this
bracket for married couples than for unmarried individuals. Similarly,
the ceiling of the 28 percent bracket for unmarried individuals is
$62,450, while joint filers do not reach the top of their 28 percent
bracket until taxable income exceeds $104,050. Again, married joint
filers are allowed 1.67 times more income before they are exposed to
the next (higher) level of tax rates. 45 These ratios are similar to the
ratio between the standard deduction for joint return filers and the
standard deduction for unmarried individuals.
For the 31 percent rate, the breakpoint for the joint return is
sti II higher but the top of the bracket is only 1.217 times that of the 31
percent bracket ceiling for unmarrieds. At this point the bonus effect
of the rate tables begins to shrink and the penalty effect becomes more
dominant. This shift is even more apparent in the 36 percent bracket,
which begins at $130,250 for unmarried individuals and at $158,550
for joint filers. In effect, the marginal differences between the
brackets for joint returns and unmarried individuals ends at $158,551
of taxable income, which both tax rate schedules place in the 36
percent bracket. In all filing statuses, except married filing separately,
the 39.6 percent rate starts applying at the same amount taxable
44
45

See supra note 42.
Compare tbl. 1 and tbl. 3, supra note 42.
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income - above $283,150 . For the married separate til ing status, the
39.6 percent rate starts at $141,575, half the joint return breakpoint.46
Only penalty effects are seen in the top bracket. If two
unmarried individuals each had $283,150 of taxable income, their
individual tax burdens would be $90,200.50, .or $180,401 combined.
If they filed a joint return and aggregated their incomes as required,
their joint tax would be $197,416 a marriage penalty of $17,416 for
each year in which they were married and lucky enough to have this
income. A sole earner with the same $566,300 of taxable income who
filed as an unmarried individual would owe a total of $202,328,
representing $90,201 on the first $283,150 and $112,127 on the
second $283,150. If she and her spouse filed a joint return, the tax for
this sole earner couple would be only $197,416,· but the $4,912
marriage bonus arises entirely in the taxation of the income below the
$283,150 mark. The second $283,150 bears a tax of $112,127 in the
joint return as it would in the unmarried individual return. 47
The $17,000 that the dual earner couple with individual
taxable incomes of $283,150 pays in the example above for the
privilege of being married is a large amount of money by any
standard. However, this is not the most onerous marriage penalty that
the joint return system creates. If the two high-income spouses share
this additional tax burden, it would amount to 3 percent of taxable
income for each. Although the incidence of this tax may be hard to
defend, the federal income tax has imposed even greater tax burdens
on very large incomes within the past fifteen years. But marriage
penalties that can grow to 8 to 10 percent of adjusted gross income for
minimum wage earners simply seem unconscionable. 48
4. The Earned Income Tax Credit
Unusually severe marriage penalties can occur in connection
with the earned income tax credit. The earned income tax credit is a
refundabl~ tax credit "intended to provide tax relief to low-income
working individuals with child~en and t6 improve incentives to
46
47

48

Compare tbls., supra note 42.
.

Compare tbl. 1 and tbl. 3, supra note 42.
.

CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 17-23.
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work.,,49
In large measure the tax relief that it provides is
compensation for social security and other flat rate payroll taxes
collected from the earnings of minimum wage workers; it applies at
income levels so low that regular federal income tax typically is not
incurred. But these refundable credits are also clearly social welfare
transfer payments to the working poor. 50 Nonetheless, earned income
credits should be considered in assessing income tax marriage
penalties and bonuses. Unlike most of the other social welfare
payment systems, this one is included in the Internal Revenue Code
and governed by the tax law's concepts of income. 51 In particular, the
explicit use of the joint return and the concept of unitary taxation of
married couples in the determination of earned income tax credits
make this regime very much a part of the joint return system.
Earned income credits can be very substantial. The maximum
credit payment of $3,816 is available to qualified working families
with earned incomes between $9,540 and $12,460 and two or more
children. At the bottom of this income range, receiving the full credit
would represent a 40 percent increase in disposable income. Working
parents with one qualified child in the home can also qualify for
credits. The maximum for the one child family is $2,312 and is
applicable when income is within the $6,800 to $12,460 range. The
credits begin to phase out for all working parents at incomes above
$12,460. The credits reach zero at the $30,580 income level for
families with two or more children and at $26,928 for the one child
unit. Childless adults with earned incomes in the range of $4,530 to
$5,670 can also qualify for up to $347 of credits which are phased out
completely at $10,200. 52
The income tests described above are applied to married
couples on a completely unitary basis. The aggregated incomes of the
married couple and the individual income of the unmarried person are
both tested against the same income, or perhaps need, standard to
determine eligibility for the EITC. The standard deduction, the tax
49 1986 JOINT COMM. GENERAL EXPLANATION, at 27.
See Anne L. Aistott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations
of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 533-544 (1995).
50

51

See CBO

STUDY,

supra note 4, at 17-23.

52 See Rev. Proc. 98-61.
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rate tables and most of the other credits require the married couple to
aggregate income but then moderate the impact of the unitary income
theory of married couples by adopting breakpoints that treat the
married couple as more-than-one unit, although generally less-thantwo units. The earned income tax credit (EITC) does not make use of
different income tests for taxpayers of different marital statuses. The
same income floors and phase-out ceilings are applied to all
taxpayers, married joint filers and unmarried individuals or heads of
household alike. For purposes of determining eligibility for and the
amount of the earned income credit, the married couple as a unit is
equated to the unmarried individual. 53
In the earned income credit, the relationship between the joint
return filing status and the unmarried individual filing status is not the
more - than - one, less - than - two relationship seen in the tax rates
and the standard deduction, but simply a one - to - one relationship.
Thus, a married couple with earned income of $11,000 and one child
is eligible for an earned income tax credit of $2,312. An unmarried
individual who also has $11,000 of earned income and one child is
entitled to the same refundable credit of $2,312. 54 The marriage
penalty potential in this structure is substantial.
If the unmarried mother with one child and minimum wage
level earnings of $11,000 mentioned above marries a father with his
own $11,000 of earned income and his own child, they will suffer a
marriage penalty equal to 12.8 percent of their newly aggregated
. adjusted gross income of $22,000. As unmarried parents, neither
owed any regular federal income tax (after giving effect to personal
exemptions and standard deductions) and each was entitled to an
earned income tax credit of $2,312. While they were unmarried, their
combined refundable earned income tax credits equaled $4,624.
Marriage reduced their total refundable credits to $1,807. They lost
$2,817 in earned income credits, about 60 percent of what they had. 55
53 Consistent with this unitary view, married persons are only eligible for the
earned income tax credit at all if they file joint returns. See I.R.C. § 32(d) (1999).
54 See I.R.C. § 32 (1999); see also Rev. Proc. 98-61, § 3.03.
55 This example was computed using the following assumptions. Each
unmarried parent had one child and qualified for the head of household standard
deduction ($6,350) as well as two personal exemptions, eliminating taxable income for
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In addition to the obvious marriage penalty potential here,
there is also a marriage bonus opportunity that arises from the positive
impact of increases in the number of children in the household on the
available credits. If a childless sole earner whose income is within the
maximum credit range marries the non·earner father of two children,
they can qualify for the $3,816 credit. 56 Indeed, as long as the
marriage does not result in aggregate income that exceeds the phase
out threshold, the marriage of a low-income parent and a low-income
non-parent may increase rather than decre~se credits. But the income
range within which credit increases could occur or within which credit
decreases could be avoided by dual earner couples is very small in
reality. The phaseout for the credit begins at $1.2,460 for families
with children and at $5,670 for childless households. The minimum
wage earning mother of two children who has an income of $9,540 is
entitled to the maximum credit. If she marries a man whose earned
income is· more than $2,920, she wiil start to lose her credits. 57
An even more drastic EITC marriage penalty was found to
exist in an example qeveloped by the Congressional Budget Office.
Computed on the basis of 1996 conditions, the CBO found that for a

the adjusted gross incomes of $11 ,000. At $22,000 of joint return adjusted gross income,
the married couple with two children would have taxable income of $1,800 and tax of
$270. They can offset the $270 with the new nonrefundable child credit of $500 per child.
I.R.C. § 24 (1999). While unmarried the two parents would each be entitled to an earned
income tax credit of $2,312 or $4,624 in total. Married, they would compute their credit
as follows: 3,816 - 21.06% (22,000 - 12,460) = $1,807. See I.R.C. § 32(a)(2) (1999);
Rev. Proc. 98-61. This example is based on an illustration in the CBO Study that found a
larger marriage penalty based on 1996 rates and without giving effect to the child credit
which was not enacted until 1997. See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 21. Tax analyst
Laura Wheaton runs the same example and finds a smaller penalty because she gives both
children to one spouse and does not use two head of household deductions. Laura
Wheaton, Low-Income Families and the Marriage Tax, 81, 125 (1998). It seems just as
valid to compare the married earned income credit couple to two unmarried heads of
household for two reasons. First, households and families composed of adults with
children from different marriages are common today. Second, if we assume that
taxpayers respond to tax incentives and disincentives as strong as those found with the
earned income credit, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that they would try to
optimize their tax outcomes by making use of existing tax benefits. Further, the CBO
report also used two heads of household in a number of its simulations.
56

.

See I.R.C. § 32 (1999); accord Wheaton, supra note 55, at 126.

57 See Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-521RB 18, § 3.03.
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couple in which each spouse had earned income of $11 ,610 and there
were four or more children, marriage caused a tax penalty of more
than 25 percent of income. Filing as an unmarried parent with two
children, each spouse would have had an earned income tax credit of
$3,556. If they married, their aggregate credit was reduced to $1,111.
The marriage penalty for this couple was $6,001, representing about
25.8 percent of joint adjusted gross income. 58 This couple's marriage
penalty would be slightly increased to about 26 percent if the rates and
limitations for 1999 were applied. 59
In essence, in the earned income tax credit, the joint return is
used to aggregate incomes of husband and wife and then tax the
aggregated sum under the same ability-to-pay tests applied to an
unmarried individual. This use of unmoderated unitary taxation of
married couples is reminiscent of the pre-1948 mandatory joint return
idea, which was repeatedly advanced as a general solution to .the
community property and income shifting controversies, but never
adopted in the federal income tax. 60
5. Phaseouts
Phaseouts are another source of income tax marriage penalties
and bonuses that are growing in number and importance even as
Congress is beginning to consider relief proposals. At an accelerating
pace since the 1986 tax reform, Congress has been enacting new
deductions and non-refundable tax credits for individuals.
A
58 CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 23. The CBO study also describes the
potential for a marriage bonus in the earned income tax credit, which could occur when a
low income non-parent forms a sole earner marriage with the parent of a qualifYing child.
[d. at 20.
59 Using 1999 rates and adjustments, there is no taxable income in either the
married or unmarried scenario. The only issue is the limitation on the earned income
credit. With adjusted gross income of $23,220, there would be $10,760 above the
$12,460 phaseout threshold amount. Applying the phaseout percentage of 21.06% to the
$10,760, and subtracting the product from the maximum credit of $3,816 produces an
earned income credit of $1 ,550, which is $6,082 less than the total credits the two parents
could have had as two unmarried heads of households. See I.R.C. § 32 (1999); see a/so
Rev. Proc. 98-61.

60 See infra notes 109-110 and accompanying discussion of mandatory joint

returns.
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substantial number of these provisions are limited in their application
to taxpayers within specified income ranges through the mechanism
of phaseouts based on adjusted gross income. By using income limits
and the phaseout mechanism, Congress has been able to enact new
and popular targeted tax cuts at lower revenue costs.
This
increasingly utilized technique allows not only programatic targeting
but also income class targeting. Arguably it increases progressivity
by excluding upper income taxpayers. Typical examples are seen in
the new education tax breaks and the child credit. Older and equally
problematic phaseout penalties are found in the exclusion for social
security old age benefits and the dependent care tax credit, applicable
to working parents. A recent congressional study confirms that
because of special deductions and phaseouts very few taxpayers can
determine their effective tax rate from the tax table's alone. 61
The new phaseouts have added visibility to the issue of
marriage penalties and bonuses. But some of the older phaseout
provisions continue to have a wide impact. 62 With few exceptions, the
phaseouts follow the familiar pattern of treating joint return filers as
more than one unmarried taxpayer but less than two. Generally, the
income ceiling for joint return filers is set at an amount that is greater
than but not twice the amount of income allowed an unmarried filer.
Hence phaseouts introduce both marriage penalties and marriage
bonuses.
The 105 th Congress in 1997 made two noteworthy additions to
the list of phaseouts. The first is the child tax credit. The child tax
credit awards a $500, non-refundable tax credit per child. The
phaseout for this credit begins at $110,000 of adjusted gross income
for joint return filers but at $75,000 for unmarried parents, creating
both a marriage bonus in the phaseout of $35,000 for sole earner
61

1998 EFFECTIVE MARGINAL RATE STUDY, supra note 40 at 93-95.

62 There are now some 60 different provisions in the Internal Revenue Code
that can contribute to marriage penalties and marriage bonuses. See Hearing on the
Marriage Penalty Before the House Cornrn, on Ways and Means, 105th Congo (1998)
(statement of David Lifson, Vice Chair, Tax Executive Comm., American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants [AICPA]). TheAICPA testimony noted that it had found
"at least 63 provisions in the Internal Revenue Code where tax liability depends on
whether a taxpayer is married or single." [d. In addition, the AICPA identified 18
different phaseout tests in 18 different provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. [d.
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couples and a marriage penalty of $40,000 for dual earner couples. 63 ·
The other newcomer that makes use of phaseouts based on marital
status is the deduction for interest on student loans. The phaseout for
this deduction begins at $40,000 for unmarried individuals and at
$60,000 for joint return filers. 64 Like the child credit phaseout, it
confers a marriage bonus on sole earner couples and a marriage
penalty on dual earner couples, following the pattern of a more
generous benefit for the joint return filers that is still less than twice
the allowance for unmarried individual filers.
Another important provision in the penalty/bonus arena is the
child care credit for working parents, which has long embodied
numerical limits and income tests based on unitary income. Both of
these features create marriage penalties. The child care credit sets
$10,000 as the income ceiling for the maximum credit of $1,440
applicable when the working parent or parents have two qualified
children. Although this maximum is not attainable by either married
or unmarried parents under present conditions, the $10,000 income
ceiling for it is also the beginning of the phasedown of the credit rate
from 30 percent to 20 percent.65 Like the earned income credit, the
income test for the child care credit is applied to married couples on
an unmodified unitary basis - the same income ceiling that is applied
to the unmarried individual is also applied to the joint return of the
two working parents. The marriage penalty created can be seen in the
example of the dual earner couple who each has $15,000 of income.
If unmarried, the child care credit rate applicable to each of them
would be 27 percent. If married, with $30,000 of aggregate income,
the credit rate would be reduced to 20 percent. 66 Further, the amount
of creditable child care expenditures is fixed by the statute and capped
at $4,800 for each taxpaying unit, whether married or unmarried. An
unmarried couple in which each partner has two children may be able
to qualify for twice the child care credit that they could receive if
63
64

See I.R.C. § 24(b )(2) (1999).
See I.R.C. § 221 (b )(2) (1999).

See I.R.C. § 21 (1999). See also Symposium: Panel III: Women. Child
Care and Tax Treatment, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 203, 204 (remarks of Ann F.
65

Thomas).
66

See I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (1999).
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married. 67
Marriage penalties and bonuses are also created by the
individual retirement account (IRA) provisions. Unlike the other
provisions of the tax law described in this section, the rules governing
eligibility for the tax benefits of IRAs can create substantially
different tax outcomes for married couples with the same aggregate
incomes. Recent amendments allow sole earner married couples to
create a homemaker's IRA and use tax deductible payments to fund it,
even when their joint return income exceeds the levels at which dual
earner married couples may be disqualified. 68 The income tax
differences that can result are substantial. But even more noticeable is
that two lower income earners, whose combined efforts are required to
bring them into the middle income range, lose the opportunity to use
tax deferrals to enhance their retirement income security when a sole
earner couple with more than twice the income continues to have such
tax benefits available to them.
For unmarried individuals, the basic version of the IRA allows
a deduction of up to $2,000 for contributions to retirement savings
accounts, provided the taxpayer is not an active participant in any
other qualified plan for the year. There are no income limits for the
IRA deduction unless the taxpayer is an active participant in another
qualified pension plan during the year. Contribution deductions for
unmarried individuals who are active participants in other plans begin
to phaseout at a modified adjusted gross income of $31,000. For a
married taxpayer who is also an active participant in a qualified plan,
the phaseout starts at $51,000 of joint income. 69 Hence two unmarried
workers who each earn $30,000 and are each included in a pension
plan at work, whether it is generous or stingy, may continue to claim a
deduction for whatever they can manage to put aside for retirement
67

See I.R.C. § 21 (1999).

68 See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; CBO STUDY, supra note 4,

at 25 (describing penalty and bonus effects of lRAs before the changes in law described
here).
69 See I.R.C. § 219(a), (b), & (g) (1999). A new joint return income test for
deductible contributions by one spouse when the other spouse is an active participant in
an employer pension plan was added in the Tax Relief Act of 1997. See Tax Relief Act
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 6005(a)( I )(A), III Stat. 788.
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savings, up to $2,000 each. But marriage will reduce their permitted
IRA deduction from $2,000 each to $200 each.70
On the other hand, marriage and the availability of the higher
income threshold for joint returns, will enable the sole earner of
$60,000 who also participates in her employer's pension plan to
qualify for a $200 IRA contribution deduction, providing there is no
other income. On the basis of marital status, the sole earner became
eligible for a deduction of $200 when she had had none as an
unmarried person. The dual earner couple whose aggregate income is
the same as the sole earner couple's is allowed two deductions of
$200 each, for a .total of $400. Marriage causes them to lose a total of
$3,600 in IRA contribution deductions. Until recently this result
seemed to justify ascribing a one couple, one pension goal to the IRA
retirement savings incentives.
However, since 1998, sole earner couples like this one have
been permitted to create a spousal IRA for the non-earner spouse and
make up to $2,000 in deductible contributions for the year to his
account. 71 Thus a married couple with $60,000 of aggregate income
can end up with IRA contribution deductions of $2,200 if it is a sole
earner couple, and $400 of deductions if it is a dual earner couple,
assuming all the earners are pension plan participants. Moreover, the
70 The phaseout formula reduces the contribution deduction by 10% for every
$1,000 that adjusted gross income exceeds the statutory amount. The reducing ratio is
described in the statute as the ratio of the excess of adjusted gross income over the
statutory amount for the year to $1 0,000 (going up to $20,000 for joint returns in the year
2007). The statute includes a schedule of increases for the beginning of the phaseout that
bring it up to $50,000 for unmarrieds and $80,000 for marrieds in the year 2007. See
I.R.C. § 219(g) (1999). The IRA deduction is particularly valuable because it is an
unreduced "above the line" adjustment to income. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(7) (1999).
71 See I.R.C. § 219(g)(7) (1999). Before 1997, the spousal IRA gave rise to
only $250 in contribution deductions. The amendments bringing it up to $2,000 were the
result of an effort to give homemakers their own pensions. Rep. Nancy R. Johnson (RCT) and Senators Kate Hutchison (R-TX) and Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD) introduced
identical bills on January 26, 1995, described in their official titles as an amendment "to
allow homemakers to get a full IRA deduction." The substance of these bills was
included 'in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, sec.
1427, § 219(c), lIO Stat. 1755,1802. Rep. Johnson described the impact of the bill as
enabling a non-working spouse to make deductible contributions "just as working spouses
do under current law." Johnson's bill was entitled the Homemaker Relief Act of 1995.
See H.R. 708, I04th Congo (1995). See also S. 287, I04th Congo (1995).
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full IRA deduction is available to the spouse of a sole-earner pensionplan participant at much higher income levels, up to joint return
income of $150,000. 72 It is unlikely but not impossible that the
pensions of the husband and wife who both earn $30,000 would
together match the pension benefits that the sole earner of $60,000
will receive. It is certain that the employer provided pensions of the
dual earners of $30,000 each will not produce anything like the level
of income security that the earner of $150,000 will have from her
pension. The spousal IRA contribution deduction creates a sizable
income tax marriage bonus for sole earner couples and the spousal
IRA itself creates a pension for the spouse engaged in home
production rather than market work, as it was intended to do. 73 These
outcomes are the result of the policy choice to recognize differences in
the income configurations of the sole earner couple and the dual
earner couple, a choice that that joint return system generally rejects.
Another noteworthy phaseout penalty has its impact on the
elderly. Much of the focus of the controversy is on the impact of
penalties and bonuses on the work force participation decisions of
married women. However, the marriage penalty has also long been
identified as a disincentive to marriage for the retired elderly who live
on fixed incomes. 74 A widow and widower each of whom has some
72 This is the newly adopted ceiling for individuals whose spouse is an active
participant and applies to dual earners as well when only one is a pension plan participant.
See I.R.C. §§ 219(c), (g)(7) (1999).
73 The Roth IRA, a retirement savings program that creates tax-free
retirement benefits but is funded by after tax contributions, went into effect starting in
1998. It also allows a spousal IRA for a non-earner spouse. Income ceilings do apply,
phasing out at $160,000 for joint return filers and $110,000 for unmarrieds. There is a
unitary income ceiling of $100,000 applicable to married couples and unmarried
individuals in determining eligibility for roll over of other lRAs into a Roth IRA. See
I.R.C. § 408A (1999); Treas. Reg. § 1.408A-3, 1.0408-4 (1999).
74 See, e.g., Meylinda Dovel Wilcox, Love and Money, Senior Style,
KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL FINANCE MAGAZINE, Oct. 1996, at 83 (reporting that "for many in
the social security set, matrimony is out, pragmatism is in" because marriage can mean
loss of spousal social security benefits and increased income taxes); Gail Levin
Richmond, Taxes and the Elderly: An Introdllction, 19 NOVA L. REv. 587 (1995). The
new exclusion of capital gains from the sale of the principle residence which was intended
to remove tax disincentives to the sale of what for many Americans represents the greater
part of their assets, contains a sizable marriage bonus and a widow's penalty. Joint return
filers can exclude up to $500,000 of gain but for unmarried individuals, including widows
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income in addition to their social security benefits may face a
marriage penalty peculiar to their part of life, in addition to the general
marriage penalties in the standard deduction and the tax rate tables.
The extent to which social security old age benefits are taxable in
current law depends upon the amount of income from other sources
that the taxpayer has. For married couples, individual incomes must
be aggregated and reported on a joint return in order to qualify for the
most beneficial outcome under the exclusion formula. The formula is
based on income tests that allow joint return filers more than an
unmarried individual is allowed but much less than twice as much.
The ratio is closer to 1.36.75

B. Measuring Penalties and Bonuses
These then are the mechanics of the taxation of married
couples and the tax law rules that give rise to the more prominent
76
marriage penalties and bonuses. The actual impact of marital status
on any particular couple is determined by the couple's individual
circumstances and which of a myriad of provisions could be
applicable to them in a given year. Individual examples therefore may
be illustrative of structural sources of penalties and bonuses but
cannot convey the magnitude of the issue very well. 77 Broader
and widowers who no longer qualify as surviving spouses, the exclusion is reduced by
half, to $250,000. See I.R.C. § \21 (\999).
75 See I.R.C. § 84(c) (\999). The base amount for married joint filers is
$34,000; for unmarried individuals it is $25,000.
76 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 25 (finding most significant sources of
bonuses and penalties for low incomes are standard deduction, non-earners personal
exemption and earned income credit; for high incomes, tax-brackets are described as the
primary source of bonuses and penalties).

77 The actual marriage penalty or marriage bonus to which any given couple
is subject depends upon which of the many provisions that now carry penalty and bonus
consequences will be applicable to them in the tax year in question. There is much
variation between individuals. One taxpayer may, for example, claim the child care credit
while another makes use of the social security old age benefit exclusion formula and a
third uses both, the child care credit also being applicable to expenses in connection with
the care of other dependents, including an elderly spouse or sibling in the household who
suffers from Altzheimer's. See I.R.C. § 2\(b)(l) (\999) (qualifying individual includes a
spouse or dependent who is "physically or mentally incapable of caring for himself'). Of
course, for any given couple, marriage penalties and marriage bonuses may change from
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statistical analysis and more generalized estimates such as those
reported in the 1997 Congressional Budget Office report are necessary
for an understanding of the economic and social impact of marriage
penalties and bonuses as well as the revenue implications of proposed
changes. 78 These simulations more clearly indicate the magnitude and
distribution of marriage penalties and bonuses, both of which vary
significantly across income classes and racial groups.79
From the point of view of the fisc, the joint return system is a
revenue loser. The latest estimates, which are for 1996, show total
marriage penalties of about $28.8 billion and marriage bonuses of
some $32.9 billion. 80 These numbers indicate that if the joint return
were repealed and all married couples were required .to file as if
unmarried, total federal income tax liability, and likely, revenue,
would go up by $4.1 billion. Average penalties and bonuses give
some indication of the substantial size of these shifts for the
individuals. Penalties averaged $1,380 and bonuses $1,300; some
20.9 million married couples paid penalties and 25.3 million received
year to year as the individual incomes change in absolute amount and relative to each
other and different choices are made about claiming the standard deduction or itemizing.

78 The key issues in measuring marriage penalties and bonuses are division
of earnings, income from investments and deductions and also the filing status that are
used in the unmarried comparison model. Accord Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the
Income Tax. 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339,381-401 (1994) (discussing choices to be made in
the design of a mandatory separate filing system). The primary measure ("basic
measure") in the CBO simulations assigned earnings to the earner, deductions to
associated income and investment income in proportion to earned income. The standard
deduction was used when it exceeded itemized deductions. In constructing the unmarried
taxpayer model for comparison to the joint return filer, the presence or absence of
children in the household can be significant because it may enable the parent to use the
head of household filing status and its more generous rate tables and standard deduction.
The CBO basic measure used head of household status for both partners when the
presence of two or children would make it applicable, producing larger penalties and
smaller bonuses than are seen when the unmarried individual status is the standard for
comparison. The earned income credit was also allowed to both where applicable. Both
choices seem reasonable if one of the goals is to understand existing tax incentives and
disincentives. See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 27-29, see also supra notes 6, 7, & 55.
79 See infra note 95 and accompanying text for disc.ussion of impact of race
on distribution of marriage penalties and bonuses. For a fuller discussion of this issue:
see Dorothy Brown. The Marriage Penalty/Bonus Debate: Legislative Issues in Black and
White, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 287 (1999).

80 CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at tbl.

4 (basic measure).
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bonuses. 81
The largest average penalty and bonus amounts were seen at
income levels above $100,000, not very surprising since the higher
marginal rates at that level would magnify the impact of deductions
gained or lost as a result of filing status. But the amounts are
themselves noteworthy. At this level, the average penalty was $2,640
and the average bonus was $2,970, representing 1.4 percent and 1.2
percent of adjusted gross income, respectively.82
In comparison, at the lowest end of the income scale, the
impact of penalties and bonuses is much greater although the average
dollar amounts are smaller. For joint returns with adjusted gross
income below $20,000 average penalties were $770 and bonuses
$680. But in this income range such amounts represent a more
significant portion of income. The average penalty for incomes below
$20,000 represented the loss of 7.6 percent of adjusted gross income.
The average bonus represented a gain to disposable income of 5
percent of adjusted gross income. From the earned income credit
example discussed above, it is easy to see how marriage penalties as
large as 8 percent and even larger could be created for very lowincome people. It is more difficult to find a distributive justice or
social policy goal that is served by such outcomes.
About 70 percent of joint returns for 1996 reported aggregate
adjusted gross income in the range of $20,000 to $100,000. In this
middle range, the picture of marriage penalties and bonuses is more
complex and a significant shift occurs at the $50,000 mark. 83 Joint
return filers with incomes between $20,000 and $50,000 received the
largest share of both penalties and bonuses measured by income class
in the study. This income group paid some 38.5 percent of the
penalties and other married couples in the same income range
received about 41 percent of the bonuses. 84 The number of couples
with bonuses predominated and their average bonus was $870, equal
to 2.6 percent of income. Marriage penalty couples in this income
81 Jd.
82 Jd. at tbl. 6.
83 Jd. at tbls. 5, 6.
84 Jd. at tbl. 6.
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category paid penalties that were substantially greater, $1,190 on
average, representing some 3.2 percent of income. 85 In the $50,000 to
$100,000 income category, the penalty couples outnumbered the
bonus couples by 1.8 million but the bonus couples received $2.4
billion more in bonuses than the penalty couples paid in penalties. 86
A verage bonuses jump to $1,880 at this income level and represent a
larger share of income - 2.8 percent - than they do for couples in
the $20,000 to $50,000 range. Penalties, which average $1,240 cost
about 1.7 percent of income. 87
Overall, almost 60 percent of bonuses are received by joint
returns with adjusted gross incomes above $50,000, an income group
that includes. only 44 percent of joint return filing couples. Almost 62
percent of the penalties are paid by this income group as well. The
dollar amount of average penalties and bonuses rises with income,
from bonuses of $680 at incomes below $20,000 to bonuses of $2,970
at levels above $100,000.
Penalties follow the same pattern:
averaging $770 at the bottom and $2,640 at the top. On the other
hand, penalties and bonuses become proportionately smaller as
income rises, indicating that couples with lower aggregate incomes
may be affected more profoundly in both directions than are couples
with higher incomes and larger dollar amounts of penalties and
bonuses. 88 One measure of the severity of the marriage penalty for
low-income families is that for those with incomes below $20,000,
marriage penalties averaged 7.6 percent of income while the average
penalty for couples with more than $100,000 of income was 1.4
percent of income. 89

C. Change and Context
The marriage penalties and bonuses described and quantified
above arise from many different provisions of the federal income tax

85 /d. at tbl. 6.
86 [d. at tbl. 6.
87

/d. at tbl. 6.

88 [d. at tbl. 32.
89

See Wheaton, supra note 55, at 125-26.
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statute. More fundamentally, they all arise from the joint return,
which treats the married couple as one taxpaying unit, disregarding
the income configuration within the marriage and looking at
aggregated income only. The unitary view of married couples is
adhered to more or less rigorously in specific provisions, more often
moderated by treating the married couple as being more-than-one
individual taxpaying unit but less-than-two. This approach to the
taxation of married cO\Jples, typified by the standard deduction,
simultaneously creates the potential for marriage bonuses and
marriage penalties. The one provision that looks within the joint
return to take individual income characteristics of spouses into
account in order create a marriage bonus, the individual retirement
account provisions, exacerbates its marriage penalties because it
applies a more stringent aggregation of incomes requirement to dual
earners.
When presented with the tax outcomes described here, many
people find income tax marriage penalties and marriage bonuses to be
unfair or distasteful or irrational, as the terminology of the discussion
suggests. One of the Republican Presidential candidates this year has
called marriage penalties "obscene," an assessment that no doubt
would have been shared by the feminist legal scholar whose path
breaking 1971 critique on this subject was entitled Sexism in the
Code. 90 Writing in a law journal a generation ago, Grace Blumberg
described the income tax law as perpetuating a pattern of work
disincentives for married women "inconsistent with the principle of
sexual equality enunciated in title VII" and arguing for the "social and
political desirability of neutral taxation for married women.'.9i But it
is necessary to go beyond the mechanics of the taxation of married
couples to understand fully the choices that current tax policy reflects.
An important part of this analysis lies in the realm of tax theory, in the
relationship between the aggregation of income idea of the joint return
and the progressivity of the income tax, a problem that is discussed in
90 See John McCain Presidential Campaign Website, (visited Nov. 7, 1999)
<http://www.mccain2000.com>; see also Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A
Comprehensive Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L.
REV. 49 (1971).
91
Blumberg, supra note 90, at 49, 95.
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the next section which also traces the historical development of the
joint return.
Another aspect of the fairness question that underlies the
discussion of marriage penalties and bonuses is that .increasing
numbers of married couples are paying what they have come to regard
as extra taxes. The profound changes in the labor force participation
rates of married women have very significantly altered the incidence
of marriage penalties and bonuses over the past 30 years. The
structural choices in the income tax law that produce different tax
outcomes on the basis of marital status have come to have a different
meaning for increasing numbers of. married women and their
husbands.
The extent to which increases in marriage penalties can be
attributed to the increased labor force participation of married women
was demonstrated in a 1996 study by Aim and Whittington described
in the eBO report. The study examined what the marriage penalty
and marriage bonus effects would have been for married couples in
1969 had current income tax law applied to their joint returns. Only
about 30 percent of married couples in 1969 would have been penalty
couples if present tax law had applied to them, while 64 percent
would have been marriage bonus couples. But this study found that
by 1996 the two groups were almost equal: some 47 percent paid
marriage penalties and some 48 percent received bonuses.92 The
proportion of penalty couples during this period increased by more
than 50 percent while the percentage of bonus couples declined to
about three quarters of its prior level.
The period during which this shift occurred saw massive
changes in the work force participation of married women. Almost 52
percent of working-age married couples in 1969 were sole earner
couples, however, by 1995 the percentage of sole earner joint returns
had diminished to less than 40 percent. During these two and one half
decades, the increase in dual earner couples with relatively equal
incomes has been even more dramatic. The 1969 data shows that in
only 17 percent of married couples did each spouse contribute at least
92 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at tbls. 16, 18 (reporting on the James Aim
& Leslie Whittington study, The Rise and Fall and Rise . .. of/he Marriage Tax, 49 NAT.

TAXJ. 571 (1996».
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one third of earnings, the measure of parity in incomes that is
associated with the gre~test incidence of marriage penalties today.93
But by 1996, some 33.9 percent of working age marriages were in this
category - almost a doubling over a twenty-six year period - and
some 90 percent of them were also marriage penalty couples. 94 The
conclusion is clear. Holding the tax law and its penalty and bonus
producing provisions constant, a comparison of the married couples of
1996 with the married couples of 1969 demonstrates that it is the entry
of married women into paid employ'ment that created the conditions in
which penalty and bonus effects are felt. The decline of the sole
earner marriage has resulted in the growth of marriage penalties.
Significant as these trends in the paid employment and
earnings of married women are, they do not represent the patterns
seen in all groups over the past _thirty years. Married AfricanAmerican women were already _in the labor force in greater
proportions than were White women in 1969 and hence were more
likely to have been in marriage penalty couples even then. 95 Today,
married Black women are still more likely to be in a dual earner
marriage than a White woman although the gap has narrowed
substantially since the middle of the century. But there are other
differences as well. A higher proportion of African-American wives
earn at least half as much as their husbands do. Professor Dorothy
Brown attributes these different patterns of marriage and employment
to a number of factors, including the smaller proportion of AfricanAmerican men in the highest salary quartiles. Whatever the reasons,
the effect on marriage bonuses and penalties is rather direct. With
fewer sole earners among black couples eligible to file joint returns,
disproportionately fewer marriage bonuses are seen and more
penalties paid. 96
Fairness is-one of the criteria by which a tax system is judged.
93

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

94
SuCBO STUDY, supra note 4, at tbls. 16, 18 compare supra note 9.
95 See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN tbl. 2.1 (1990) (showing a 50% labor force participation
rate for married women of Color in 1970 and a 38.5% rate for married White women in
the same census).
96
See Brown, supra note 79.
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Fairness in taxation is generally understood to mean that taxpayers
with equal ability to pay should pay equal amounts of tax. 97 This is a
rule of practical politics as much as it is a tenant of moral philosophy.
Taxes that are perceived as being unfair can only be extracted with
great effort and at great cost. Taxes are only collectible when they are
accepted as being reasonably, although perhaps not perfectly,
equitable. Little inequities should be expected and generally will be
ignored. Larger inequities are more difficult to ignore, even when
they may not be purposeful. When many taxpayers are subjected to
outcomes that they view as unfair, the integrity of the entire tax
system may be in question. Tax theorist Michael Graetz has
concluded that marriage penalties are a particular threat to the income
tax. He finds that "the American public rightly loses respect for the
law" when it is seen to so widely require couples "to pay higher taxes
solely because they have married.,,98 This observation, and indeed the
current discussion of marriage penalties, may suggest that ideas about
the standards for measuring fairness in the taxation of married couples
are changing in the United States.

D. Development of the Joint Return System
The very discussion of marriage penalties and bonuses
proceeds from a premise that is antithetical to the joint return - the
idea that fairness in taxation requires the recognition of the individual
income characteristics of husband and wife. The joint return of today
is the instrument of quite a different vision of tax equity - the goal of
equal taxation of married couples with equal incomes. It came into
the income tax in 1948 and its development since then has been
surprisingly haphazard for an issue of such fundamental importance to
a tax system as the design of the 'unit of taxation. Both the theory and
the practice of the joint return are under attack today in the debate
97 See. e.g.,

MICHAEL

1.

& DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME
31 (3d ed. 1995) (note introducing criteria for

GRAETZ

TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

evaluating taxes).

98 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 7, 3940 (1997) (arguing that tax compliance and perception of consistency of tax system with
moral values and social norms are linked) .
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over marriage penalties and marriage bonuses.
1. The Choice of the Joint Return
The adoption of the new joint return filing status in 1948
represented the explicit tax policy choice to make the equal taxation of
married couples with equal incomes the governing principle in the
taxation of marriage. The new joint return, which required husband
and wife to aggregate incomes, ended several controversies
concerning the taxation of married couples. It largely erased the
. disparities in the taxation of married couples in the two different
marital property regimes, ending the long controversy over the impact
of community property law. It also ended what the Treasury saw as a
larger problem of widespread tax evasion in which wives were the
foils of tax shirking husbands. 99
Prior to the 1948 joint return husband and wife were treated as
separate individuals in the income tax except to the extent that they
were required to share a married couple's personal deduction. lOo The
99 Several sources support the conclusion that Treasury's concerns about tax
avoidance by married couples went beyond the community property issue. The central
theorist of the 1948 joint return, Harvard Law School Professor Surrey, argued that
inequities in taxation of married couples resulted if couples with different income
configurations but the same total incomes did not bear the same tax burden. In Surrey's
analysis the outcome is inequitable whether the difference arises from marital property
law, the division of income producing property or family partnerships. He describes his
per capita joint return proposal as "equalizing the tax treatment of married couples
regardless of the character of their income or their geographical location." Stanley S.
Surrey, Family Income and Federal Taxation, 24 TAXES 980, 982-84, 987 (1946).
Accord Boris Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1397, 1416 (1975) (discussing the Senate Finance Committee Report in 1948). In its
attacks on income splitting through family partnerships in the 1930s and 1940s, the IRS
treated wives who worked full time in the family business as making no separable
economic contribution. See also Carolyn Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax
Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, Legal History Program, Working Papers, Series 2,
May 1987,30-63 (history of family partnership cases).
100 The relationship between the individual and married couple's personal
deduction varied over the years between 1913 and 1948. When the married couple's
deduction was greater than the unmarried person's, a sole earner couple had a marriage
bonus to that extent. The dual income couple suffered a marriage penalty whenever the
married couple's deduction was less than twice the individual's. See Symposium: Panel
II: Observing Money, Marriage and Taxation, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 127, at 12728 (1999) (remarks of Ann F. Thomas quantifying the amount of marriage penalty and
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same progressive tax rate schedule applied to everyone, so although
aggregation of income by married couples was permitted on a
voluntary basis, it generally was disadvantageous, exposing income to
higher rates than would apply if each spouse reported individual
income only.IOI However, in this system of individual taxpayers,
disaggregating income could be very advantageous. If, for example, a
spouse with $] 0,000 of income in the 50 percent marginal surtax
bracket could shift that amount to a spouse whose marginal tax rate on
this sum would be only 25 percent, half the tax otherwise due would
be saved. Tax brackets were often quite high in this era; during both
world wars, they rose above 70 percent. 102 But even at lower rates,
many taxpayers sought what Stanley Surrey (the tax theorist who was
the architect of the 1948 joint return) called "the thrill that comes from
sliding down a progressive rate scale."I03
In ] 930 married couples living in the eight community
property law states succeeded in establishing the right to split their
incomes from all sources into two equal shares when filing their
individual income tax returns. Their theory was that community
property law gave the wife an interest in half the marital community
even though the husband earned, controlled and managed all property
and income during the marriage. The Supreme Court sustained this

marriage bonus in 1913}. See, e.g., Tariff Act of October 3, 1913,38 Stat. 114, 168
(codified as I.R.C. § IIA (19\3»; see also GLADYS BLAKEY & ROY BLAKEY, tHE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX tbl. 20 (1940) (compiling the personal exemptions for married and
unmarried taxpayers and dependents from 1913 through 1939).
101 A married couple was permitted to file a different kind of joint return
between 1918 and 1948 but its primary benefits were that it allowed losses of one spouse
to offset gains of the other and, if combined adjusted gross income was greater, a large
charitable contribution might be possible. See Bittker, supra note 99, at 1400, n.20. The
Internal Revenue Service tried to compel joint return filers accept joint and several
liability for tax due for the year but was unsuccessful until Congress enacted an
authorizing provision in 1938. See Beck, supra note 20, at 458-59.
102
.
See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, sllpra note 100, at tbls. 20-21; GRAETZ &
SCHENK, sllpra note 97, at 9. Prior to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; the tax rates
.
were a composite of the normal tax and the surtax.
103 See Surrey, supra note 99, at 980. The 1948 joint return was widely
called the Surrey Plan and generally traced to his 1946 proposal, originally. delivered as a
speech at the Thirty-ninth Annual Conference of the National Tax Association, published
in Taxes. See e.g., Bittker, supra note 99, at 1412-1414.
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view in Poe v. Seaborn in 1930. 104
This ruling meant that a sole earner husband in, for example,
a community property law state such as Texas paid tax on half his
salary and his wife reported and paid tax on the other half, whether or
not she ever saw or controlled a penny of it. By contrast if they lived
in Indiana, which was a common law state, he alone would have been
the taxpayer on all of his earnings. If he earned $15,000 and the rate
schedule required a 20 percent tax on the first $10,000 and a 30
percent tax on the next $5,000, he would have owed $3,500 in tax,
living in Indiana. But living in Texas, the total tax was reduced to
$3,000. The Texas sole earner and his wife each reported income of
$7,500, keeping. the entire amount in the 20 percent bracket. Each
paid a tax of $1 ,500. Indeed, they could each report up to $10,000 in
the bottom tax bracket. The tax brackets for married couples in
community property states functionally were twice as wide as those
stated in the statutory tax rate schedule.
In the same year another development in tax jurisprudence
confirmed that the vast majority of married couples in the United
States - those living in the common law states - were to be required
to pay tax on the basis of those statutory rates and could not split
income from salaries. The Supreme Court ruled that the Internal
Revenue Service was correct in its view that the earner of income
could not by private contract or agreement between the spouses shift
any portion of his personal service income to his wife. Spouses in the
40 common law states could make tax-effective transfers of income
from property but only if they also transferred ownership and control
of the property to the other spouse. 105
By 1948 several states had adopted community property law
in order to allow their residents to take of advantage of the Poe v.
Seaborn exception and reduce their taxes.
Other states were
reluctantly considering doing the same but many called on Congress
to solve for them what was described as the problem of geographic
104 See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); see also Bittker, supra note 99,
at 1399-1408 (discussing pre-I 948 taxation). Tax rates in the example in the text are not
actual 1930 tax rates.
105 See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. III (1930); Bittker, supra note 99, at 13991408.
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disparity in taxation. They looked to Congress to spare them the
difficult choice between reducing taxes and giving wives rights that
the legislatures only vaguely understood in the property of their
husbands. 106
Several solutions were available to Congress, including
conforming the tax treatment of earned income, one way or the other,
for the two marital property regimes. 107 Another possibility was to
amend the federal income tax statute to specify that community
property law would not determine the identity of the taxpayer, perhaps
establishing actual control of income rather than vested interest as the
test. Congress had not yet tried this approach in the income tax statute
but there was reason to think that the Supreme Court would accept
such a legislative decision fully.108
106 Much of their reluctance came from concern about changing the substance
of marital property rights and the possibility that it might give wives control over the
property or income of their husbands. A few states repealed their new community
property statutes after very brief experience. See Jones, supra note 99, at 15-28. The
Senate Finance Committee asserted that the 1948 joint return would produce "substantial
geographical equalization" in taxation. Bittker, supra note 99, at 1412 (quoting Senate
Finance Committee).

107

See Jones, supra note 99, at 62-68. Professor Jones reports a 1948
proposal to allow income splitting on the basis of a marital partnership agreement and
finds that it would have had the effect of reversing Lucas v. Earl. /d. See also discussion
of Lucas v. Earl and Poe v. Seaborn in Bittker, supra note 99, at 1400-1408 (noting
inconsistencies and suggesting that a different result in Lucas v. Earl would have
improved tax equity).
108 The emphasis that the Supreme Court put on control of income by the
husband in United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926), in assessing the California
marital property regime can be read as an invitation to Congress to speak to the issue and
delineate the impact that it wished to see community property law have on taxation. But
when Poe v. Seaborn reached the Court four years later, Congress had still not spoken to
this question although the issue had been debated. See Thomas, supra note 20. While
Surrey blames the Supreme Court for inconsistency in Poe v. Seaborn and Lucas v. Earl,
he also acknowledges that "the judicial process is not the appropriate medium, and that a
legislative solution is required." Surrey, supra note 99, at 984. By 1945 the Supreme
Court had already sustained the efforts of Congress to reduce the tax benefits of
community property in estate and gift taxation. As Professor Bittker suggests, the
prospects of the Court sustaining legislation to reverse the impact of community property
in the income tax were also good. Bittker, supra note 99, at n.60. But the political
prospects for enactment of such legislation were poor; Surrey noted in 1946 that "the
community property forces are adding to their congressional strength:' Surrey, supra
note 99, at 984.
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The solution to the community property problem that the
Treasury had promoted during the Franklin Delano Roosevelt
administration was simply to require married couples to file a
common return in which husband and wife aggregated their incomes.
The tax due on this mandatory joint return was to be determined by
using the same rate tables that applied to unmarried taxpayers. For
sole income couples in common law states the mandatory joint return
would not have changed anything, but it would have ended the income
splitting tax· benefits of the community property law regime. The
mandatory joint return would also have imposed large marriage
penalties on dual earner and other dual income couples. This was in a
sense its purpose; the Treasury regarded the husband as the real
economic owner of the income and any arrangement that attributed his
income to anyone else as tax avoidance. 109 The mandatory joint
return was shouted down in 1941 and 1942. 110
The version of the joint return adopted in 1948 went quite in
the opposite direction. Although it required income aggregation, it
also allowed income splitting. In effect it made the tax outcome of
community property law applicable to all married couples in all
marital property systems. To determine their tax liability on the joint
return, husband and wife added their individual incomes together,
divided the total in half and then computed the tax on one-half their
109 See Surrey, supra note 99, at 980,984 (describing husband as source of
earned income and capital accumulation and later, noting with approval judicial efforts to
"build a wall around the husband with a variety of anti-avoidance rules").
110 For another description of the mandatory joint return proposal see Surrey,
supra note 99, at 984. Women's groups including the National Federation of Business
and Professional Women and the General Federation of Women's Clubs vigorously
opposed the mandatory joint return. - See Jones, supra note 99, at 66-67; GENERAL
FEDERATION OF WOMEN'S CLUBS CONVENTION RESOLUTION ON MANDATORY JOINT
INCOME TAX (1942-1948) (copy on file with author). One opponent of the 1948 income
splitting joint return described the rejection of the mandatory joint return in the following
terms: "Every time the mandatory joint return issue has been raised, hosts of gold-plated
suffragettes have descended on Congress to reenact their epic drama regarding women's
rights, and claim that all will be lost if ever a wife must file a joint return with her
husband and thereby be relegated to "economic slavery." The real issues thereby
muddled, various moralists and misled church groups joined the battle and a deafening
thunder of cries about marriage, morals, economic serfdom, and the like killed any further
relevant determination or any action." Hearings on Reduction of Individual Income Taxes
before Sen. Comm. on Finance, 80th Congo 279 (1948) (statement of Paul J. Foley).
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aggregated income. They doubled the amount of tax on the one-half
to determine the tax due on the whole on their joint return. I I I Married
joint filers and unmarried individual filers used the same graduated
rate schedule so the effect of the joint return was to give married
couples the use of tax brackets that were twice as wide as those for
unmarried individuals. 112
The Republican controlled 80 th Congress enacted the incomesplitting joint return l13 as part of a massive tax cut. It was the
cornerstone of the third tax cut bill that the 80th Congress passed.
President Truman vetoed all three bills, but the popularity of the new
income-splitting joint return helped attract the· votes to over-ride the
President's third tax cut veto: 14 The campaign slogan of the
Republicans in the 80th Congress was "Had Enough?" and it spoke to
their conservatism and their intention to reduce government spending
and block the Democratic President's liberal and expensive domestic
programs. I 15 The principle of unitary taxation of married couples,
also pursued in the failed mandatory joint return proposals, was
enacted at the cost of the loss of considerable progressivity in the
income tax. I 16

III Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, sec. 301-303, §§ 12, 23(aa)(1 )(A),
(aa)(4), & SI(b), 62 Stat. 114-15 (passed April 2, 1948, over presidential veto). See also
Jones, supra note 99, at 2.
112 For example, if the lowest bracket taxed income up to $4,000 at the rate
of 10%, and income above that amount at 20%, a married couple with $8,000 income
filing the income splitting joint return would pay $800 tax while an unmarried person
with the same income paid $1,200. The 1948 joint return puts $4,000 into the \0%
bracket, calculates tax of $400 and doubles it to find a total tax of $800. In effect the
splitting and doubling allows $8,000 to be taxed in a bracket intended to be $4,000 wide.

I \3 Professor Jones uses the term "income splitting joint return" to describe
the 1948 enactment and this article adopts this very useful and informative term as well.
Jones, supra note 99, at I.
114
115

1d. at 2, 63-68 (providing a detailed account of the Revenue Act of 1948).

See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE UNFINISHED NATION: A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 787 (1997).
116 It was part of the tax reduction bill that Congress enacted over the veto of
President Truman and it carried an estimated revenue loss of $803.5 million. See Jones,
supra note 99, at 63-64; Bruce Bartlett, The Marriage Penalty: Origins. Effects and
Solutions, 80 TAX NOTES 1341, 1343, tbl. 3 (\ 998) (describing impact of the Revenue Act
of 1948: "almost every married couple saw a sharp reduction in their marginal tax rate").
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But income aggregation advocates like Treasury Tax
Legislative Counsel Stanley Surrey regarded at least part of the-tax cut
as well spent because it introduced a better system: the system of
equal taxation of married couples with equal incomes. He described it
as the "one bright spot" in the tax bill that his administration had
vetoed. 1I7 The Treasury regarded the husband as "providing both the
dollars of income and the accumulation of capital producing
additional dollars of income."lls Any doctrine or arrangement that
moved taxable income (and tax liability) away from the husband was
viewed as a tax avoidance device.
According to Surrey, the
Treasury's leading tax theorist at the time, "normally, the husband
pays income tax" on all of "these dollars.,,119 Aggregating the
incomes of husband and wife correctly collected the income into one
taxpaying unit rather than allowing it to be divided between two units
in a manner he regarded as artificial. The new joint return established
this important principle. The tax cut aspects were part of the cost of
establishing the principle. Moreover, Surrey indicated that he did not
think full income splitting should be a permanent feature of the tax
rates. 120
2. Income Theory and the Joint Return
Whatever political and practical ends its enactment in 1948
117 See Bittker, supra note 99, at 1413 (quoting Surrey's appraisal of the
Revenue Act of 1948: "The adoption of a presently acceptable solution to the family
income problem represents the one bright spot in the Revenue Act of 1948").
lIS This is Surrey's premise in the 1946 proposal, made when he was Tax
Legislative Counsel at Treasury. Surrey, supra note 99, at 980.
119 Id. The 1948 joint return made the husband and wife liable for tax on the
unit's income for the year through its imposition of joint and several liability.
120 The Internal Revenue Service challenged the' wife's partnership in family
businesses in cases in which the wife's role ranged from having babies to running the
poultry department of the grocery store. See Jones, supra note 99, at 30-63 (describing
the family partnership cases litigated in the 1940's). Surrey in his proposal for the joint
return mentions family partnerships as one of the income splitting tax avoidance devices
that demonstrated the importance of aggregation in the taxation of married couples.
Surrey, supra note 99, at 981-82,985-87. On the issue of income splitting itself, in his
1946 proposal Surrey took the view that "ability to pay" considerations would place the
correct tax burden for married couples between "per capita" (split income) taxation and
the mandatory joint return (unitary taxation). Id.
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may have served, the income splitting joint return brought with it into
the federal income tax a number of assumptions about marriage and
tax theory that continue to affect tax policy and tax outcomes today.
The income-splitting joint return had a substantial marriage bonus
effect for sole earner couples. 12I Even though it did not introduce
systemic marriage penalties measured by changes in the tax burden of
couples, the 1948 joint return did introduce the secondary earner or
stacking problem. Aggregation of incomes for the spouses in the
progressive income tax tended to increase effective tax rates for the
low earner in the couple, who typicaIly was the wife. 122
Despite the commitment to "equalize the treatment of married
couples regardless of the character of their income," Surrey's initial
proposal held out the possibility that dual earner marriages might be
treated differently. Surrey apparently thought "the problem of the
working wife" in a joint return should be solved with additional
deductions although whether these would relate to additional costs of
dual employment, child care or something else is not clear from his
1946 proposal.1 23
But the example of the dual earner marriage also presented
another income theory issue that contained a deeper criticism of the
Surrey
goal of taxing couples with equal incomes equally.
acknowledged that the "problem of the working wife" raised the issue

121 See Surrey, supra note 99; accord Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Liberals,
Loopholes, and Long-term Growth: Equity, Growth and Gender in Postwar Tax Policy,
1948-1960, at 6-25 (unpublished paper presented at the American Society for Legal
History Annual Meeting Oct. 21-23, 1999) (on file with author) (cited with Mr. Ventry's
permission).
122 Between 1948 and 1969 married taxpayers were still permitted to file as
individuals on the basis of their separate incomes. While separate fllingmight reduce tax
for the low earner, it usually increased the tax for the higher earner who had to forgo the
benefits of income splitting on the joint return. Generally the joint return produced the
lowest tax for the couple as a unit and also the lowest tax for the higher or primary earner.
But for the lower or secondary earner, there was an increase in effective tax rates unless
all joint return income was within the lowest bracket. For an early presentation of the
stacking or secondary earner issue described here, see Harvey S. Rosen, Is It Time to
Abandon Joint Filing?, 30 NAT. TAX 1. 423, 425-26 (1977) [hereinafter Rosen 1977]. See
also text accompanying notes 134-135 infra.
123 Surrey, supra note 99, at 984.
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of "imputed income of the housewife.,,124 The problem is that the sole
earner couple really has two economic incomes, the wages of the
market earner and the imputed income of the housewife, and the tax
law ignores the imputed income.
In economic terms, the housewife contributes imputed income
in the form of the goods and services that she produces in the home
for home consumption. Hence the economic income of a couple
composed of a housewife and a sole earner with market wages of
$15,000 is actually more than the economic income of a dual earner
couple with combined wages of $15,000. However the imputed
income of the housewife has not been subject to tax in the federal
income tax.125 Thus the housewife and her untaxed imputed income
confers a double marriage bonus. Her economic income and its
contribution to the couple's standard of living is tax free and marriage
to her allows the sole market earner to reduce his taxes with her
unused personal exemption, transferred standard deduction and
married person's entitlement to the joint return tax rates. 126
The choice of the joint return in 1948 was thus a choice to
treat married couples with the same money incomes as equals and to
ignore at least for the time being economic differences that existed
between dual earner couples and sole earner couples. 127 In addition to
these unresolved aggregation issues, the 1948 joint return left another
tax equity problem for the future. The income-splitting feature of the
new joint return created new disparities in the taxation of the married
and the unmarried that were difficult to ignore.
124

!d.

125 See Staudt, supra note 36.
126 For a fuller discussion of the marital transfers, see supra notes 28, 35-40
and accompanying text. Tax incentives favoring housework can turn into disincentives to
market work. If she were to venture into paid employment, the former housewife would
have to earn more than the after tax value of her housekeeping or its purchased
replacement to be show any economic improvement. See, e.g., Edward McCaffery,
Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40
UCLA L. REv. 983, 1001-5 (1993) (discussing imputed income from home production).
127 Dr. June O'Neill in her Keynote Address also uses the term money
income to identify the absence of imputed income from the equal income standard. See
O'Neill, supra note 5, at 120. The correct term in the federal income tax is gross income
but is not used here because it is not as informative to non-technicians.
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3. Time Line of Marriage Penalties and Marriage Bonuses
The income-splitting joint return slashed marginal rates for
married couples, delivering a tax cut of some $800 million to them. 128
But the 1948 tax cuts left unmarried individuals with the old rate
schedule. Comparing herself to a sole earner married couple with the
same total income, an unmarried individual was required to pay from
20 percent to almost 40 percent more federal income tax.129 Surrey as
early as 1946 identified the need to find a better balance between
married and unmarried taxpayers than the doubled joint return
brackets provided. But Congress did not act to adjust the relationship
between the two groups of taxpayers until 1969, during the first
administration of President Richard M. Nixon.I3O
Effective in 1971, new rate tables fixed the ratio between the
unmarried individual's tax and the tax on the joint returns at the same
income level at 1.2.131 This is the origin of the present pattern in the
income tax treating the married couple as a tax unit that is greaterthan-one unmarried individual tax unit but less-than-two. It was the
rebalancing of the relative tax burdens on married couples and
unmarried individuals in 1969 that introduced systemic marriage
penalties for dual income couples.132 With the widening of the rate
128 See Bartlett, supra note 116, at 1341, 1343, tbl. 3 (describing impact of
Revenue Act of 1948).
129 See Bittker, supra note 99, at tbl. 3.
130 See Surrey, supra note 99, at 985-987. Surrey discusses the issue at some
length, concluding that on a consumption standard the correct tax for a married couple
"lies between the liabilities produced by the per capita system and by the mandatory joint
returns." Id. at 985.
131 See Pamela B. Gann, The Earned Income Deduction: Congress's 1981
Response to the "Marriage Penalty" Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 468, 471-72 (1983)
(discussing 1969 amendments).
132 For a discussion of the singles penalty issue and the 1971 marriage
penalties, see GRAETZ, supra note 98, at 31-34. The joint return did not go unchallenged
in Congress in the 1950s and 1960s although the tax literature in this era tended to
support it. See Ventry, supra note 121, at 6-25 (demonstrating that some reforms were
regarded as loopholes benefiting the wealthy during the 1950s and I 960s). Blumberg
notes marriage penalties in the child care deduction as well as stacking effects and the
loss of one standard deduction. Blumberg, supra note 90, at n.35. The same change also
made marriage bonuses somewhat smaller for sole earner couples because the joint return
brackets were no longer twice as generous as the unmarried brackets.
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brackets for unmarried individuals, the joint return no longer entitled
married couples to doubled marginal brackets. Dual earner couples
began to see that marriage had a tax cost. 133
The 1969 amendments also restricted the filing status choices
of married couples, cementing the hold of the joint return on married
couples and with it the aggregation principle. While reducing the tax
rates for s'ingles, Congress created a new and disadvantageous rate
schedule for married persons who wished to file separately from their
spouses. The new rate tables for married persons filing separately
consisted of tax brackets that were half as wide as those for joint
return filers (as they are under present law for this filing status).
Spouses with separate incomes were no longer permitted to file as
individuals using the rates applicable to unmarried persons, as they
had been able to do between 1948 and 1969.134
By forbidding married couples to use the new singles' rates,
Congress cut off the possibility that the community property
controversy would be re-opened by couples seeking to split marital
income between separate tax returns at the newly reduced rates for
unmarried individuals. The new, punitive rates for married separate
filing increased the relative benefit of the joint return for married
couples, further melding the economic identities of husband and wife
for tax purposes. But for dual earner couples with relatively equal
incomes, the new distinctions and new rate tables meant that marriage
would increase their composite tax burden. The policy choice of 1948
that required married couples with equal amounts of money income to
pay the same amount of tax was preserved and perpetuated although at
the cost of imposing a marriage penalty on dual earners and other dual
income couples. 135
Yet even apart from the new marriage penalty on dual income
133 See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 98, at 34-38 (discussing the Boynters
whose year-end divorce plan to reduce the marriage penalty attracted attention from the
I.R.S., the courts and Congress in the 1970s).
134 By filing separately, spouses were able to avoid the joint and several
liability imposed on joint return filers. In the years between 1948 and 1969, separate
filing by spouses rarely resulted in a lower combined tax bill than the joint return
produced. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
135 See GRAETZ, supra note 98, at 31-35; Bittker, supra note 99, at 1414-1415
& 1428-1429.
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couples that began in 1971, the joint return came under attack because
of its role in creating tax disincentives for married women to enter or
remain in paid employment. Legal scholars and economists during
this period of women's rights advocacy began arguing for individual
taxation and abandonment of the joint return. 136 Economists and legal
scholars in the 1970s pointed out that the joint return system imposed
high effective marginal tax rates on the earnings of wives who entered
or re-entered the labor force, reducing the economic return on their
work effort. 137 Because the joint return required the incomes of the
two spouses to be aggregated, the earnings of the secondary worker
were seen to be stacked on top of the income of the primary earner
and taxed at rates starting with the highest marginal rate applicable to
him.138 One feminist legal scholar argued that the tax disincentives to
paid employment for married women seen in the limitations on child
care deductions and the high effective rates created by aggregation of
spousal incomes constituted gender discrimination. 139
The secondary earner in the marriage, then as now, was
assumed to be the wife in most instances both because of social
expectations and because of lower earnings. 140 Empirical data had
136 See

Blumberg, supra note 90, at 95; Rosen 1977, supra note 122. The
Rosen article was entitled: Is It Time to Abandon Joint Filing?
137
See e.g., Blumberg, supra note 90, at 50-59; Rosen 1977, supra note 122,
at 427-428 (arguing that the joint return is economically inefficient and unduly
burdensome to secondary workers).
138 Stacking is a widely used term for this effect. See, e.g., Hearing on the
Marriage Penalty Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Congo (1998)
(statement of David Lifson, Vice Chair, Tax Executive Comm., American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants). Stacking can impose a much higher average rate of tax on
the secondary worker's earnings than applies to the primary earner. If, for example, the
husband's first $10,000 of income was taxed at 10% and his second $10,000 of income
was taxed at the 30% rate, his average rate of tax would not be 30% but 20%, reflecting
the lower rate that applied to him in the bottom bracket. But if his wife earned $10,000
more, the aggregation of incomes in the joint return would make 30% her bottom tax
bracket. Her average tax rate would be no less than 30% and might be higher if her
income exceeded the ceiling of that bracket.
139

See Blumberg, supra note 90, at 95.

140 Accord McCaffery, supra note 125, at 992-994 (arguing that continuing
wage gap between husbands and wives continues to place wives in the role of secondary
earner); Rosen 1977, supra note 122, at 426 (pointing out the "social reality" that "it is
assumed that the husband will work full time and the wife make her labor force decision
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already established that the labor force partIcIpation of married
women was quite responsive to increases in real net wages. This
suggested to some economists that high effective tax rates, which
would reduce net wages, would lower the amount of time that married
women would spend in paid employment. The concern raised was
that the high effective tax rate that the joint return imposed on married
women was creating inefficiencies and changing the work choices that
women would otherwise make: 41
But some legal scholars and economists defended the joint
return and even marriage penalties. Partly in response to a bill that
proposed a "marriage-neutral federal income tax," Professor Boris
Bittker developed what has become the classical statement of the
competing considerations in the taxation of married couples. 142
Pointing out that tax neutrality concerning marriage could not be
reconciled with the goal of equal taxation of married couples with
equal incomes in a tax system with progressive rates, he described a
"collision of objectives.,,143 Bittker argued that the correct policy
choice was to retain aggregation and equal taxation of married
couples, despite the appearance of marriage penalties. Marriage
neutrality he found was inconsistent with what he described as "a
dominant theme of tax theory for at least 50 years - the irrelevance
of ownership within intimate family groups . . . together with its
implication that taxpaying capacity is best measured by consolidated
marital or family income.,,144 In his view, couples neutrality was the
conditional on the husband's income").

141 See Rosen 1977, supra note 122, at 426.

142 See Bittker, supra note 99, at 1395-6. Assistant Secretary of Treasury for
Tax Policy, Edwin S. Cohen, in testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee
in 1972 presented the analysis as a mathematical proof. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note
97, at 471 (presenting quotes of Edwin S. Cohen's 1972 testimony before the House
Ways and Means Committee); see also Hearings on the Tax Treatment of Single Persons
and Married Persons Where Both Spouses are Working Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 93rd Congo (1972) (statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant for the
Treasury on Tax Policy). See also McCaffery, supra note 126, at nn.25-26; Zelenak,
supra note 78, at 342-342.

143 Bittker supra note 99, at 1395-6, 1430-3\. This statement
the classical treatment of the issue.

IS regarded

as

144/d. at 1396; accord Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of
the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1573, 1590
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better choice.
In 1981, tax theory notwithstanding, Congress allowed dual
earner married couples a deduction intended to recognize the
individual incomes of the spouses and reduce marriage penalties.
Dual earner couples filing joint returns were allowed to deduct up to
$3,000 a year as an adjustment to gross income. The revenue estimate
put the revenue loss from the dual earner deduction at $37.5 million
over five years. 145 The dual earner deduction was included in the
Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981, the multi-year $251 billion tax
cut for individuals that initiated President Ronald Reagan's supply
side economics program to shrink the government and stimulate the
economy with tax savings. The 1981 Reagan tax law enacted the
largest cut in American history.146
The legislative history of the Economic Tax Recovery Act of
1981 prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation reported that
Congress had been "obliged to make a distinction between one-earner
and two-earner married couples" in order to alleviate marriage
penalties that "undermined respect for the family by affected
individuals and for the tax system itself.,,147 But the Joint Committee
noted that the second-earner deduction reduced marriage penalties and
improved work incentives "without abandoning the basic principle of
encouraging joint returns.,,148 Although the dual earner credit did not
eliminate marriage penalties, it did reduce them substantially.149
However, the dual earner deduction also increased marriage bonuses
for some dual earner couples, as advocates of individual taxation of

( 1977) (defending the joint return on grounds that husband and wife pool income and
"benefit more or less equally from the total available").
145 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 1981 JCS·71·81, at 33-37 (1981) [hereinafter GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF ERTA].
146 See id. at 17·19; see also BRINKLEY, supra note 115, at 909 ·912.

147 See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 145, at 34.
148 1d. at

35.

149 See Harvey S. Rosen, The Marriage Penalty is Down But Not Out, 40
NAT. TAX J. 567, 568 (1987) (commenting on findings of Feenberg) [hereinafter Rosen
1987].
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married couples were quick to point out. ISO
The bipartisan broad based tax reform of 1986 that flattened
rates in President Reagan's second Administration also repealed the
dual earner deduction that had been enacted five years before during
his first Administration.
The legislative history indicates that
Congress expected that marriage penalties would be reduced by the
effects of rate changes and changes in the standard deduction. lsl
Subsequent analysis confirmed that both the incidence of marriage
penalties and the average size of penalties were lower after 1986. But
the same study also found that many married couples were still paying
sizable penalties. For 1988, about 40 percent of married couples were
found to. be paying marriage penalties averaging $1,100. Further,
about 53 percent of married couples were experiencing marriage
bonuses which averaged $609. In 1988 penalties were projected to be
$24 billion and bonuses to be $17.4 billion.152
Renewed interest in marriage penalties and bonuses prompted
further scholarly inquiry into t~e impact of the joint return system in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The impact of marriage penalties and
marriage bonuses on marriage decisions and on the choice of work for
married women again became the subject of wide discussion and
concern. A new wave of economics and legal scholarship critical of
the joint return on behavioral and theoretical grounds began in the
early 1990s,153 just before the enactment of the 1993 Tax Reform Act
which raised marriage penalties and bonuses to new heights. Much of
150 See Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REv. I (1980).
151
See 1986 JOINT COMM. GENERAL EXPLANATION. supra note 39, at 19.
The Republican Party won control of the Senate in 1980, and kept it until 1986, but the
Democrats remained in the majority in the House throughout both of Reagan's terms in
office. See BRINKLEY, supra note 115, at 909,915,921.
152
See Rosen 1987, supra note 149, at 574.

153 See e.g., Edward McCaffery, supra note 126; Marjorie Kornhauser, Love,
Money and the IRS: Family Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45
HASTINGS LJ. 63 (\993); Julie A. Nelson, Tax Reform and Feminist Theory in the United
States Context: Incorporating Human Connection, (unpublished paper prepared for
conference on Emancipatory Economics and Tax Reform, University of Limburg, Feb.
22, 1991) (copy on file in with author). Tax scholars also began to present the marriage
penalty issue to wider audiences. See, e.g., Ann F. Thomas, Women and Taxes: The
Costly Connection, RADCLIFFE Q., June 1993, at 9.
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this criticism can be described as feminist because of its focus on the
impact of the marriage penalty and bonus on the economic power and
labor force participation of married women. Disincentives to paid
employment and inequitable taxation of the second earner have
continued to be the primary criticisms since the 1970s. However, a
new generation of feminist scholars has also expressed concern about
biases against recognizing the housewife's economic contribution. 154
These critics have also questioned the theoretical premises of
the joint return and the assumptions about the economics of marriage
upon which supporters of the joint return have relied. 155 In addition to
the feminist criticism, the joint return is being questioned on tax
efficiency grounds as well. Here the argument is that the federal
income tax should be neutral with respect to the choice between
market work and housework for married women because it is a
socially contested issue. 156 Continuing empirical research examining
the impact of tax incentives and disincentives on the decision to marry
and the divorce is beginning to indicate that women are influenced by
tax outcomes in making these choices. 157 Empirical research has also
reopened the question of whether husband and wife pool their
incomes and consume as a unit or whether consumption depends on
the source of income. 158
4. Recent History - The 103 rd and 104 th Congresses
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, signed into law by
154 See. e.g., Staudt, supra note 36, at 1571-1578 (advocating recognition of
economic contribution of housewives through taxation and credit system); Anne L.
Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96
COLUMBIA L. REv. 2001, 2001-2008 (1996) (arguing that benefits of individual filing are
overstated and that feminist goals are not well served by tax reform proposals alone but
require coordination and implementation with family allowances to support caregivers).
155
See McCaffery, supra note 126; Kornhauser, supra note 153.
156 Zelenak, supra note 78. See also David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing.
Doctrine and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1627 (1999) (analyzing
efficiency in doctrinal decision making and identifying the distinction between market
income and imputed income as one of the important line drawing issues in the tax law).
157 Aim & Whittington, supra note 6.

158 See. e.g., Amy Ellen Schwartz, Whose Money Is It?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. Rrs. 135 (1999).
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President Clinton on August 10, 1993, substantially increased
marriage penalties in the income tax and drew criticism from
Congress and the media. The 1993 amendments added two tax
brackets to the top of the income scale and expanded the earned
income tax credits at the bottom. Because of the way they were
structured, these changes affected many dual income couples
adversely.159 The marriage penalty effects of the 1993 tax increases
provoked comment from a surprising array of sources. Liberal
Democrats such as Representative Barbara Kennelly (D-CT) and the
Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues aired their critique of the
new marriage penalties publicly. At the same time, the subject of the
income tax marriage penalty made news in the conservative and
financial press. 160
Under the headline "Living in Sin to Cut Tax Bill Would
Look Even Better to Some Under Clinton Plan," The Wall Street
Journal published an article describing and analyzing the marriage
penalty and marriage bonus effects of the President's proposed tax bill
while it was still pending. 161
The country's leading financial
periodical gave prominence to marriage penalties - featuring the
long and detailed article on page one of its Money and Investing
section. With the aid of a table prepared by KPMG Peat Marwick,
one of the country's largest accounting firms and the auditor of many

159 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. Law No. 103-66, sec. 13131(a)
& 13201(a), § 32(a)(b), § I(a)-(e), 107 Stat. 415, 435, 458. In the earned income credit,

joint return filers remained subject to the same income phaseouts as did unmarried
individuals, causing dual income couples who married to lose some of the new tax
benefits that would have come to them had they remained single. At the upper end, the
breakpoints for the top two brackets for joint returns began to converge with the
unmarried individual brackets, reducing bonuses and increasing marriage tax penalties.
The top marginal rate of 39.6% began at $250,000 for both joint returns and unmarried
individuals. See also Daniel R. Feenberg & Harvey S. Rosen, Recent Developments in the
Marriage Tax, 48 NAT. TAX J. 91 (1995) (assessing impact of the 1993 tax law
amendments); supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text concerning breakpoints.
160 Rep. Kennelly Tells Clinton His Top Rate Hike Would Widen Marriage
Penalty, DAILY TAX REpORT, March 12, 1993, at 0-15 (reporting remarks of Rep.
Kennelly at meeting of members of Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues with
President Clinton on March II, 1993).
161 Ellen E. Schultz, Living in Sin to Cut Tax Bill Would Look Even Better to
Some Under Clinton Plan, WALL ST. J., March 9, 1993, at Cl.
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of the largest corporations, the Journal provided an estimate of
marriage penalties for dual earner working couples at different income
levels. For the low-income dual earners with $24,000 of combined
income, it showed a marriage penalty of $4,040 and an effective tax
rate of 45 percent, including Social Security tax. At the opposite end,
the Journal reported that a dual earner couple earning $250,000 each
would pay $27,150 to be married. The marriage bonus couple
described was also affluent; with the husband earning $170,000 and
the wife earning $12,000, marriage reduced their combined income
tax burden by $4,464. 162
Social conservatives in Congress seized the issue of marriage
penalties and linked it to their concerns about family values and
sexual morality. One of the earliest legislative responses was that of
then-freshman' Representative Ernest 1. Istook, Jr. (R-OK), an
outspoken advocate of school prayer and other issues on the agenda of
the Republican social conservatives. 163 Mr. Istook's bill, introduced
on February 2, 1994, decreed that "no husband and wife shall be
required to pay more in income taxes under this subtitle because of the
fact that they were legally married during a taxable year, then they
would be required to pay if they had not been married." The Istook
bill specified that its new policy for the taxation of married couples
would be implemented by offering husbands and wives the annual
option to use the filing status that the spouses "would otherwise have
used" if they had not been married. 164 Joining him in the original
introduction of the bill were sixteen Republican stalwarts, including
Representative 1. Dennis Hastert (R-IL), the Speaker of the House in
the 106th Congress. 165 Istook's proposal eventually gathered 62 co162

1d.

163 See, e.g., Patrick B. McGuigan, Ernest Istook: The Final Installment,
SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN (City Edition), Nov. I, 1992, at 30, (quoting Representative Istook
expressing approval for "voluntary nonsectarian prayer being offered in a classroom
setting," school vouchers, and family values and opposition to condom distribution to
high school students). Rep. Istook was also the sponsor of the Religious Freedom
Amendment bill, H.R.1. Res. 78, 105th Congo (1997), which called for a constitutional
amendment to permit school prayer.
164 H.R. 3851, 103rd Congo (1994) (introduced by Mr.lstook (R-OK),
.
Feb.lO, 1994).
'165

See, e.g., Hastert Corrals Fractious GOP to Pass $ 792 Billion Tax Cut,
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sponsors. 166 Representative Istook's bill was the only one that
addressed itself to the income tax marriage penalty in the I03 rd
Congress. Indeed, it was the first general marriage tax penalty relief
biB introduced in Congress since 1981. 167
By September 27, 1994, the income tax marriage penalty was
close to the top of the agenda of Representative Newt Gingrich (RGA) and the insurgent conservative Republicans in the House. Repeal
of the income tax marriage penalty appeared as one of the planks in
their Contract with America. Three hundred fifty Republican
candidates in the 1994 congressional bi-election were reported to have
signed the Contract. Having gained control of the House, in the 104th
Congress they began introducing the ten reforms that they had
promised. In observance of their pledge, signers of the Contract
introduced the Contract With American Tax Relief Act of 1995,
which called for a marriage tax penalty reduction through a dual
earner credit. The Contract with America biBs generally offered the
same solution - a dual earner tax credit of up to $145. 168 Marriage
tax penalty relief of the far reaching kind that Representative Istook
had proposed was not seen in the bills introduced in the 104th
84 TAX NOTES 495 (1999) (describing Rep. Hastert's roll as Speaker of the House).
Bill Summary & Status for the 103 rd Congress (visited
Dec.ll, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>.
166 H.R. 3851;

167 There were two marriage tax penalty relief proposals for the benefit of
senior citizens in the intervening Congresses. In 1983, during the 98th Congress, Senator
Boren proposed an amendment to the Social Security Act Amendments of 1983 that
would have eliminated the phaseout marriage penalty in the taxation of Social Security
benefits. It did was not agreed to in the Senate. See S. Arndt. 124, 98th Congo (1983) and
proposed as Arndt. to H.R. 1900, 98th Congo (1983); Bill Summary & Status/or the 98th
Congress (visited Dec. 11,1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. In the IOlst Congress,
Representative Ritter introduced a bill to "eliminate the marriage penalty for senior
citizens in the standard deduction" and also to remove the phaseout marriage penalty in
the taxation of S.ocial Security benefits. Senior Citizens' Tax Fairness Act of 1990, H.R.
4904, IOlst Congo (1990).
168 Compare Contract with America Tax Relief Act of 1995, H.R. 1215,
104th Congo (1995), § 102 (introduced by Mr. Archer (R-TX» and Tax Fairness and
Deficit Reduction Act of 1995, H.R. 1327, § 6102, 104th Congo (1995) (introduced by
Mr. Kasich (R-OH». American Dream Restoration Act, H.R. 6, 104th Congo (1995),
introduced by Representatives Crane (R-IL), Nussle (R-IA), and Salmon (R-AZ), offered
a different formulation, allotting a total budget of $2 billion to marriage penalty relief.
Their bill called for the Secretary to determine the dollar amount each year.
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Congress.

II.

MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS IN THE

105 TH AND 106TH

CONGRESSES

In the 105 th and 106th Congresses, policy makers have shown
more interest in the income tax marriage penalty than at any time
since 1981 when the short-lived dual earner deduction was enacted.
More than forty-five measures aimed at providing marriage tax
penalty relief were introduced in the three most recent sessions of
Congress. Both Congresses put marriage penalty relief proposals into
major legislation but neither Congress succeeded in enacting its
proposals into law. The various bills advanced different solutions to
the marriage penalty, often more than one at a time. Over the course
of the last three years, two parallel trends have developed. Defying
the dictates of tax theory concerning the inconsistencies of couples
neutrality and marriage neutrality, Congress has shown strong interest
in retaining and enhancing the joint return but at the same time
making it optional by allowing dual income couples to elect to be
taxed on the basis of individual incomes.
The solutions to the marriage penalty that Congress has been
pursuing indicate both a continuing commitment to the joint return
and skepticism about its fairness in all instances. The idea of an
optional combined return of individual incomes, which received
substantial support in both Congresses, represents a significant
departure from the theory and practice of the joint return. It would
allow married couples with equal total incomes to be taxed quite
differently, depending on how the income was earned or owned
within each marriage. Yet framed as an alternative to the joint return,
it confirms that the aggregation system is a valid method of taxing
some couples. From the point of view of theory, the divergent and
sometimes internally inconsistent proposals for marriage penalty relief
present a confused picture. Some simply re-enforce the aggregation
principle in the taxation of married couples while others promote
dissaggregation by offering filing options. From the perspective of
tax politics, these diverse proposals suggest a concern to try to
accommodate the pressing claims of dual earner married couples for
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equitable treatment without disturbing the now-traditional tax benefits
of the joint return for sole earner couples.
The high level of interest in income tax marriage penalties in
the 10S th and 106th Congresses can be attributed to a number of
factors. Since 1993, marriage penalties have been a more tangible and
more visible concern of taxpayers. The substantial increases in the
marriage penalty effects of the income tax after the 1993 amendments
and the ever-larger numbers of dual earner married couples who pay
penalties have both contributed to moving the discussion of the issue
from the academic tax and economics literatures to the center of the
political arena again. 169 An important event in this transition was the
decision of the insurgent Republican fiscal and social conservatives to
include the repeal of the marriage penalty in their Contract with
America campaign in 1994. 170 Another significant factor has been the
availability of quantitative data from the Congressional Budget Office
and the General Accounting Office concerning the incidence,
distribution, and magnitude of marriage penalties. 171
The analysis that follows of trends in the marriage relief
proposals in the IOSth and 106th Congresses looks at the bills
themselves and the impact that the proposals would have if enacted
rather than at the less specific discussions of goals and concerns that
surrounds the legislative process. Although the party politics of the
marriage tax penalty debate is not the focus of this article, a few
observations about the political context are necessary. Legislative
proposals for marriage penalty relief have come from both
Republicans and Democrats, but Republicans have dominated the
field as they have generally done in tax legislation in the three most
recent Congresses.
Since the 1994 congressional elections, the Republican Party
169

See. e.g., CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 8; Feenberg & Rosen, supra note
159. See also supra text accompanying notes 92-96 (discussing increases in the number
of dual earner couples and the impact of this trend on marriage penalties).
170 See supra text accompanying notes 163- 68.
171 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4 (analysis of statutory sources of marriage
penalties upon which it relies); GEN. ACCT. OFF., Income Tax Treatment of Married and
Single Individuals, GAO/GGO-96-175 (September 1996). See also Bruce Bartlett, The
Politics of the Marriage Penalty, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. 1. HUM. RTS. 185 (discussing the
influence of the CBO Study).
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has maintained a majority in both the House of Representatives and
the Senate, pursuing an agenda of tax cuts and other fiscal policies at
odds with those of the President and his Democratic Party. Although
the first session reduced the capital gains tax and enacted the child
credit promised in the Contract with America, the second session of
the 10S th Congress, riven by the bitter partisan politics of the
presidential impeachment, did not enact any of the major pieces of tax
legislation that the majority Republican leadership sought. J72 By the
beginning of 1999, a budget surplus of as much as $ 3 trillion was
projected for the ensuing ten years. Early in the fiscal year 2000
budget process, President Clinton made clear his intention to veto any
bill that attempted to cut taxes before his goals for Social Secu~ity,
national debt reduction, and other fiscal reforms are accomplished. J73
He made good his threat in his September veto of the 1999 tax cut
bill.
The President's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget proposal, released in
early February 1999, did not include any recommendation for general
marriage penalty relief. However, it did call for an expansion of the
dependent and child care credit, which primarily applies to dual earner
couples, but the Administration identified this proposal simply as
"[m]aking Child Care More Affordable.,,174 Although he did not
directly address the issue of marriage penalties, Secretary of the
Treasury, Robert E. Rubin, in his testimony before the House Ways
and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, made it
clear that the Administration was not particularly interested in the
172 See note 229 infra for a fuller discussion of the failed 1998 tax cut bill.

173 See. e.g., House Republicans in Quandary Over Approach to Tax Policy,
DAILY TAX REPORT, Feb. II, 1999, at GG-I (quoting Rep. Callahan (R-AL) "We don't
have the votes to override a veto, which the president is going to do to any tax cut");
Appearance o/GOP Unity on Budget, Taxes May Hide Key Disagreements, DAILY TAX
REPORT, Feb. 2, 1999, at GG-13; Lott's Radio Address, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 31-25,
Feb. 13, 1999 available in LEXIS Fedtax Library, TNT file.
174 The Administration proposed to extend this non-refundable tax credit to
all parents of infants, without regard to whether the parents were in paid employment or
whether they had child care expenses. Hence stay-at-home parents of infants under the
age of one year and working parents whose infants were cared for by other family
members would have been eligible for a partial credit. See DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS 2325 (1999).
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issue. Secretary Rubin told the Senate and House tax writing
committees that "tax burdens for working families are at record lows
for recent decades.';175 Ii has been against this background of
anticipated presidential vetoes, and in the 106th , the anticipated budget
surplus, that members of both' the majority and minority parties in
Congress have made their proposals for marriage penalty relief. 176
The bills analyzed here were found by means of word searches
on THOMAS and the tEXIS bill tracking service. They are bills that
are self-identified as marriage penalty relief measures.177 Floor
amendments that were not agreed to generally are not included in the
survey. Support and interest in bills that have not been enacted is
difficult to measure. In the discussion below, assessments of interest
and support for the different ideas ·about marriage penalty relief are
based not only on the endorsement of the tax writing committees or
the inclusion of a proposal in major legislation - which indicates
interest on the part of Congressional leadership as well as member
support - but also on the number of co-sponsors of the bills of
individual members. The number of bills that proposed a particular
idea is also considered a measure of support for the solution advanced.
Co-sponsors are reported both by the LEXIS bill tracking service and
in the THOMAS database. Neither measure can be regarded as
politically conclusive; both can fairly be regarded as representative of
current congressional sentiment.
The future of the joint return system of marriage penalties and
marriage bonuses is unclear at this time. Where the ,next Congress
175 Treasury Secretary RobertE. Rubin Testimony Before the Senate Finance
Comm., Text· as Prepared for Delivery, Feb. 2, 1999, (visited Dec. II, 1999)
http://treas.gov/press/releases.
176 See e.g., SENATE FIN. COMM., REpORT ON THE TAXPAYER REFUND ACT OF
1999 (S.1429), S. REp. No. \06-120, reprinted in BNA TEXT SuPP., July 27, 1999, at Sc
110 . [hereinafter REpORT ON THE TAXPAYER REFUND ACT]' See infra text 'accompanying
notes 252,302-307 (discussing veto).
177 The bills and proposals aimed at adapting retirement savings tax
incentives to the work patterns of women in the labor force and t~e provisions addressing
divorce-related issues are not within the scope of this' article. These subjects are
addressed in' the Senate Finance Committee Report and Minority Views under the
heading "Enhancing Fairness for Women." See also, Symposium: Forum on Women and
Social Security: What Would Equity Look Like?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 217
(1999).
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will find consensus and, indeed, whether it will forge a new
agreement on the taxation of marriage remains to be seen. The current
crop of Congressional marriage penalty relief proposals suggest an
interest in enhancing the marriage bonus value of the joint return and
reducing marriage penalties at the same time, an expensive program
by any measure. Whatever direction the income tax takes on the
question of marriage penalties and marriage bonuses, it will be
important to understand the competing ideas from among which
policy choices are made. Whether the choice is to change the joint
return system broadly or narrowly or to leave it alone, the alternatives
considered along the way will illuminate the tax and social policy
content of the decisions reached. Observing Congress in the midst of
the process is an opportunity to listen to policy makers both speaking
to their constituencies and thinking out loud through their legislative
proposals. 178

178 The motivation of legislators is the subject of an extensive political
science and law and economics literature.
Explanations of the motivations for
introducing legislation in this literature range from the altruistic and pluralist public
interest view of competing ideas and beneficial compromises to the more cynical view of
public choice theory which sees legislators as beholden, perhaps financially, to interest
groups who in turn are competing for advantage. Professor Shaviro has pointed out that
other, non-monetary benefits of a more directly political nature can accrue to legislators
who introduce bills or co-sponsor them. These intangible benefits include enhancing
reputation for presenting innovative ideas, for leadership skills in advocacy and
developing consensus, and for intellectual leadership shown by mastery and knowledge of
difficult subject matter as well as the opportunity to exercise power. Introducing
legislation can also be a means of symbolic communication with constituents and thus a
means of promoting their own re-election by advocating laws that large numbers of voters
in the Member's district like. Both of these categories of benefits can be reaped without
regard to the actual impact of the legislation and, indeed, whether or not it is enacted. See
Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public (:hoice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980's, 139 U. PA. L. REv.l, 3-11 (1990)
(arguing that both public interest and public choice theory offer incomplete explanations
for tax reform legislation, ignoring the inherent value and benefit for the legislator of
legislating as a means of symbolic communication and an exercise of power, benefits that
may not depend on the actual impact of the legislation sponsored). The naming of bills
may be an important part of the symbolic communication. Many of the measures
described below that would only modestly reduce marriage penalties bear the title
"Marriage Penalty Elimination Act."
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A. The Proposals - Summary and Scorecard
The multitude of income tax marriage penalty relief measures
introduced during the three most recent sessions of Congress can
usefully be divided into eight major categories. In terms of the impact
on the marriage penalty and its sources in the federal income tax law,
the specific proposals pursued by Congress during these three years
have ranged from very narrow to over-broad. The chronological
development of the legislation and the trends in congressional
sponsorship and support for the different marriage penalty relief
proposals over the past three years are described in detail in the next
section. Figure A below provides a summary analysis in tabular form
of the scope and impact of the major categories of proposals to reduce
income tax marriage penalties and some of the important variations.
Proposals to revive the dual earner deduction of the 1980s
formed one of the major categories of penalty relief solutions
presented in legislation during the 1997 to 1999 period. 179
Amendments that sought to reduce EITC phaseout marriage penalties
were found in a number bills and represent another approach. 180
Proposals for comprehensive elimination of the marriage penalty
made up a third and quite different category of marriage penalty relief
ideas. The specific proposal introduced in these bills was the optional
combined return of individual incomes, a hybrid approach to income
measurement and liability composed of features of both the individual
and joint return filing statuses. I 81
179 For a fuller discussion of the dual earner deduction in the 1980s see text
accompanying note 145, supra; for a discussion of the dual earner deduction proposals
and bills see text accompanying note 205, infra. See a/so Appendix - Tables 3 & 4 infra,
listing the bills introduced in the three sessions and noting the categories of proposals in
each.
.
180 See text beginning at note 277, infra. for a discussion of the EITC relief
proposals; see a/so Appendix - Tables 1 & 2 infra for a listing of the EITC relief bills
introduced in each chamber during the session.
181 See text beginning at note 213, infra; Appendix - Tables 3 & 4 for a
listing of bills introducing the optional combined return in each session and notation of
sponsorships. The term optional combined return of individual incomes is introduced in
this article as a convenient and distinguishing name for this proposal which in the bills
introducing it is generally called "a combined return of income taxes" or "combined
return under which each spouse is taxed using the rates applicable to unmarried
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The five other major proposals can be broadly described as
attempts to re~establish the fuller income~splitting results of the 1948
joint return, in whole or in part. One of the proposals in this group did
indeed call for an income splitting combined return to be created as an
optional fiI ing status for married couples. 182 Another proposal would
have produced much the same results as the income splitting 1948
joint return but took the approach of combining changes in the
structures of the standard deduction and of the rate tables to achieve
this outcome. These proposals for structural income splitting would
have made the joint return standard deduction equal to double th~
amount allowed to unmarried individuals and at the same time would
have revised the tax rate tables to make the brackets for joint return
filers twice as wide as thoseJor unmarried individuals. 183
Proposals to restructure only the standard deduction and give
joint return filers a doubled deduction formed another separate and
significant category of bi.1ls.~84 Another group of bills proposed to
revise the rate tables only and give joint return filers. brackets double
in width to those for unmarrieds. 185 Yet another group of proposals
following this theme would have doubled only the lowest bracket for
the joint reiurn. 186
individuals." See, e.g., The Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S.1314, 105th Congo (1997).
182 See text beginning at notes 2'25, 269 infra for a fuller discussion of the
proposal: see also Appendix- Tables 3 & 4 for listing of bills introducing income splitting
combined return and co-sponsorships.
183 See text beginning at notes 237, 268, 273, infra for a fuller discussion of
structural income splitting proposals; see also Appendix-Tables 3 & 4 for list of bills
proposing both standard deduction doubling and bracket doubling This article introduces
the term structural income splitting for this proposal to indicate both its impact and
technical form. The bills themselves do not include any designation or name for the
combination of amendments they propose.
184 See text 'beginning at note 197 infra for a fuller discussion of the
proposals to allow joint filers a doubled standard deduction; see also Appendix-Tables 3
& 4 for a listing of the bills that made this proposal as a separaie relief measure and in
tandem with bracket doubling in a structural income splitting proposal.
.
185 See text beginning at note 240 infra for a fuller discussio~ of the bracket
doubling proposals; see also Appendix-Tables 3 & 4 for a listing of bills proposing
bracket doubling both as a separate solution to marriage penalties and as part of structural
,
income splitting. '
186 See beginning at· note 270 infra for a discussion of proposals for doubling
the lowest bracket for joint return filers; see also Appendix-Tables 3 & 4 for a listing of
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Figure A provides a comparison and summary of the scope
and impact of these eight major categories of relief proposals and
includes four additional proposals, for a total of twelve. Two of the
additions represent important variations of the major proposals. The
proposal made by Senator Gramm to create a new deduction from
gross income (GI) for joint return filers is in concept in the same
category as the proposal to allow joint return filers a standard
deduction equal to twice the deduction for unmarried filers. Both
would remove the marriage penalty feature of the standard deduction
by increasing deductions for joint return filers. The Gramm proposal
varies from the doubling proposal in four ways. It measures the
marriage penalty in the standard deduction against the amount for
heads of household deduction as well as against the unmarried
individual's deduction. It positions its anti-penalty deduction as a
subtraction from gross income so that it will reduce adjusted gross
income and thus also encompass relief from phaseout penalties and
the EITC marriage penalty in particular. The deduction also is
available whether or not the standard deduction is claimed and hence
may be used by more taxpayers. Finally, it places an income limit on
the relief, a restriction that is not present in any of the other proposals
to eliminate the marriage penalty element of the standard deduction. 187
Including the Gramm variation as a separate category in Figure A
provides a basis for comparing the impact of measures with income
limitations to those without and also demonstrates the greater impact
of measures that reduce AGI as compared to those that have their
effect below the line only.
For purposes of the scope and impact analysis, Figure A
divides the category of EITC marriage penalty relief measures in two, .
presenting the proposals that would reduce phaseout penalties only for
dual earner couples as a solution distinct from a general increase in
phaseout ceilings for all joint return filers. In terms of scope this
distinction is important and points out that a policy choice to reduce
the EITC marriage penalty can be made in both a focused manner or
bills making this proposal.
187 Compare S. Arndt. 2686, 105th Congo (1998) with Save Social Security
and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1998, H.R. 4597, I05th Congo (1998). For a discussion of the
doubling proposal, see text beginning infra note 192; see also Appendix - Table 3, infra.
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as part of a general increase in EITC credits for married couples.
Two additional categories are also presented in Figure A the proposals to eliminate the phaseout marriage penalty in the
deduction for higher education loan interest payments and the
proposals to expand the child care tax credit. Both are considered too
specific in their focus to warrant inclusion in the group of major
marriage penalty relief proposals but are included here for comparison
and to provide a fuller picture of the range of proposals under
consideration in Congress. 188 Congressional support for the eight
major categories of proposals, as evidenced in bills introduced and cosponsorships, is analyzed and presented in summary form in tables
one through four in the appendix.

I gg For a discussion of the amendments to IRe section 221 (1999) proposed
in 1999 to remove the phaseout marriage penalty in the education loan interest deduction,
see supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also infra note 302. For a discussion of the
child care phaseout penalty and proposals to expand the child and dependent care credit,
IRe § 2 I (1999), see supra note 65 and text; see also text accompanying notes 255, 2836, and 303 infra.
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FIGURE A
IMPACT OF INCOME TAX MARRIAGE PENALIT RELIEF PROPOSALS
1
ST
INTRODUCED IN 10STil CONGRESS AND 106" CONGRESS, 1 SESSION

Proposal
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Standard
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doubled for
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returns up to
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Marriage Penalty Relieflmpact Scoring
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Individual
Phaseout
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no
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Inefficient

yes
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no; income
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no

yes

maybe

no

no

yes
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somewhat;
limited by
joint return
AGI

somewhat;
due to infant
year credit

no

yes

$50.000
Edu-Ioan
interest jt.
return phaseout relief
Child care tax
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EITC phaseout relief for
joint returns
ElTC phaseout relief for
dual earners
only
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tax credit
Optional
combined
return of
individual
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, A
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§ 221;
Inefficient
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less so due
to infant
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§ 21

no

Inefficient
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SOLE EARNER COUPLE CANNOT FALL INTO THE MARRIAGE PENALTY CATEGORY BUT DUAL EARNER
COUPLES WHOSE EARNINGS ARE VERY UNEQUAL CAN HAVE MARRIAGE BONUSES AND ALSO QUALIFY FOR
DUAL EARNER DEDUCTIONS.
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In assessing the scope and efficacy of the proposals introduced
as marriage penalty relief measures, six criteria are used: (l) the
marriage penalty focus; (2) the extent of phaseout penalty relief; (3)
the extent of EITC (earned income tax credit) penalty relief; (4) the
generality of application; (5) the recognition of the individual incomes
of the spouses; and (6) whether marriage bonuses are increased.
Figure A uses these criteria to rate each of the twelve categories of
proposals.
Proposals that are restricted in their impact to reducing the
marriage penalties in current law are described as having an efficient
marriage penalty focus. Those proposals that would result in a tax
reduction for all joint return filers, spending fiscal resources to
enhance marriage bonuses to sole earner couples while providing
incidental relief to dual earner or dual income married couples, are
rated as inefficient or having a poor marriage penalty focus.
The tax credit and deduction phaseouts tend to be based on
adjusted gross income. Hence the extent of phaseout penalty relief is
determined by whether the proposed amendment has its impact
"above the line," reducing AGI, or would alter the phaseout formula
in a particular tax credit or deduction provision. The phaseout of the
EITC is based on AGI and also on a different measure, earned
income. To reduce the EITC marriage penalties, which can be
unusually severe, targeted amendments are required. For this reason,
determining the impact of a proposal on the EITC marriage penalty
The criterion generality of
requires a separate evaluation. 189
application assesses whether the proposal offers income tax marriage
penalty relief broadly or only to a particular group of married couples.
Relief targeted to a given income class or source of income would not
be rated general relief.
The fifth criterion, the extent of recognition of the individual
incomes of the spouses goes to the heart of the aggregation issue. The
present joint return system aggregates the earnings and income of
husband and wife, treating dual earner and sole couples with the same
money incomes as having comparable economic power and ability to
189 See text beginning at note 61 supra for a discussion of phaseout marriage
penalties. Adjusted gross income [AGI] is defined in I.R.C. section 62 (a) (1999). See
text beginning at note 49 supra for a discussion of EITC marriage penalties.
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pay tax. The aggregation precept disregards the empirical data
confirming that most couples do not pool their earnings but tend to
regard the earner as the owner of his market income. Moreover, by
equating sole earner and dual' earner couples, the joint return system
ignores the real economic costs of having two wage earners rather
than one, tending to devalue the work effort of married women both in
the home and in paid employment. 19o Proposals to measure income
tax liability or to extend marriage penalty relief on the basis of
individllal incomes are rated as recognizing individual spouses, those
that base relief on joint return income are rated as not recognizing
individual spouses.
.
The final criterion is not a measure of marriage penalty relief
but instead tracks the impact of the proposal on marriage bonuses. It
is somewhat duplicative of the question of marriage penalty focus but
provides a .specific assessment of the outcome for marriage bonuses.

B. The Trends

1. The 10S th Congress
During the 10S th Congress twenty-four bills and numerous
resolutions aimed at marriage penalty relief were introduced. The
Congressional Budget Office released its study of marriage and the
federal income tax during the first session and the House Committee
on Ways and Means held hearings on the marriage penalty during the
Sec on session. 191 Although Republican members introduced most of
the' penalty reduction bills, Democrats introduced seven: In both
chambers, Republicans remained in the majority and the atmosphere
in Congress was fiercely partisan much of the time. But during this
Congress, several marriage penalty relief bills enjoyed substantial
190 See text at notes 117-127, 136-144, 153-57 supra for a fuller discussion
of aggregation theory and the joint return.
191 CBO STUDY, supra note 4; Hearings on the Marri~ge Penalty Before the
House Comm. On Ways and Means, 105th Congo (1998). Among those testifying were
Dr. O'Neill, Professor Michael Graetz, Dr. Daniel Feenberg, Bruce R. Bartlett and the
President of the AICPA, who advocated dissaggregation as the fairest approach and the
dual earner credit as the simplest. Jd.
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bipartisan support. 192
Despite the high level of interest. in reducing it, no marriage
penalty relief provisions were included in either the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997 or the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, the
two major tax reform measures enacted in the 105 th Congress. 193
Moreover, while many members of the l05 th Congress denounced
marriage penalties, the tax legislation enacted added to the number of
marriage penalty provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. 194
Ideas about marriage penalty relief in the l05 th Congress
ranged from the narrowly targeted to the expansively over-inclusive.
Revenue costs also varied widely from $6 billion to $25 billion or so.
The trends in the two sessions were quite different and merit
individual analysis. Table 3, printed in the Appendix, traces these
trends in the two sessions and over the l05 th Congress as a whole. It
provides a summary and analysis of twenty-four bills described
below, encompassing the eight major categories of general income tax
marriage penalty relief proposed. 195 The trends in the House from
192 For much of the 105th Congress, all other business, including tax reform
had to compete with the impeachment process for the attention of the members. See, e.g.,
Cheryl Bolen, Senate to Pursue 'Dual Track' Approach; Do Legislation, Impeachment
Simultaneously, DAILY TAX REPORT, Dec. 15, 1998, at N-I (describing efforts of Senate
Republican leadership to decide whether to schedule only impeachment proceedings or
try to work on legislative business in the mornings and impeachment in the afternoons).
193 The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685; The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 10534, III Stat. 788.
Conservative Republican members made frequent statements to the press
about their intentions to eliminate the marriage penalty during the 105th Congress. See,
e.g., Heidi Glenn, Congress Returns to Its Go-Nowhere Agenda, 78 TAX NOTES 407
(1998) (quoting Senator Ashcroft (R-Mo) "This onerous tax on marriage penalizes the
traditional family. We must promote this institution, not punish it"). In the same article
Tax Notes also reported the plan of the Conservative Action Team in the House to include
"full elimination of the marriage penalty" in their budget plan. Id.
194 For example, the 1997 Act added several credit phaseout provisions
including that in the child credit. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
195 Figure A, supra, analyzes twelve categories of marriage penalty relief
proposals. In Appendix - Tables I through 4, two pairs o(the Figure A categories have
been consolidated (deduction from GI for joint return up to $50,000 with the standard
deduction doubling and the two versions of EITC phaseout relief) and two have been
elimi.nated (the §221 education loan interest deduction phaseout relief proposal and the
child care tax credit expansion). See also supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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1997 through 1999 are presented separately in Table 1 and those in
the Senate in Table 2, both also in the Appendix.
a. The first session, 1997
In the first session of the 10S th Congress, nine marriage
penalty relief bills were introduced, six in the House and three in the
Senate. 196 All but one were introduced by Republicans. The bills
advanced four different solutions to the income tax marriage penalty:
a dual earner deduction or credit; an increase in the standard deduction
for married couples; a new optional filing status for married couples;
and a return to the 1948 version of the joint return with full income
splitting. The bill that had the strongest support in the House was the
proposal of Representative Weller (R-IL) for optional taxation of
individual incomes in a combined return. Of the Senate bills, the split
income proposal introduced by Senator Faircloth (R-NC) had the
largest number of co-sponsors. None of the nine bills became part of
major legislation during the session.
\.

Doubled standard deduction

In the House, Representative Joseph K. Knollenberg (R-MI)
introduced a general tax reduction bill that included a proposal to
make the standard deduction for married couples filing joint returns
equal to twice the deduction allowed to unmarried individuals. The
biII also proposed to make the standard deduction for married persons
filing separate returns equal to the deduction for an unmarried
individual. 197 Knollenberg's bill had 14 co-sponsors by the end of the
session; all were Republicans. 198 The proposed doubling of the
196 In addition, House Bill 242, introduced by Mr. Neal (D-MA) on January
7, 1997, proposed the elimination of the marriage penalty in old I.R.C. § 121, the
provision allowing a one-time exclusion of gain from the sale of the principle residence
by taxpayers over the age of 55. See H.R. 242, 105th Congo (1997). Old I.R.C. § 121
was repealed by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, III Stat. 788 and
replaced by new I.R.C. § 121. New I.R.C. § 121 allows the exclusion of up to $500,000
in gain from the sale of a principal residence for married couples filing joint returns and
$250,000 for other taxpayers. I.R.C. § 121 (1999).
197 Taxpayer Relief and Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2718, 105th Congo §§
3(a), (1), (2) (1997).
198 H.R. 2718.

76

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XVI

standard deduction would remove one of the structural features of the
marriage penalty. But such a change would also substantially increase
marriage bonuses. Its impact extends well beyond reversing the
marriage penalty itself, which is only experienced by dual income
couples. The doubling proposal was not limited in any sense to the
marriage penalty couples. The effect of the proposal for a doubled
standard deduction simply would be to give a tax cut to all married
joint filers who ele.ct the standard deduction.
Under present law the standard deduction for joint filers
creates both marriage bonuses for sole income couples and marriage
penalties for dual income couples. It allows joint filers a deduction
that is greater than the amount allowed for an unmarried individual
but less than the total deduction that two unmarried individuals could
c1aim. 199 By setting the level of the joint filers' deduction at twice the
amount for unmarrieds, the portion of the marriage penalty arising
from the standard deduction would be eliminated. But the marriage
bonus effect of the standard deduction would be increased as well.
For sole earner married couples who are already using a standard
deduction that is 60 percent larger than what they would be entitled to
use as singles, the doubling would result in a marriage bonus of 100
percent. If the bill were applicable for 1999, it would give all married
couples filing joint returns that did not itemize their personal
deductions an additional deduction of $2,900.
It is difficult to estimate the ultimate cost of such a proposal.
However, the estimated revenue cost for a similar proposal made in
1998 that also included an additional deduction for the blind and
elderly was about $6 billion a year. The House Ways and Means
Committee estimated that the somewhat broader 1998 proposal would
affect 48 million married individuals but did not indicate how many
would just be receiving additional marriage bonuses. Ways and
Means did note that six million additional individuals were expected
to use the standard deduction if it were doubled. 2oo

199

See examples in notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.

200 HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, H.R. Doc No. 105-739,
reprinted in BNA TEXT SuPP., Sept. 25, 1998, at S-25, S-26, S-58. Although 72 percent
of all taxpayers use the standard deduction, it appears to be used by a lower percentage of
joint return filers. See CBOSTUDY, supra note 4, at 15. The CBO estimates that there
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Increasing the standard deduction would have little impact on
the other sources of the marriage penalty. The standard deduction
only reduces taxable income and does not affect adjusted gross
income. But adjusted gross income is the measure used to determine
eligibility for the earned income credit, child care credit and in most
other phaseouts.201 Moreover, allowing a doubled standard deduction
for all joint return filers across the board is a solution that is both over
inclusive and narrow in scope. Some but not all of the revenue loss
would reduce marriage penalties, most would go to marriage bonus
couples. And even though inefficient, poorly focused and expensive,
it is a solution that addresses only one source of the penalty and hence
would leave much of the marriage penalty firmly in place. The CBO
study estimated that 51 percent of the revenue cost of both doubling
brackets and the standard deduction would go to marriage bonus
couples. No estimate was provided of the effect or cost of doubling
the standard deduction by itself, but the CBO notes that the standard
deduction is an important contributor to the marriage penalty in lower
income couples?02
The choice of the standard deduction as the focus of marriage
penalty relief may have the appeal of simplicity but it can lead to
erratic and inequitable results. While some 70 percent of returns
claim the standard deduction, another 30 percent do not because
taxpayers have chosen to itemize their deductions instead. Although
disproportionately more higher income taxpayers choose to itemize
than do low income taxpayers, there are important variations based
upon state of residence. Taxpayers in such high tax states as New
York and California elect to itemize more frequently, at the rates of
36% and 34.8% respectively, and at lower income levels than do
taxpayers in low tax states like Texas, which has no state income tax.
Only about 18.4% of federal income tax returns filed in Texas in 1997

were 54.67 million married couples filing tax returns in 1995. /d. at tbl. C-4. The
General Accounting Office [hereinafter GAO] report found that 25.15 million married
taxpayers filing jointly used the standard deduction in 1992. See GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra
note 171, at appendix V.
MARGINAL

201 See I.R.C. §§ 32(a)(2), 21(a)(2) (1999).
RATE STUDY, supra note 40, at 4-10.

202 CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 51.

See also 1998 EFFECTIVE
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claimed itemized deductions. 203
Further, reliance on the standard deduction to deliver marriage
penalty relief may impose unintended costs on lower income couples.
The itemized deduction for medical expenses is heavily used at lower
income levels. More than 49 percent of the tax returns that in 1997
claimed the itemized deduction for medical and dental expenses
reported AGI below $30,000. Some 2,799,965 tax returns were in this
category.204 Why marriage penalty relief should not also be available
to taxpayers who do not elect the standard deduction because, for
example, they have a catastrophic accident in a given year and itemize
their medical expenses is not clear.
II.

Dual earner deduction or credit

Two different versions of the dual earner deduction were
proposed in the first session. Early in 1997, Representative Sam
Johnson (R-TX) proposed a dual earner credit of up to $145 for joint
return filers. 20S Like the dual earner tax credit proposal in the
Contract with America, the statutory dollar limit was further limited
by the amount of marriage penalty on earned income. Eleven other
Republicans joined Johnson as co-sponsors when the bill was
introduced. Later in the session, Representative Wally Herger (CA-R)
introduced H.R. 2593, proposing an above the line dual earner
deduction very similar to the one that had been in effect from 1981
through 1986.206 The proposed amendment would have permitted a
deduction from gross income of up to $3,000 for dual earner married
couples filing joint returns. The deduction was further limited by the
earned income of the low earner?07 Herger's dual earner deduction
203 See INTERNAL REv. SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 153-205
(Spring 1999) [hereinafter SOl BULLETIN].
204 See id.

20S Tax Freedom for Families Act of 1997, H.R. 1584, 105th Congo § 202
(1997) (introduced by Mr. Sam Johnson (R -TX» (credit to reduce marriage penalty).
206 See text accompanying notes 145-150 supra.
207 Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 2593, 105th Congo § 2 (1997)
(introduced by Mr. Herger (R-CA» (restoration of deduction for two-earner married
couples); compare GENERAL EXPLANATION OF ERTA. supra note 145 and I.R.C. § 221
(prior to repeal in 1986), reprinted in I INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, INCOME TAXES 486169 (CCH, June 25, 1999).
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bill attracted 188 co-sponsors - 51 Democrats and 137 Republicans.
Representative Barbara Kennelly (D-CT) introduced the measure with
Herger. 208 Judged by the number of co-sponsors, the Herger dual
earner deduction was the runner-up in the House.
The CBO Report estimated that restoration of the dual earner
deduction, which is what Herger proposed, would cost about $9
billion in lost revenue. 209 About 80 percent of the revenue cost would
be applied to reduce marriage penalties. But about 10 percent of the
tax reduction arising from the dual earner deduction would go to joint
return filers already receiving marriage bonuses. The Congressional
Budget Office predicted that the greatest impact of the dual earner
deduction would be felt in the $50,000 to $100,000 aggregate income
range?IO It would not have much affect on the marriage penalty at
lower incomes because in addition to the $3,000 ceiling, the dual
earner deduction is limited to 10 percent of the earnings of the low
earner.
Restoring the dual earner deduction would reduce aggregate
marriage penalties by about 32 percent. 211 Although in amount the
$2,900 extra standard deduction that Representative Knollenberg
proposed is very close to the $3,000 maximum that the restored dual
earner deduction would allow, the two deductions are quite different
in their impact on marriage penalties. The dual earner deduction
reduces adjusted gross income and hence could reduce the marriage
penalty impact of the earned income tax credit, child care deduction
and other phaseouts which are calculated with reference to adjusted
gross income. The increase in the standard deduction would not
reduce marriage penalties as much as the dual earner deduction would
because the standard deduction has no impact on adjusted gross
income. It simply reduces taxable income. 212
208 H.R. 2593.
209

CBO STUDY, supra note 4 at Summary tbl. 4.

210/d. at 51-52, Summary tbl. 4, fig. 8. CBO estimates that 3% would go to

unaffected couples and 7% to penalty couples, but in amounts in excess of their penalties.

Id.
211

Id. at Summary tbl. 4.

212 See I.R.C. §§ 32(a)(2), 21(a)(2) (1999); compare I.R.C. §§ 62 and 63

(1999). See also Figure A, supra.
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Optional combined return of individual incomes

Three bills in the House and one in the Senate proposed a
new, optional separate return filing status for married couples that
recognized the individual income of each spouse as the pasic measure
of ability to pay tax. This innovative alternative to the joint return
would allow married couples to elect on an annual basis whether to
file a joint return or the new optional combined return of individual
incomes.213 The optional combined return would allow husband and
wife to determine their separate taxable incomes and then calculate
the tax due on each income using the rate tables for unmarried
individuals. The sum of the two tax computations would be the tax
due from the couple?14 It is an efficiently focused penalty relief
proposal because only couples who otherwise would incur marriage
tax penalties are likely choose this alternative. But the proposed
separate filing status would not eliminate all marriage penalty effects
because in the form proposed important features of the joint return
system would be retained.
The disaggregation of incomes in the tax computation would
eliminate the marriage penalty effects of the progressive tax rate
tables, the standard deduction and all other features that affect the
determination of taxable income. Income of one spouse would no
longer be stacked on top of the income of the other in determining the
initial amount of tax payable. 215 However, the opti'onal combined
return of individual incomes as proposed did retain some features of
the joint return, including joint and several liability for tax. Further,
213 Compare Taxpayer Justice Act of 1997, H.R. 3059, 105th Congo (1997)
(introduced by Ms. Jackson-Lee (D-TX»; Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 2456,
105th Congo (1997) (introduced by Mr. Weller (R-IL»; H.R. 2462, 105th Congo (1997)
(introduced by Mr.Kasich (R-OH»; and Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th
Congo (1997) (introduced by Mrs. Hutchinson (R-TX» (section 2 -Combined returns to
which unmarried rates apply). See also Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1285, 105th
Congo (1997) (introduced by Mr. Faircloth (R-NC» (section 2 - Combined return to
which unmarried rates apply). The term "optional combined return of individual
incomes" is developed and introduced in this article. See supra note 181.
214 H.R. 2456 (proposing new § 6013A to the Internal Revenue Code). The
citations here are to the proposed new LR.C. section.
215 For d'Iscusslon
. an d exampI
'
. rate
es 0f
marriage
pen a I"
ties In the progressive

tables and standard deduction, see supra text accompanying notes 42-48, 26-33, 136-41.
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the new married separate filing status did not attempt to reverse the
marriage penalties in the various tax credit phaseouts or the EITC.
. The optional combined return of individual incomes is a
distinct departure from the joint return and its goal of equal tax for all
married couples. with the same total income.
It would allow
differentia~ion bet~een couples and would result in two married
couples 'with the same total incomes paying different amounts of tax,
if, for example, one was a sole earner couple and the other was a dual
earner couple. Th'e dual earner couple would generally pay less tax
than the sole earner couple unless all income was within the lowest
marginal bracket. 216 All married couples with dual incomes, whether
the sources of i~come are earnings or investments, would be eligible
to make the election' to report individual incomes on a combined
return.
The four bills proposing the optional combined return were
identical, although one was introduced by a Democrat, Representative
Jackson-Lee (0-TX), and the others by Republicans. In the Senate,
Mrs. Hutchinson's (R-TX) bill found twelve co-sponsors. But in the
House,
Representative
Weller's (R- IL) bill had very wide support. It
.
.
attracted 238 co-sponsors, the largest following among all of the antipenalty bills in the first session of the 105 th Congress. 217
The optional filing proposal is a hybrid, allowing
disaggregati<?n of incomes some of the time but retaining the joint
return's concepts of tax liability and aggregation for most phaseouts.
The option to use the unmarried individual rate tables and
dissaggregate income was conditioned upon filing a combined return.
Apart from the separate income and tax table computations, the
combined return was to be treated as if it were a joint return. 218 The
proposal specified that tax credits would continue to be "determined"
and applied against the couple's joint tax liability "as if the spouses
had filed a joint return.,,219 Thus the combined return would not have
216 This conclusion assumes that the combined return allows each spouse an
unmarried individual's standard deduction, which was the effect of the proposals.
217

.

. H.R. 2456; Bill Summary & Status for I05th Congress (visited
Dec.ll, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

218
219

.

H.R. 2456 (proposed sections 6013A (a)( I) & (e».
H.R. 2456 (proposed section 6013A(d».

The provision speaks of
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reduced the marriage penalty effects of the many tax credit phaseouts
based on joint return AGI. Other features of the joint return, including
joint and several liability would apply to the combined filing.
Reducing pre-credit tax by means of the optional combined
return would have the effect of making any earned income credits
more valuable because this credit is refundable. But the optional
combined return would not have alleviated the marriage penalty
effects of the EITC phaseout. The married couple with two incomes
of $11,000 each would continue to have to aggregate incomes in
determining the earned income tax credit and they would find that
marriage still reduced their earned income credits by $2,817, or 12.8
percent of their AGI. 220
One important issue that the proposal leaves somewhat
unresolved is the allocation of income from property. The approach
to identifying separate income that the optional combined return takes
might have the effect of reopening the old controversy about
community property that the adoption of the joint return in 1948 was
intended to end. Earned income is to be taxed to "the spouse who
rendered the services." Income from property is to be "divided
between the spouses in accordance with their respective ownership
rights in such property.,,221 For married couples, ownership rights in
property are still determined by the marital property law of the
jurisdiction in which they reside. Community property law differs
from state to state and ownership rights can sometimes be found in the
absence of control. 222 Because control is the general standard in the
applying the credits against "the joint liability of the couple for tax." !d.

220 See supra note 55.

221 H.R. 2456 (proposed section 60I3A(b)(I) & (2».
222 Community property law continues to be regarded

as different from
common law on these questions even though most common law states have adopted
equitable distribution concepts that arguably give spouses interests in property to which
they do not have title during the marriage. The old law allowing or even requiring
income splitting for tax purposes by couples in the community property law system
remains in effect except where Congress has specifically provided that community
property laws will not apply. Unless the intention is to reopen the possibility of
differences in taxation based on different marital property law systems, it may be
necessary to introduce the concept of control along with ownership. See Beck, supra note
20, at 465-467 (discussing the continuing impact of Poe v. Seaborn and community
property law in the income tax). Professor Beck argues that its main impact has been to
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tax law for assigning tax liability, there is a potential for contlict if
state law rights arise when tax concepts of control are not satisfied. 223
The intention may be to deal with this issue in regulations but it is too
sizable an issue for such a delegation. 224
IV.

Income splitting joint return

Senator Faircloth (R-NC) proposed an optional combined
return that would have permitted married couples to choose to be
taxed on the basis of the income-splitting joint return that was in
effect from 1948 to 1970. Although the structure of his proposal was
the same as the Weller bill's, the content was quite different. Like the
Weller combined return, the Faircloth version allowed husband and
wife to elect to determine their incomes separately and then apply the
tax tables for unmarried individuals. But the Faircloth version defined
the separate income of each spouse as "one-half of the taxable income
computed as if the spouses were filing a joint return." A doubled
standard deduction was also to be allowed. Thus it called for a return
to income splitting, 1948 style. Apart from this very significant
difference, the Faircloth optional combined return followed the Weller
proposal, retaining the joint return features and the marriage penalty
effects of the credit phaseout rules.
Like the prototype 1948 income splitting joint return, the 1997
Faircloth proposal would eliminate marriage penalties in the rate
structure itself and also, like the 1948 proposal, it would create
substantial marriage bonuses. The present rate tables with their morethan-one, less-than-two bracket differential already give sole income
couples marriage bonuses.
But the Faircloth income splitting
make married women in community property law jurisdictions who file separate returns
liable for tax on half the income of their husbands. He also notes seven provisions in the
Internal Revenue Code which contain the override language directing implementation
"without regard to community property laws." /d.
223 See Kornhauser, supra note 153, at 74-77; accord Susan Kalinka, Federal
Taxation o/Community Income: A Simpler and More Equitable Approach, 1990 WIS. L.
REv. 633, 633-35 (1990) (arguing for a change in the "settled principle" in federal income
taxation that control of property is irrelevant in taxation of community property).
224 The Joint Committee Staff report notes that "It is not clear whether
ownership rights would be determined without regard to community property laws."
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO
PROPOSALS TO REDUCE THE MARRIAGE TAX PENALTY, JCX-I-98, at n.14 (1998).
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approach would increase marriage bonuses by doubling the marginal
brackets for all married couples and their standard deduction.
Measured by reference to the married couple, all joint return filers
would seem to be able to reduce taxes on the basis of the Faircloth
income splitting combined return. For unmarried taxpayers, it would
also re-introduce the singles penalty differential supposedly redressed
in the 1969 amendments. Senator Faircloth's income splitting
combined return attracted 39 co-sponsors in the Senate. 225
The Faircloth proposal for an income splitting· combined
return is another example of an approach that is both over-inclusive
and limited in its impact on the marriage penalty. Retaining as did the
Weller proposal the joint return for determining applicability of tax
credits, the Faircloth income splitting return would have no impact on
phaseout penalties or the EITC marriage penalties. Yet it would
increase the marriage bonuses of virtually all bonus couples. The
Congressional Budget Office analysis of a comparable proposal
suggests that the revival of the income splitting joint return would cost
about $25 billion and that 51 percent of that revenue loss would be
caused by tax reductions that further increased marriage bonuses. 226
v.

Other thoughts about marriage penalties

Members of Congress expressed interest in exploring
alternatives to the current joint return system in several resolutions
also introduced in this session. Senator Kerrey (D-NE) included in
Senate Bill 1096, the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1997, a provision that would have required the
Treasury and the Comptroller General to each conduct a study of
separate filing. He asked for recommendations for eliniinating the
marriage penalty, dealing with community property. issues, and
"reducing the burden for divorced and separated taxpayers."
Representative Portman (R-OH) introduced an identical bill in the

225 See Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S.1285, 105th Cong.· (1997)
(introduced by Mr. Faircloth (R-NC), Oct. 9, 1997) .
226 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at Summary tbl. 4. The CBO estimate· is
an evaluation of the doubling of marginal brackets and standard deductions, which is the.
effect of the Faircloth proposal. Like the Faircloth proposal, it would appear to leave ihe
impact of credit phaseouts on· marriage penalties unchanged, i.e., still in effect.
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House on July 30, 1997, the day before Senator Kerrey introduced his
bill.227
Other resolutions expressed a general concern about the
impact of the tax system on marriage and family. Senator Faircloth,
who had introduced the bill calling for the re-creation of the 1948 split
income version of the joint return, also included the marriage penalty
issue in his outline of nine goals for "any new Federal tax system."
Number seven on his list was the direction that any new tax "not
penalize marriage or families." The provision was part of his Tax
Code Elimination Act of 1997?28
b. The second session, 1998
In the second session of the 10S th Congress interest turned in
an entirely different direction. Both the House and the Senate
strongly endorsed the idea of restructuring the standard deduction to
in effect remove its marriage penalty feature. But while each chamber
approved such a measure in 1998, the two specific proposals that
passed were quite different in scope and impact. Proposals for more
comprehensive relief also attracted substantial support. The House
and Senate favored very different approaches to this solution as well.
The doubled standard deduction proposal appeared in six bilIs
in the House, including the 1998 Taxpayer Relief Act, which passed
the House and then floundered in the Senate. This proposal attracted
the most co-sponsors among the various ideas for marriage penalty
relief introduced in the House during the session. In the Senate, a
different proposal for removing the marriage penalty element in the
standard deduction gained approval as an amendment to the Universal
Tobacco Settlement Act. The version that the Senate approved was
targeted to low and middle income levels and structured as an above
the line deduction reducing adjusted gross income and phaseout

227 The Kerrey bill called for studies of the "feasibility of treating each
individual separately for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." S. 1096, I05th
Congo (1997). It is not clear whether his interest was in mandatory or optional separate
taxation. Rep. Portman's bill was H.R. 2292, 105th Congo (1997).

228 Internal Revenue Service Oversight, Restructuring and Tax Code
Elimination Act of 1997, S. 1555, I05th Congo (1997) (introduced November 13, 1997).
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penalties. 229
Measured by the co-sponsor interest in individual bills, the
House leader was again a bill introduced by Congressman Weller.
His 1998 proposal took a quite different approach than had the
focused and efficient solution advanced in his 1997 bill. In the second
session Mr. Weller's bill proposed structural income splitting - the
doubling of the standard deduction and tax rate brackets for joint
return filers. In the Senate, few co-sponsors emerged for any of the
bills. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson's bill reintroducing the optional
combined return of individual incomes proposal tied with the Gramm
joint filers' deduction amendment for most co-sponsors in the session.
Each bill only attracted four co-sponsors.
The array of proposals introduced in this session included both
new ideas about marriage penalty relief and solutions that had been
seen before. The new proposals were, first, an increase in the income
ceiling of the earned income tax credit specifically for married
couples and second, structural income splitting through doubling of
the standard deduction and marginal rate brackets for joint filers.
Doubling of the lowest bracket entered the field of competing
solutions to the income tax marriage penalty. The dual earner
deduction and the optional combined return proposals were also
reintroduced. Overall, sixteen different bills and measures addressed
themselves specifically to the marriage penalty issue. 23o
I.

Doubled standard deduction

The proposal to increase the standard deduction for joint
returns as a form of marriage penalty relief, which had been
229 See Appendix-Table 3 infra. For an account of the legislative history of
the 1998 Taxpayer Relief Act (H.R. 4579, 105th Congo (1998» in the House and Senate,

see Clinton Signs Omnibus Spending Bill Containing Tax Extenders. Some Ta'C Breaks,
DAILY TAX REPORT, Oct. 22, 1998, at GG-2 (noting that "Senate GOP leaders had sought
to bring up for Senate floor consideration an $80 billion tax cut package (H.R. 4579), but
lacked the votes needed to prevent a threatened filibuster and to override an expected
presidential veto of the measure."). See Appendix - Table 2 infra for a listing of the
major marriage penalty relief proposals introduced as amendments to the Universal
Tobacco Settlement Act, S.1415, 105th Congo (1997).
230 See Appendix - Table 3 infra for a listing of the bills introduced in the
Second session with notation of sponsorship interest in leading bills and proposals; see
also Figure A supra for a summary of the impact of each category of proposal.
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introduced in one bill in the first session of the 105 th Congress, was reintroduced in ten bills and measures in the second session. These ten
new bills and measures had broad bipartisan support. Seven of the
bills proposed the doubling of the standard deduction alone 231 and
three proposed it in combination with a doubling of marginal brackets
for joint return filers. 232 Democrats Rangel (D-NY) and Gephardt (DMO) introduced bills to provide marriage penalty relief by giving joint
return filers a doubled standard deduction as did Republicans Nancy
Johnson (R-CT) and Weller (R-IL) and House Ways and Means
Chairman Archer (R-TX).
The ten bills and amendments advocating an increased
standard deduction took a number of different approaches to achieving
that end. The Archer bill, H.R. 4579, which passed in the House on
September 26, 1998, provided simply that the standard deduction for
joint return filers would be twice the amount for unmarried
individuals. 233 Archer's bill was very similar to the Knollenberg
proposal of the prior year. The 1998 bills of Representatives Rangel
and Nancy Johnson also provided for a doubling based on the existing
statutory amounts of the standard deductions. 234 But five of the bills
proposed to increase the base amount of the standard deduction for all
four filing statuses as well as to allow joint return filers a doubled
deduction?35 Yet another of these proposals, an amendment twice
231 See H.R. 3524, 105th Congo § I (1998) (introduced by Representative
McDermott (D-WA»; Marriage Penalty Reduction Act, S. 1989, 105th Congo § 2 (1998)
(introduced by Senator Ford (D-KY»; Tax Relief for Working Americans Act of 1998,
H.R. 4542, 105th Congo § 101 (1998) (introduced by Mrs. N. Johnson (R-CT); 1998
Taxpayer Relief Act, H.R. 4579, 105th Congo § 101 (1998) (introduced by Mr. Archer (RTexas»; Save Social Security and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1998, H.R. 4597, 105th Congo §
101 (1998) (introduced by Mr. Rangel (D-NY); S. Arndt. 2686, 105th Congo (1998) and
S. Arndt. 2437, 105th Congo (1998), both amending the Universal Tobacco Settlement
Act, S. 1415, 105th Congo (1997), both offered by Mr. Gramm (R-TX).
232 Gephardt 10 percent Tax Act of 1998, H.R. 3620, 105th Congo § 102
(1998) (introduced by Mr. Gephardt (D-MO»; Marriage Penalty Elimination Act of 1998,
H.R. 3734, 105th Congo § 3 (1998) (introduced by Mr. Weller (R-IL»; Marriage Penalty
Elimination Act of 1998, S. 1999, 105th Congo § 3 (1998) (introduced by Mrs.
Hutchinson (R-TX». See also discussion of structural income splitting at note 237 infra.
233 H.R.4579 § 101.
234

Compare H.R. 4579 § WI with H.R. 4542 § 101 and H.R. 4597 § 101.

235

Compare H.R. 3524 § I with S. 1989 § 2, H.R. 3620 § 102, H.R. 3734 §
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offered by Senator Gramm to the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act,
proposed an increase in the joint filers' deduction but restricted it to
those with adjusted gross incomes of $50,000 or less. The Gramm
proposal made the anti-penalty increment of the standard deduction an
adjustment to gross income. As an above the line deduction, the
Gramm proposal would have reduced adjusted gross income of
eligible joint return filers and hence reduced phaseout penalties. It
also included a provision that specifically provided relief from the
EITC phaseout for joint return filers eligible for the new deduction. 236
Structural income splitting

II.

One of the more significant developments in the second
session was the emergence of a marriage penalty relief proposal that
can be described as structural income splitting. In the 1997 session,
one Senate bill that received considerable support had tried to recreate the tax computation method of the 1948 joint return, restoring
to married couples full income splitting.
This bill was not
reintroduced in the second session but members in both chambers
proposed bills that achieved substantially the same effects. Rather
than changing the joint return provisions of the tax law, these
structural income splitting bills proposed to reach the same tax
outcome by a coordinated restructuring of both the standard deduction
and the tax rate tables. The standard deduction was to modified to
provide joint return filers with an allowance equal to double the
amount given to unmarried individuals. At the same time, the tax
tables were to be redesigned to create a new joint return rate schedule
in which the tax brackets would be twice as wide as those for
unmarried individuals. Another related development was seen in the
bills which proposed widening some or all of the of tax brackets for
joint return filers. Five bills introduced in the second session
proposed to give married couples some or all of the benefits of the
1948 version of the income.splittingjoint return. 237
3, andS. 1999 § 3.
236 S. Arndt. 2686. See also Lawrence Zelenak, Gramm Marriage Penalty
Fix Needs Some Fixing of Its Own, 79 TAX NOTES 1515 (1998) (pointing out the Gramm
Amendment's cliff effect).
237

Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1998, H.R. 3151, 105th Congo § 3 (1998)
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Three of the proposals in this category, which were introduced
by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson and Representatives Gephardt and
Weller, would have given joint return filers the entire structural
income splitting package of doubled marginal brackets and doubled
standard deductions. 238 In essence this combination replicates the
1948 joint return as far as income computation and pre-credit taxes
were concerned. But neither of these changes would affect the
phaseouts or other marriage penalties that were determined on the
basis of adjusted gross income. Standard deductions and rate tables
do not have any impact of adjusted gross income. In terms of
reducing marriage penalties, the CBO found the split income approach
would remove about 44 percent of penalties. Weller's bill had 58 cosponsors in the House, fifty-seven Republicans and one Democrat.
Overall, this approach is an expensive and inefficient way to
reduce marriage penalties. The cost of structural income splitting is
high. The 1997 Congressional Budget Office report estimated that
doubling brackets and standard deductions would cost about $25
billion. These adjustments are in substance across the boards tax cuts
and the CBO' s prediction that some 51 percent of the tax savings
would be received by marriage bonus couples confirms this
observation. 239 In comparison the dual earner deduction, which is also
criticized for being somewhat inefficient, would have a revenue cost
of only $9 billion and would remove about 32 percent of the penalty.
Only about 10 percent of the revenue cost for the dual earner form of
marriage penalty relief would leak out to marriage bonus couples.
(introduced by Mr. Thune (R - SD) on Feb. 3, 1998) (increases the 15% bracket and
doubles this bracket for joint returns); H.R. 3620 § 101 (offers a general reduction in
rates; all joint return brackets double individual); H.R. 3734 § 2 (section 2 - all joint
return brackets double individual); S. 1999 §2 (all joint return brackets double
individual); Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1998, S. 1569, 105th Congo § 2 (1998)
(introduced by Mr. Coverdell (R-Ga), Jan. 27, 1998) (increases the 15% bracket and
doubles this bracket for joint return; same as H.R. 3151). See also Appendix-Table 3

infra.
238 H.R. 3620 §§ 101, 102 (general reduction in rates; all joint return brackets
double individual; raises standard deduction); H.R. 3734 §§ 2, 3 (all joint return brackets
double individual; raises standard deduction); S.1999 §§ 2, 3 (all joint return brackets
double individual; raises standard deduction). See also Figure A supra; Appendix - Table

3 infra.
239

CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at Summary tbl. 4.
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The other two bills, those of Representative Thune and
Senator Coverdell, attempted something less than full structural
income splitting, focusing instead on marginal tax brackets alone.
These identical bills would have created a 15 percent bracket with a
ceiling of $70,000 for joint return filers and $35,000 for unmarried
individuals?40 In the upper brackets, the post-1969 relationship of
more-than-one, less-than-two was maintained. So marriage penalties
remained above the $70,000 level but were eliminated from the rate
table structure for married couples with incomes up to that level.
Neither bill proposed to alter the standard deduction. Some 44
percent of joint return filers in the $20,000 to $50,000 income group
pay marriage penalties and 54 percent receive bonuses.241 Like the
larger vertical adjustment proposed by Gephardt and the others, the
newly widened bottom bracket would redress some marriage penalties
but would also increase marriage bonuses for many couples.
Ill.

Optional combined return of individual incomes

Senator Hutchinson reintroduced her proposal for an optional
combined return of individual incomes in the second session of the
105 th Congress. She later also proposed structural income splitting
through doubled brackets and doubled standard deductions as
described above. Although the combined return of individual incomes
bill attracted only four co-sponsors in the Senate in 1998, it tied with
the Gramm joint filers deduction for most heavily co-sponsored bill in
the session. In the House this proposal, which had gathered 271 cosponsors in 1997, was not reintroduced in 1998.242

240 H.R. 3151 § 3 (increases 15% bracket and doubles this bracket for joint
returns); S. 1569 §2 (increases 15% bracket and doubles this bracket for joint return; same
as H.R. 3151).
241

CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at Summary tbl. I.

.

See Half and Half: Tax Relief and Debt Reduction Action of 1998, S.
1711, 105th Congo (1998) (introduced by Mrs. Hutchinson (R-Texas), March 5, 1998)
(proposing optional combined return of individual incomes). Senator K.B. Hutchinson's
structural income splitting bill was Senate Bill 1999, 105th Congo (1998). See also
Appendix - Table 3 infra for a comparison of the bills introduced in the first and second
sessions of the 105th Congress.
242
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Dual earner deduction or credit

The solution to the marriage penalty that had drawn 188 cosponsors in the first session of the 105 th Congress attracted little
interest in the second session. In the debate over the Universal
Tobacco Settlement bill, Senator Daschle (D-SD) proposed the dual
earner deduction as an amendment. Structurally similar to the dual
earner deduction repealed in 1986, the Daschle proposal allowed
much larger deductions but phased out entirely at $60,000 of joint
adjusted gross income. The amendment was rejected in the Senate.
Senator Daschle also introduced his dual earner proposal in a separate
bill.243
v.

Earned income tax credit relief

In the first session of the 105 th Congress, none of the marriage
penalty relief proposals addressed the substantial marriage penalties
that can arise in the earned income tax credit. During the second
session, EITC phaseout penalty relief provisions were included in
three bills, two in the Senate and one in the House.
In the House, Representative Neal (D-MA) introduced a bill
that targeted marriage penalty relief at the earned income tax credit
phaseout. The marriage tax penalties at this level are notoriously
large, averaging 7.6 percent of income but ranging as high as 25
percent. The Neal proposal would have lifted the starting point of the
phaseout from $11,610 to $16,020 for married couples filing a joint
return. Seventeen Democrats co-sponsored the measure. 244 In the
Senate, EITC marriage penalty relief also received attention for the

243 See S. Arndt. 2688, 105th Congo (1998), amending Universal Tobacco
Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Congo (1997) (offered by Mr. Daschle (D-SD) on June 10,
1998) (professing "to provide a deduction for two-earner married couples ... "); S. 2147,
105th Congo (1998). The Daschle dual earner deduction bases the phaseout on "the
taxpayer's" modified adjusted gross income but elsewhere refers to the earned income of
"the spouse." !d. The import seems to be that the ceiling is based on the joint return and
not on the income of the low earner spouse. See also Appendix - Table 3 infra for a
comparison of the proposals introduced and co-sponsorship interest in the two sessions.

244 For a fuller discussion of EITC marriage penalties, see supra notes 49-60
and accompanying text. See also H.R. 3995, 105th Congo (1998) (introduced by Mr. Neal
(D-MA), June 4, 1998); Bill Summary & Status report for I05th Cong. (/998), (visited
Dec. II, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>.
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first time in the IOSlh Congress. Both the Gramm amendments and
the Daschle amendment and bill made special provision to address the
earned income credit and sought to have the deductions they were
proposing reduce the EITC phaseout marriage penalties. However,
the focus of the marriage penalty relief being proposed differed from
bill to bill. The Daschle proposal was limited to dual earner couples,
at least potentially marriage penalty couples. But the Gramm and
Neal proposals would have increased EITC eligibility for joint filers
who were sole earner couples as well as dual earners, hence removing
penalties and adding to bonuses at the same time. 245
VI.

The sense of the Congress

In addition to the many bills and proposals, members of
Congress again expressed their thoughts about the marriage penalty in
resolutions as they had done in the first session. These resolutions
were more specific in their content. While expressing very grave
concern about the possibility that the income tax was influencing
marriage behavior, the resolutions also voiced concern about the
creation of tax disincentives for traditional family structures.
The Senate resolved that "a simple and fair federal tax system
is one that ... does not penalize marriage or families." The same
resolution went on to express its concern about the impact of marriage
penalties on society. Noting the findings of the Congressional Budget
Office on the percentage of married couples paying penalties and the
average size of those penalties, the resolution added a piece of data
from another source. It reported that there had been a very substantial
increase in the percentage of unmarried couples between 1970 to
1996. The Senate in its resolution drew its own conclusions about the
behavioral effects of marriage penalties. It found that "This penalty is
one ofthe factors behind the decline of marriage" and resolved to start
reducing it. This resolution passed in the Senate on April 2, 1998. 246
A few weeks before, on February 11, 1998, the House of
245

See S. Arndt. 2688; S.1415; S. Arndt. 2686, 105th Congo (1998) and S.
Arndt. 2437, 105th Congo (1998); see also Appendix - Table 3 infra and Figure A sllpra.
246

Concurrent Senate Budget Resolution for FY 1999 - 2003, S. Res. 86,
105th Congo §§ 302, 326 (1998) (epacted). The fin9ing that 0.5% of couples were
unmarried couples in 1970 and that 7.2% were unmarried in 1996 is unattributed.
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Representatives had passed a resolution expressing the sense of
Congress that "the federal government should acknowledge the
importance of at-home parents and should not discriminate against
families who forgo a second income in order for a mother or father to
be at home with their children.,,247 More clearly perhaps than the
technical solutions to the marriage penalty that it debated, these
resolutions express the conflict for Congressional policy makers
between the claims of sole earner married couples for their now
traditional marriage bonuses and the increasingly pressing tax equity
claims of dual earner couples.
In the 1997 session, the House appeared to be interested in
proposals that were more narrowly focused on reducing taxes for
marriage penalty couples. The two ideas about marriage penalty relief
that attracted substantial interest, the dual earner deduction and the
optional combined return of individual incomes, both had this effect.
Moreover, the interest shown in these proposals indicated a
willingness to consider differentiating between married couples on the
basis of the individual incomes of husband and wife. On the other
hand, the more expansive and less targeted combined return proposal
that simply reduced taxes on all married couples by re-introducing
complete income splitting gathered more support in the Senate than
did the idea of combined returns of individual incomes?48
The next year, in the second session, both the House and
Senate were attracted to the more over-inclusive solutions. Both
chambers approved proposals to double the standard deduction. At
the same time, the most over-inclusive solution, structural income
splitting, gained supporters in the House and the Senate. By the end
of the second session, the 105 th Congress seemed focused on
benefiting the sole earner married couple as much as it was working
on marriage penalty relief for the dual earner couple. 249

2. The 106th Congress
The first seven months of the I06 th Congress saw almost as
247 H. Con. Res. 202, 105th Congo (1998) (enacted).
248

Compare Figure A supra and Appendix - Table 3 infra.

249

Compare Figure A supra and Appendix - Table 3 infra.
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many marriage penalty relief proposals as had been made in the two
prior years put together. From January 6, 1999 through July 29,1999,
twenty separate bills and three important floor amendments
250
addressing the income tax marriage penalty were introduced.
th
During the entire 105 Congress, twenty-four bills had been
introduced. As in the 105 th Congress, proposals described as marriage
penalty relief by their sponsors ranged from full income splitting to
the dual earner deduction. The I06 th Congress had an interest in
changing specific joint return phaseouts and in general tax cuts, also
sometimes identified as marriage penalty relief. More than half the
bills proposed two or more anti-penalty provisions. In this riot of
marriage penalty relief proposals, one Senator introduced two bills on
the same day, offering two alternative formulations of the same
solution. 251
This intense legislative interest in the income tax marriage
penalty culminated in August in the passage of the Taxpayer Refund
and Relief Act of 1999, the $792 billion Republican tax cut bill that

250 For consistency, only the version of the tax cut bill House Bill 2488
reported by the Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee's Senate
Bill 1429 are included in the count of bills that were introduced in the 106th Congress.
Unless otherwise noted, neither of the engrossed tax cut bills in the House and Senate (the
versions that passed in the respective chambers) are included in the count or in the
analysis of introduced measures that follows. The conference bill is not counted as an
introduction either. On January 6, 1999, Rep. Joseph Knollenberg (R-MI) for the third
time introduced (in H.R. 108, 106th (1999) ), his proposal for a doubled standard
deduction for joint returns. See Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 108, § 2, 106th Congo
(1999). Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY) introduced House Bill 2646 on July 29,1999, a bill
which also proposed a double standard deduction for joint returns and expansion of the
dependent care deduction. See Common Sense Family Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R.
2646, §§ 101, 102, 106th Congo (1999). See infra Appendix - Table 4.
251 Compare the structural income splitting proposal in the Marriage Tax
Penalty Elimination Act of 1999, S. 12, 106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mrs.
Hutchinson (R-TX), Jan. 19, 1999) and the income splitting combined return proposal in
the Marriage Tax Elimination Act of 1999, S. 15, 106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mrs.
Hutchinson (R-TX), Jan. 19, 1999). Senator Hutchinson was not alone in her enthusiasm
for marriage penalty relief of this nature. She was joined by 18 co-sponsors in Senate Bill
12 and 12 co-sponsors in Senate Bill 15. On July 30, 1999, Senator Hutchinson also
introduced the floor amendment to Senate Bill 1429 that added the doubled standard
deduction to the Senate's tax cut bill. See S.Amdt. 1472, I06th Congo (1999); see also Bill
Summary & Status Reports, l06th Congo (1999), (visited Dec. II, 1999)

<http://thomas.loc.gov>.
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President Clinton vetoed on September 23, 1999. The vetoed bill
itself adopted four different marriage penalty solutions. 252 The
Senate, in its version of the bill, had approved five anti-penalty
proposals, including the optional combined return of individual
incomes. 253 Even more clearly than in the 105 th , there was strong
Congressional interest in simultaneously augmenting the benefits of
the joint return and in permitting individual taxation of spouses.
Despite the inconsistency of these two ideas of tax equity, the Senate
demonstrated that it was capable of holding both at the same time, at
least for awhile. In substance, the vetoed tax cut bill proposed
structural income splitting for middle income taxpayers, with
additional marriage penalty relief for upper income taxpayers through
the doubled standard deduction and earned income tax credit relief for
married couples at the lower end of the income range.
In the aftermath of the veto of the 1999 tax cut bill, the
question of what Congress will do about marriage penalties and
marriage bonuses remains open, perhaps not to be addressed again
until after the elections in the year 2000. In this fluid setting, the ideas
and interests of individual members expressed in the bills that they
introduced are even more important to understanding the direction of
policy development in this area. During the first session of the 106th
Congress, Representative Weller for the third time introduced the
individual House Bill that attracted the greatest number of cosponsors in the session. The structural income splitting program that
he introduced for the second time was also the most popular proposal
in the House, measured by number of co-sponsors. In the Senate,
Mrs. Hutchinson's structural income splitting bill also had the greatest
number of co-sponsors of any single bill. But the group of proposals
for relief from EITC marriage penalties, contained in four bills in the
Senate, found more co-sponsors?54

252 See infra note 282.

253

.

See Remarks on Returning Without Approval to the House of
Representatives the "Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999," 35 WEEKLY COMPo PRES.
Doc. 1793 (Sept. 23,1999); also Congress Clears and Keeps its $792 Billion Tax Cut, 84
TAX NOTES 807 (1999). For a fuller discussion of the vetoed bill, see infra text
accompanying note 300; Appendix - Table 4 infra.
254 See Appendix - Table 4 infra for a listing of the bills introduced in the
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Before examining the marriage penalty solutions selected by
the majority leadership in the vetoed Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act
of 1999, the trends in the individual member's bills are surveyed
below. Eight specific types of marriage penalty relief proposals were
proffered in the 106th Congress. They were: the doubled standard
deduction for joint returns; structural income splitting; income
splitting combined return; dual earner deduction; EITC phaseout
penalty relief for joint returns; expansion of child and dependent care
deduction for dual earners, phaseout penalty relief for the education
loan deduction; and optional combined reporting of individual
incomes. Rate flattening developed more of a following as a solution
to income tax marriage penalties and is also discussed below in the
text although it is not here classified as a major category of marriage
penalty relief and hence is not included in the tabular summaries.
Table 4, printed in the Appendix, maps the trends in twentythree different measures introduced in 1999 and all versions of the
vetoed tax cut bill. The shifts in sponsorship interest in the eight
major categories of proposals from session to session are presented in
summary form in Tables I and 2, also in the Appendix. 255
a. Doubled standard deduction
In the 106th Congress interest in doubling the standard
deduction for joint return filers remained strong. Eighteen of the
twenty-three marriage penalty relief bills and significant amendments
introduced in 1999 would have given joint return filers a standard
deduction equal to at least twice that allowed to unmarried
individuals. Eight of these bills sought to incorporate the doubled
standard deduction into a broader relief proposal; the remainder
confined themselves to proposing amendments to the standard
deduction allowance as the primary form of marriage penalty relief.
In all instances the doubled allowance was available to all joint return
filers whether or not they were dual earner or dual income couples.
Hence all the proposals had the effect of increasing the marriage
second session and a count of the co-sponsorships of the leading bills and proposals. To
compare the 1999 session with the I05th Congress, see Appendix - Tables 1 & 2, infra.
255 See note 195 supra for a comparison of the categories of proposals in
Figure A supra and Appendix - Tables I through 4 infra.
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bonus as well as reducing marriage penalties. Doubling the standard
deduction was a feature of the House Ways and Means Committee's
tax cut bill from its inception.' The proposal was added to the Senate
Finance Committee's bill only as a floor amendment.
Ten bills offered the doubled standard deduction as the only
form of general marriage penalty relief. 256 . In four bills in this group,
an . expansion of the child and dependent care credit was also
proposed, arguably a form of marriage penalty relief for dual earner
married couples but only applicable to those with children under the
age of 13 or other qualified dependents. Democrats introduced thre!!
of the four bills with the child care feature?57 The House Ways and
Means Committee's tax cut bill, the Financial Freedom Act of 1999,
was among those that offered general marriage penalty relief only
through the doubled standard deduction. 258 Like another Republican
sponsored bill introduced in the Senate, the Ways and Means
Committee bill included a general tax rate cut as wel1. 259
Representative Kleczka's bill, one of seven in 'the House that
proposed general marriage penalty relief through th~ doubled standard
256 Financial Freedom Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Congo §§ III, 112
(1999) (introduced by Mr. Archer (R-TX), July 16, 1999); Family Tax Reduction Act of
1999, H.R. 2085, 106th Congo §§ 2, 5 (1999) (introduced by Ms. Hooley (O-OR), June 9,
1999); Marriage Penalty Elimination Act of 1999, S. 284, 106th Congo § 2 (1999)
(introduced by Mr. McCain (R-AZ), Jan. 21, 1999); Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R.
108, 106th Congo §2 (1999) (introduced by Mr. Knollenberg (R-MI), Jan. 6, 1999); H.R.
725, 106th Corig. (1999) (introduced by Mr. Kleczka (0- WI), Feb. II, 1999); Tax Relief
for Working Americans Act of 1999, S. 1160, 106th Cong: § 101 (1999) (introduced by
Mr. Grassley (R-IA) and Ms. Feinstein (O-CA»; Tax Relief for Working Americans Act
of 1999, H.R. 2020, 106th Congo §§ 101, 102 (1999) (introduced by Mrs. Johnson (RCT»; Common Sense Family Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2646, 106th Congo §§ 101,
102 (1999) (introduced .by Mrs. McCarthy (0- NY), July 29, 1999); Pro-Family, ProGrowth, Pro-Reform Tax Reduction Act of 1999, H.R.2574, 106th Congo §§ 702, 703
(1999) (introduced by Mr. Maloney (O-CT), July 20, 1999).
.
257 H.R. 2085, §§ 2, 5; H.R. 2646, §§ 101, 102; H.R .. 2574, §§ 702, 703;
2020, §§ 10 I, 102. See also I.R.C. § 21 (1999).
258 The Ways and Means Committee bill also included, and identified as
marriage penalty relief, a proposal to raise the phaseout staJ:1ing point for the student loan
interest deduction ofI.R.C. section 221 for joint return filers. H.R. 2488, §§ III, 112.
259 The Senate bill, S. 799, also proposed a widened lowest bracket in all
filing categories. S. 799, I06th Congo §§ 1,2,3 (introduced by Mr. Nighthorse (R-CO)
April 14, 1999).
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deduction only, had 154 co-sponsors, the largest number in this
category of bi lls?60
In 1999 the support in Congress for focusing marriage penalty
relief on a restructured standard deduction was strong and bipartisan.
The Ways and Means Committee bill passed in the House as
introduced, without adding any additional ideas about general
marriage penalty relief. 261 In the Senate, the Democratic minority on
the Senate Finance Committee proposed an overall increase in the
standard deduction and restructuring it to double the joint return
allowance in order "to address the marriage penalty for couples who
do not itemize." The minority views also proposed a comparable
reduction in the income subject to phaseout in the earned income tax
credit for joint return filers "to provide a similar benefit.,,262 This
proposal was not offered as a bill but as a floor amendment to the
Senate Finance Committee's bil1. 263
The eight remaining introductions of the proposal combined a
doubled standard deduction with other substantial income tax law
amendments that were identified as marriage penalty relief. The
doubled standard deduction was a feature of the five bills that
proposed 1948 style income splitting in one form or another. 264 With
260

See Bill Status Report Data Base for 106th Congress, (visited Dec. II,

1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>.
261 Compare Financial Freedom Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Congo § 101
(1999) (introduced by Mr. Archer (R-TX), July 16, 1999) with Financial Freedom Act of
1999, H.R. 2488 (Engrossed House bill), 106th Congo § 10 I (1999) (passed by the House,
July 22,1999). Both versions of the bill included broad-based tax reduction through tax
rate cuts.

262 TAXPAYER REFUND ACT OF 1990 (S. 1429), S. REp. No. 106-120,
reprinted in BNA TEXT SUPP., July 27, 1999, at S-II 0 and S-112.
263 S.Amdt. 1442, §§ 101, 201, 106th Congo (1999), amending S. 1429,
106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mr. Breaux (D-LA), July 29, 1999). Senator Breaux's
amendment was withdrawn after debate. See Bill Status Report Data Base for 106th
Congress (visited Dec. II, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

264 Four bills proposed structural income splitting. See S. 12; Marriage Tax
Elimination Act of 1999, H.R. 6, 106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mr. Weller (R- IL ),
Feb. 10,1999); American Values Tax Savings Plan for the 21 51 Century, H.R. 2350, 106th
Congo §§ 10 I, 102 (1999) (introduced by Mr. Sam Johnson (R-TX), June 6, 1999); Top
Ten Terrible, H.R. 2414, 106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mr. Tancredo (R-CO), July
I, 1999). The income splitting combined return proposal of the Marriage Tax Elimination
Act of 1999, S. 15, 106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mrs. Hutchinson (R-TX), Jan. 19,
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the amendment that added it to the Senate Finance Committee's bill,
the doubling proposal became one of four changes identified as
marriage penalty relief measures in the Taxpayer Refund Act of
1999.265 One of the floor amendments offered by the Democratic
leadership to the Senate Finance Committee's bill would have both
increased the standard deduction by 60 percent and made the joint
return allowance double the amount for unmarried individuals. 266
Senator Moynihan's (D-NY) proposal included a similar increase in
the joint return filers' standard deduction along with a dual earner
deduction. 267
b. Structural income splitting and the income splitting combined
return
In the first session of the 106th Congress, eight bills in addition
to the vetoed tax cut bill introduced amendments to the Internal
Revenue Code that would have had the effect of re-creating income
splitting along the lines of the 1948 joint return. Five of the bills
proposed structural income splitting for all joint filers. Three of the
bills would have confined the effects of income splitting to the lowest
marginal bracket. Moreover, both the version of the tax cut bill that
the Senate passed and the conference bill presented to the President in
substance proposed income splitting for the lowest bracket taxpayers.
Representative Weller re-introduced his proposal for full
structural income splitting, a concept which was echoed in' several
other bills. It gathered an even greater following in 1999 than it had
in 1998 - 232 members of the House joined him as co-sponsors in
the 106th while only 58 had in the 105 th Congress. Twenty-six of the

1999) had a similar effect.
265 Senate floor amendment to Senate Bill 1429 proposed by Senator K.B.
Hutchinson. Senate Amendment 1472, was agreed to on July 30,1999. See Bill Status
Report Data Base for J06th Congress (visited Dec. II, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>.
See also S. 1429 (as introduced); H.R. 2488 (Senate Engrossed Amendment); Appendix Table 4 infra.
266

S. Arndt. 1442 (the Breaux Amendment).

267 S. Arndt. 1384, 106th Cong., §§ 101, 102 (1999) (introduced by Mr.

Moynihan (D-NY), July 28,1999) (amending S. 1429).
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co-sponsors in the l06 th Congress were Democrats. 268 Four'other bills
either made the same proposal as Weller's did - to both double
standard deduction allowance and double the width of the marginal
rate brackets for joint return filers - or called for its equivalent, an
income splitting combined return. 269
A scaled-down version of structural income splitting' found
more support from congressional leadership in both parties than did
the Weller proposal. The Democratic minority report in the Senate
Finance Committee (and one of the Democratic leadership's
amendments to the Senate tax cut bill) proposed a substantial amount
of income splitting for the lowest bracket joint return filers through a
combination of bracket widening at that level and doubling of the
standard deduction. 270 Two bills, both introduced by Republicans,
made similar proposals. 271 .
The version of the Senate Finance Committee's tax cut bill
which passed in th~t chamber would also have created significant
income splitting effects at the. lowest taxable income levels through
the same mechanisms.272 The tax cut bill that emerged from the.
Conference "Committee would have fully implemented structural
income splitting in its expanded bottom tax bracket. 273
268 H.R. 6. The bill summary report listed 232 co-sponsors. See Bill
Summary Report ofthe J06th Congress, (visited Dec. I I , 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>.
269 Structural income splitting proposals: S. 12; H.R. 2350, § 10 I, 102; H.R.
2414. The income splitting combined return proposal of the Marriage Tax Elimination
Act of 1999, S. 15, 106th Congo (\ 999) (introduced by Mrs. Hutchinson (R-TX), Jan. 19,
1999) had a similar effect.
270
See REPORT ON THE TAXPA YER REFUND ACT, supra note 176, at S-I 10;
see also S. Arndt. 1442, S.Amdt. 1384.
.
271 S. 799, §§ 1,2,3 106ih Congo (1999) (introduced by Mr.Nighthorse
CO), April 14, 1999) (section I (reduces all tax rates); section 2 (lowest bracket widened);
and section 3 (standard deduction doubled»; Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R.
767, 106th Congo § 3 (1999) (introduced by Mr. Thune, Feb. 12, 1999) (widens lowest
bracket and doubles it for joint return; ceiling $70,000). The Thune bill did not propose
doubling the standard deduction.

(R-

272 In the fgrm introduced, S'. 1429 called for a flatten.ing of tax rates and
broad-based tax cut through the widening of the bottom bracket. The doubling of the
Mrs. Hutchinson's amendment. See S. Arndt. 1472.
standard deduction was added

by

273 See Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488 (Enrolled Bill),

106th Congo §§ 101, III (\999) (vetoed by President Clinton, Sept. 23, 1999).
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c. Dual earner deduction
,Interest in reviving the dual earner deduction in the 106th
Congress continued to be limited largely to Democrats. Senator
Daschle (D-SD) and Representative Lampson (D-TX) again
introduced bills to provide a dual earner deduction that phased out at
$60,000 of adjusted gross income. 274 Senator Moynihan (D-NY), in
his failed floor amendment to the Senate Finance Committee's tax cut
bill, proposed a somewhat different version of the dual earner
deduction?75 All three of these dual earner proposals also would
have reduced the marriage penalties in the EITC phaseout, but only
for dual earner couples.276
d. Earned income tax credit
The 106th Congress gave much more attention to the marriage
penalty effects of the earned income tax credit than had the 105 th
Congress. Three bills and two floor amendments introduced marriage
penalty relief amendments to the earned income tax credit provision.
Interest in the Senate was more substantial than in the House. In the
Senate, the Republican leadership as well as the Democratic
leadership proposed EITC relief measures.
However, these
introductions did not all represent the same idea about marriage
penalty relief in the earned income tax credit. Some provided for a
general increase in the EITC for married couples by creating new and
higher phaseout limits for joint return filers while others targeted

274 Income Security Enhancement Act of 1999, S. 8, 106th Congo § 202
(1999) (introduced by Mr. Daschle (D-SD), Jan. 19, 1999) (section 202 - dual earner
credit with phaseout at AGI of $60,000); Income Security Enhancement Act of 1999,
H.R. 1453, 106th Congo § 202 (1999) (introduced by Mr. Lampson (D-TX), April 15,
1999) (section 202 - dual earner deduction with phaseout at AGI of $60,000). The
Daschle bill had 10 co-sponsors.
275 The Moynihan proposal had a $95,000 income phaseout ceiling' and
provided for minimum deductions of up to $4,350. S. Amdt. 1384, §§ 101, 102, 106th
Congo (1999), (introduced by Mr. Moynihan (D-NY), July 28,1999). It followed the
minority alternative described in the Senate Finance Committee's report. See REPORT ON
THE TAXPAYER REFUND ACT, supra note 176, at S-112.
276 All three of these dual earner deduction proposals included specific EITC
phaseout relief provisions.
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phaseout penalty relief to dual earners in the lowest income range.
In the Senate Finance Committee, both parties proposed to
make specific provision for joint return filers in the earned income tax
credit to alleviate marriage penalties. The majority and the minority
proposed different technical approaches but they had similar impact.
The Senate Finance Committee bill increased the phaseout starting
and ending points for the earned income tax credit. 277
The
Democratic minority report proposed to carry its increases in the
standard deduction into the earned income tax credit to reduce the
income used in applying the phaseouts. 278 Senator Breaux's CD-LA)
floor amendment to the Senate Finance Committee's bill included the
same proposal. 279 The Senate approved the Finance Committee's
earned income tax credit proposal in the tax cut bill that it passed and
the same provision was included in the enrolled bill vetoed by the
President. 280
Like the other provisions designated as marriage penalty relief
in the vetoed Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, the
amendment to the earned income tax credit would have increased
marriage bonuses as well as reducing marriage penalties. The
increased phaseout starting and ending points were to apply to all joint
return filers whether they were marriage penalty couples or sole
earner couples. In contrast, the three proposals for dual earner
deductions also would have reduced the marriage penalty in the
earned income ta~ credit, but only for couples who were dual
earners. 281 The dual earner deduction and its EITC marriage penalty
relief proposals were more focused and more efficient, but the
estimated revenue cost of the more expansive marriage penalty relief

277 See S. 1429,
278

§ 202 (EITC joint return relief).

See REPORT ON THE TAXPAYER REFUND ACT, supra note 176, at S-II 0 and

S-112.
279

Compare S. 1429 and S. Arndt. 1442.

280

Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, (Engrossed Senate
Amendment), 106th Congo § 202 (1999) (passed in Senate July 30, 1999); Taxpayer
Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488 (Enrolled Bill), 106th Congo § 115 (1999)
(vetoed by Pres. Clinton, Sept. 23, 1999).
281 See supra notes 274-276 and accompanying text (discussing Daschle,
Lampson and Moynihan dual earner bills).
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proposal for the earned income tax credit was a modest $1.3 billion
per year. 282
e. Expansion of the child and dependent care credit
In the 106th Congress, the proposal to enlarge the child and
dependent care credit emerged as an additional form of marriage
penalty relief. The President's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Proposal
made in February 1999, suggested expanding the non-refundable child
and dependent care credit for dual earner married couples and sole
earner parents and the parents of infants. The Joint Committee Staff
Comments on the President's Budget Proposal noted that an increase
in the dependent care credit "can be thought of as a proposal to
decrease the marriage penalty for families with children." The
Clinton Administration had also proposed increasing the dependent
care credit in the 1999 budget. 283
The Senate Finance Committee's tax cut bill sought to expand
child care tax credit much along the lines of the President's budget
proposal. 284 Four other bills in addition to the Senate Finance
Committee's bill proposed to expand the child and dependent care
credit. Democrats introduced three.285 With a floor amendment that
improved upon the President's proposal of a new credit for parents of
infants under the age of one year, the expansion of the child care tax
credit was 'approved by the Senate in its tax cut bill and also in the
conference bill vetoed by the President. 286 Considered as marriage
282

.

See 1999 JOINT COMM. CONF. BILL SUMMARY AND REVENUE ESTIMATES,
supra note 2, at S-II.
283

JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 43, JCS-I-99
(1998).
284 Compare S.1429, § 204 with JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, at 37-43.
285 Common Sense Family Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2646, 106th Congo
(1999) (introduced by Rep. Carolyn McCarthy (0- NY), July 29, 1999); Pro-Family, ProGrowth, Pro-Reform Tax Reduction Act of 1999, H.R. 2574,106th Congo § 703 (1999)
(introduced by Mr. Maloney (D-CT), July 20, 1999); Family Tax Reduction Act of 1999,
H.R. 2085, 106th Congo § 5 (1999) (introduced by Ms. Darlene Hooley (D-OR), June 9,
1999); Tax Relief for Working Americans Act of 1999, H.R. 2020, 106th Congo § 102
(1999) (introduced by Mrs. Johnson (R-CT» (28 co-sponsors).
286 See H.R. 2848 (Engrossed Senate Amendment) § 204 (1999); JOINT
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penalty relief, expansions in the child care credit are under inclusive
and are not generally applicable to marriage penalty couples. This
credit is only applicable to dual earner couples with qualifying
dependents and would not result in a general reduction in marriage
penalties.
But nonetheless it is also an approach that has a relatively
efficient marriage penalty focus. While not all dual earner couples are
marriage penalty couples, according to the CBO Report, about 76
percent are. Moreover, if sole earner couples are excluded from the
scope of the provision, the efficiency rating improves again. All sole
earner couples may not receive bonuses, but none of them pay
penalties. To the extent that the proposal to expand the child and
dependent care credit is used to provide an infant year supplement to
all parents, including sole earner couples, the efficiency and penalty
focus rating would diminish.
f. Flatteners
Income tax flattening proposals have been a significant part of
the congressional tax reform landscape in recent years. In 1999,
flattening the income tax became more closely associated with
marriage penalty relief in the bills introduced. One bill in the Senate
described its proposal to widen the bottom· marginal bracket - for
unmarried individuals as well as for joint returns - as an effort "to
mitigate the marriage penaIty.,,287
Four bills and amendments
COMM. ON TAXATION, COMPARISON OF HOUSE AND SENATE VERSIONS OF TAX CUT BILL
(H.R. 2488), WITH JCT REVENUE ESTIMATES, reprinted in BNA TEXT SUPP., Aug. 4,
1999, at S-10 [hereinafter JOINT COMM. COMPARISON]; Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act
of 1999, H.R. 2488, § 114 (1999) (Enrolled Bill). The extension to parents of infants
includes a caption containing the words "stay at home parents" but the operative language
of the provision would make it applicable to all parents of qualifying children whether
family members are the caregivers or undocumented paid care arrangements are used.
The wide approval which met the proposal to expand the child care tax credit for working
parents is particularly significant in the context of the efforts of the previous Congress to
establish tax policy that was neutral on the question of the labor force participation of
parents. The child credit enacted in 1997 provides up to $500 per child in tax credits,
generally non-refundable, that are available to stay at home parents as well as dual earner
parents.
287 Share the Surplus Tax Reduction and Simplification Act, S. 1379, \06 th
Congo § 12 (1999) (introduced by Mr. Domenici (R-NM) July 15, 1999).
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proposing other forms of marriage penalty relief, including the Senate
Finance Committee's tax cut bill, also proposed bracket widening at
the bottom of the rate tables. 288 Flat tax advocates with increasing
frequency in the past two years have also advanced the claim that a
flat income tax would eliminate marriage penalties. 289
Widening the brackets and flattening out the marginal rate
structure of the income tax somewhat reduces marriage penalties,
however it does not eliminate them. The reduction occurs because the
impact of aggregation of incomes is lessened. For example, if the
upper limit of the bottom bracket were raised to $70,000 for joint
return filers, as one bill proposed, only dual earner couples whose
combined incomes exceeded that _ amount would see marriage
penalties arising from the marginal brackets themselves in calculating
pre-credit incom~ tax liability.290 From an historical perspective, the
suggestion that flattening will reduce marriage penalties in the joint
return system is a familiar one. This was the argument for repeal of
the dual earner deduction made in 1986 when the federal income tax
was flattened by the consolidation of brackets and rate reduction.
Then as now, flattening brackets reduces the marriage. penalty
somewhat but does not eliminate it. Flattening would not affect the
288

.

S. 799, § 2; S. 1429 (amendment to S 1442); H.R. 767, § 3; Taxpayer
Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429 (Senate Finance Committee Bill); Taxpayer Refund Act of
1999, H.R. 2488, §§ 102,201,202,204 & 209 (Engrossed Senate Amendment) (passed in
Senate July 30, 1999) (section 102 - lower bracket increased - broad based tax relief
designation; section 201 - combined return of individual incomes; section 202 - EITC
joint return relief; section 204 - dependent care credit expanded; infants added; and
section 209 - doubles joint return standard deduction.
.
289 See Hearings o'n the Marriage Penalty Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 105th Congo (1998) (statement of Bruce Bartlett). .

290

.

See H.R. 767 (proposing the $70,000 bottom bracket). A dual earner
couple with two $35,000 taxable incomes would find the 15% rate applicabI~ to the entire
amount. The present ceiling of $43,050 on the bottom bracket for joint returns would put
$26,050 of their income into the 28% bracket. Widening of the bottom bracket would
reduce the amount of income tax and the cost of marriage tax penalties for those with
incomes above the lowest bracket as well, because more of their income would be taxed
at the lower rate. See REpORT ON THE TAXPAYER REFUND ACT, supra note 176, at S-I \0
(minority views, criticizing Senate Finance Committee majority bill's widening of the
lowest bracket by $4,000 for joint returns and $2,000 for unmarrieds). The Senate
Finance bill raised the upper limit of the bottom bracket by $2,000 for unmarried
individuals and $4,000 for joint return filers.
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penalties that arise from the rest of the joint return system, such as
those caused upon marriage by the loss of part of the standard
291
deduction or a portion of the earned income tax credit.
Even the flattest taxes being proposed would continue to
impose a higher effective tax rate on the secondary earner in the
couple and with it, continue some of the tax incentives for housework
and tax disincentives to market employment. The general flat tax
proposals, such as those of Representatives Armey and Senator
Shelby, combine flattening of rates with a per capita personal
exemption that would reduce, if not eliminate, marriage penalty
effects for the couple as a unit. 292 Yet the flat tax proposals retain
aggregation of incomes for married couples and with it, marriage
bonuses and some progressivity in average tax rates. For example, in
the Shelby-Armey flat tax, unmarried taxpayers are entitled to a
personal exemption of $11,000 and a married couple (without
children) is allowed an exemption of $22,000. 293 Although the stated
tax rate in the Shelby-Armey flat tax proposal is 17%, there are in
effect two marginal brackets. The personal exemptions create a
bottom bracket with a tax rate of zero and hence varying average rates
of tax depending on how much income there is above the exemption
level.294
If removing tax disincentives that affect the choice of work for
married women is one of the reasons to seek marriage neutrality,295
the solution will not be found in the flat taxes. Stacking the income of
the wife, generally the spouse seen to be the secondary earner, on top
of the income of the husband, results in a higher tax rate for her than
for him. His income is seen to absorb the personal exemptions of both
291 For a discussion of the continuance of marriage penalties after the 1986
reforms, see Rosen 1987, supra note 149, at 568.
292 See Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1997, S. 1040, 105th Congo
§ 101 (1997) (introduced by Mr. Shelby (R-AL»; Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act

of 1997, H.R. 1040, 105th Congo § 101 (1997).
293 S.1040,§ 101; H.R. 1040, § 101.

294 An exemption of $22,000 and a stated tax rate of 17% would result in an
average rate of tax of 8.5% on $44,000 of income and an average rate of tax of 12.75 %
on $88,000 of income.
295 Professor Zelenak made this argument persuasively in his 1994 article.
See Zelenak, supra note 78.
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and her income is seen to bear the full stated rate of tax. 296 The
couple does not pay a larger total tax because of their marital status,
but the secondary worker still sees a higher effective tax rate when
substituting market employment for home production. This problem
arises when there is aggregation of incomes if there is any amount of
progressivity. If progressivity cannot be eliminated completely, the
solution would seem to be disaggregation, a return to the individual
taxation of husbands and wives.
g. Optional combined return of individual incomes
In the 106th Congress, the optional combined return of
individual incomes gained significant support. It was the chief form
of marriage penalty relief in the tax cut bill that the Senate Finance
Committee originally introduced.
This proposal to create an
alternative to the joint return for dual income couples also won the
approval of a majority of the Senate. It was included in the version of
the Senate's tax cut bill that passed in that chamber. 297
But the optional combined return of individual incomes did
not survive the Conference Committee. In its place the Conference
Committee approved the doubling of the lowest marginal tax bracket
for joint returns.298 This substitution of the income splitting lowest
bracket for the optional combined return of individual incomes took
place in the negotiation of the differences between the House and
Senate tax cut bills. In a process not unfamiliar to observers of tax
legislation, the Conference Committee settled differences by taking an
approach to the taxation of married couples that had not been
approved in the tax cut bill of either the House or the Senate.
The proposal for the optional combined return of individual
incomes was included in the Finance Committee's tax cut bill in much
296 See Rosen (1977), supra note 122 (discussing stacking and the impact of
marriage penalties on the labor supply of married women).
297 Compare Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429 (Senate Finance
Committee bill) and H.R. 2488 (Engrossed Senate Amendment), §201.

298

See 1999 JOINT COMM. CONF. BILL SUMMARY AND REVENUE ESTIMATES,
supra note 2, at S-II (comparing the engrossed bill from the House and the engrossed
amendment from the Senate with the Conference bill results in the category entitled
"Marriage Penalty Relier').
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the same form as it had been proposed in the first session of the losth
Congress by Representative Weller and Senator Hutchinson. 299 Tax
credits were still to be determined and applied on the basis of a joint
return income aggregation, .but taxable income and the regular federal
income tax were determined as if the couple was unmarried. In
describing its proposal for optional filing, the Senate Finance
Committee indicated its intention to take "a comprehensive approach"
to the reduction or elimination of marriage penalties. The optional
combined return of individual incomes was both more comprehensive
and more targeted toward marriage penalty couples than any of the
other proposals introduced during the three sessions of Congress.
Revenue estimates indicated that it would cost about $24 billion in the
form proposed. 30o Revenue estimates of the cost of the income
splitting for the lowest bracket and a doubled standard deduction for
all joint return filers in the Conference Bill were not provided on an
annual basis and hence a comparable measure is not available. 301
h. The Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999 - the vetoed tax cut
bill
The bill that the President vetoed on September 23,1999,

299 The Senate Finance Committee's version added language providing that
income from jointly owned property was to be allocated 50-50 between husband and
wife. The impact of this change on the community property issue is not clear. It tends to
suggest that community property principles are to be followed in determining whether a
spouse has income. If that is its meaning, the impact of the combined return of individual
incomes would be very different in New York than in California or Texas. See text
accompanying notes 106-110 slIpra. Compare Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429, §
201 (Senate Finance Committee bill) and Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 2456,
105th Congo (1997) and Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1314 105th Congo (1997).
Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, (Engrossed Senate Amendment), §§ I 02, 201,
202, 204, & 209 (section 102 - lower bracket increased - broad based tax relief
designation); section 201 - combined return of individual incomes; section 202 - EITC
joint return relief; section 204 - dependent care credit expanded); and section 209 doubles joint return standard deduction).
300 ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE TAXPA YER REFUND ACT OF 1999, AS
ApPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE ON JULY 21, 1999, S. REP. No. 106-120
( 1999).
301 ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R.
2488 (JCX-61-99 R), at I. A total of $112.881 billion is shown for 2000-09. Id.
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called for some $792 billion in tax cuts over the next ten years. More
than $121 billion of the tax cut proposed by the Taxpayer Refund and
Relief Act of 1999, some 15 percent, was allocated to marriage
penalty relief provisions. 302 Like the majority of the marriage penalty
relief bills in the 106th Congress, the tax cut bill addressed itself to a
number of different features of the problem but shied away from
thorough-going solutions. Moreover, with the exception of the $5
billion or so aimed at expanding the dependent and child care credit,
the remainder of the more than $115 billion revenue cost would have
gone to a collection of the least efficient forms of marriage penalty
relief.
Different proposals for marriage penalty relief came to the
Conference Committee from the House and Senate. The choices of
the Conference Committee on the marriage penalty question were the
doubled standard deduction for joint filers, a double-size bottom tax
bracket for the joint return, increased earned income tax credits for
joint filers and an expanded child care credit with special provision
for stay-at home parents of infants.303 In effect, the Conference
Committee constructed a bill that would have given middle income
married taxpayers the benefits of structural income splitting on the
1948 model, at least for determining pre-credit tax liability. The
vetoed tax cut bill gave upper income married taxpayers the valuable
opportunity to claim the doubled standard deduction at their higher
302 .

See 1999 JOINT COMM. CONF. BILL SUMMARY AND REVENUE ESTIMATES,
supra note 2, at S-31 (showing $121.95 billion for four items: (I) doubling the standard
deduction; (2) doubling the lowest bracket, together totaling $ 112.881 billion; (3)
increasing earned income tax credit phaseout starting and stopping points for joint returns,
$4.163 billion; and (4) expanded dependent care credit, $4.9 billion). Unlike the others,
the description of dependent care expansion in the table did not use the words marriage
penalty. The alternative minimum tax [AMT] and its marriage penalty are not included in
this sum nor is the marriage penalty discussed above. The energetic efforts to repeal the
entire AMT for individuals suggest that it raises broad-based tax reduction issues rather
than marriage penalty issues despite the inclusion of the penalty buzz word in the
legislative materials. [d, at S-33, pt. III.
303 Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Congo (1999)
(Enrolled Bill), (vetoed by Pres. Clinton, Sept. 23, 1999) (section 101 - lowest bracket
doubled for joint return; section III - doubles joint return standard deduction; section
115 - EITC joint return relief; section 114 - dependent care credit expanded; infants
added).
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marginal rates and also the benefit of having more income taxed in the
expanded bottom bracket. But the marriage penalty effects of the
upper four tax brackets would have remained. Similarly, itemizers at
all income levels would have seen relatively little marriage penalty
relief. Married couples in the earned income tax credit range were to
be given the opportunity to reduce penalties or increase bonuses,
depending on where they stood under current law.
The marriage penalty solutions proposed in the Conference
Committee's bill were among those rated the least efficient by the
CBO Study. Structural income splitting in the CBO projections was
expected to deliver about half of its revenue cost to couples who were
not paying marriage penalties at al1. 304 Nor was the amendment
proposed for the earned income tax credit ~my more focused on
marriage penalty couples. While marriage penalties would have been
reduced by each of these proposals, the reduction in penalties almost
seems incidental to the enhancement of marriage bonuses that also
would have resulted. The expansion of the child and dependent care
credit would have helped dual earner couples but only if they had
qualifying dependents. The picture of the taxation of married couples
that emerges from the Conference bill is one of continuing penalties
and increased bonuses and erratic and unintended consequences.
Indications of the dominance of the trend toward using
marriage penalty relief provisions to justify a general tax cut for
married couples can be seen in the development of the Senate's tax
cut bill as well as in that of the House. The House leadership in the
Ways and Means Committee adopted one of the broadest and least
efficient forms of marriage penalty relief - the doubled standard
deduction. The Senate Finance Committee's bill started in a different
direction, with the most narrowly targeted form of marriage penalty
relief, the optional combined return of individual incomes. But the
addition of the Senate floor amendment to double the standard
deduction suggested strongly that the Senate was pursuing two
different agendas at the same time. It was making an effort to
accommodate dual earners but it also took the opportunity to try to

304

See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at Summary tbl. 4.
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reduce taxes for sole earner married couples?05
The Senate bill as introduced already provided a doubled
standard deduction for marriage penalty couples through the optional
combined return of individual incomes. Couples electing the optional
combined return determined their individual pre-credit tax liability by
using the standard deduction for unmarried individuals as well as the
rate table for unmarrieds. 306 The restructuring of the standard
deduction itself pursuant to the floor amendment only served marriage
bonus couples who would not be electing the optional combined
return.
The impact of the proposals made in the vetoed tax cut bill on
the marriage penalty is consistent with the trend of the other bills
introduced in the 106th Congress. The year 1999 saw growing support
for general tax cuts for married couples presented in the guise of
marriage penalty relief. Sole earner couples stood to benefit from
almost all of the penalty relief proposals introduced in the first session
of this Congress even though they already receive substantial
marriage bonuses and pay no marriage penalties. 307
But nonetheless, interest in providing an alternative filing
status for dual earner and dual income couples that would recognize
individual income as the basis for taxation was visible and substantial
in the Senate. A similar level of support for individual taxation of
husbands and wives had also been seen in the House in 1997, at the
beginning of this three year run of marriage penalty relief proposals,
when Representative Weller's proposal for the optional combined
return of individual incomes gathered more than 200 co-sponsors.
Amidst the movement toward general tax cuts for married couples, the
proposal for an alternative to aggregation stands out as an expression
of skepticism about the entire enterprise of joint return taxation.
Finally, it seems worth noting that despite the trend toward
describing tax reduction broadly applicable to joint return filers as
marriage penalty relief, the tax cut bill did distinguish its proposal for
a general flattening of the bottom bracket from marriage penalty
305

Compare Appendix - Table 4 infra with Figure A supra.

306 S.
307

1429, 106th § 201 (1999).

Compare Appendix - Table 4 infra with Figure A supra. See also CBO

STUDY, supra note 4, at Summary tbl.2.
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relief. The widening of the lowest bracket for the benefit of
unmarried individuals and heads of household was identified as broad
based tax reduction. The proposal to lower the bottom rate from 15
percent to 14 percent also appeared under the broad based' tax relief
title. 308

CONCLUSION

It would be unduly speculative to treat all of the tax reform
proposals made in Congress over the past three years as indicative of
considered policy choices, even on the part of their sponsors. The tax
legislative process in these years,' especially since 1998, has taken
place in an atmosphere of bitter and partisan disagreement about the
federal budget. The tax reform and tax cut bills that Congress
proposed in 1998 and 1999 were advanced under the threat, or
perhaps the promise, of a presidential veto. Further, the prospect of a
budget surplus made it possible to think about tax reform outside of a
revenue neutral plan. Under these circumstances, the normal budget
constraints may not have been at work, winnowing out the most costeffective solutions. Accountability for revenue loss in making policy
choices is not a concern if many members are convinced that the bill
will not become law in any event. But even under these conditions,
legislative proposals represent at least a window through which the
thinking of elected policy makers can be glimpsed. Indeed it may· be
argued that the certainty of a veto encourages a more, complete
expression of goals and preferences than ordinarily occurs. The ideas
advanced in bills that have not become law are nonetheless ideas that
have attracted the interest and support of policy makers. It is as ideas
about marriage and the income tax that the anti-penalty proposals in
the past three sessions of Congress are important.
Most of the bills introduced in the past three years which
identify themselves as marriage penalty relief would effectuate a
general tax cut for all married couples who file joint returns. It would
be easy to dismiss these proposals as political manipulation. Indeed,
308

Compare 1999 JOINT COMM.
ESTIMATES, supra note 2, at S-31, pt. IA & lB.
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it is arguable whether an amendment that would direct less than half
of its tax reduction effects to marriage penalty couples, as would the
structural income splitting proposal, ought to be described as marriage
penalty relief at all. But at the same time these bills offer important
insights into the re-examination of tax policy toward marriage that
appears to have e~gag'ed the attention of Congress since 1993.
, The forty-seven' bills and amendments discussed above all
claim to reduce or eliminate the marriage penalty. The attachment of
the term marriage penalty to all of these proposals indicates the
political potency of the issue. If nothing more, congressional policy
makers who make use of the m~rriage penalty buzz word in their tax
cut' proposals' are acknowledging the pressing claims of dual earner
couples to more equitable tax trea'tment. Yet it remains a striking
feature of the discourse that there appears to have been little interest in
the most obvious solution to the problem of the marriage penalties
created by the joint return system. Not a single bill proposing the
repeal of the joint return or mandatory individual filing for married
couples was introduced in these three sessions. The omission of this
solution from the bills for marriage penalty relief is particularly
noteworthy because from a revenue point of view repeal of the joint
return is an 'attractive idea. If nothing else changed in the income tax,
individual filing would end marriage bonuses and stop the loss of the
$32 billion in tax reve'nue now going in that direction. This would be
more than enough to offset the impact of forgoing the $28.8 billion in
extra tax revenue that marriage penalty couples have been paying.
But a fair distillation of the prevalent ideas in Congress about
the taxation of marriage over the past three sessions confirms that the
m<;lst revenue efficient solution has no visible supporters. None of the
bills proposed threatened marriage bonuses at all. The impact of all
but two of the solutions proposed would have been to increase
bonuses substantially. The dual earner deduction and the optional
combined return of individual incomes are the exceptions. The import
of most of the marriage penalty relief bills introduced in the past three
years is that the sole earner marriage, although diminishing in its
representation in American family life, has found renewed support in
Congress. The trends in marriage penalty relief proposals of the past
three years suggest strongly that Congress is willing to spend money
on marriage.
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Appendix - Table I
Income Tax Marriage Penalty Relief Bills Introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives
1997 to' 1999 (105 th Congress and I06th Congress, I" Session)
Bill number (spon5()f, party and
state). Bill with most co-sponsors in
session in bold; proposal with most
co-sponsors indicated by XX; if
passed in either chamber, mar1<ed
with asten. (').'

INCOME TAX MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS

SlTuctural income splitting
Tax
Standard
deduction
brackets
doubled for
doubled
joint
for joint
returns'
returns

Income
splitting
combined
return

lowest
tax
bracket
widened
overall

EITe
phaseout
relief for
joint
returns

Dual
earner

deduction
orcredtt

Optional
combined
return of
individual
incomes

(§ 32)
105n , CONGRESS, I" SESSION (1997)

H.R. 2718 Knollenberg R-MI)
H.R. 1584 S.Johnson R-TX)
H.R. 2593 Herger R-GA)
H.R. 3059 Jackson-Lee ().TX)
H.R. 2456 (Weller R-IL)
H.R. 2462 (Kasieh R-OH)

X

H.R. 3524 (MeOenmott ()'WA)
H.R. 4542 (N. Johnson R-CT)
HR. 4579 (Archer R-TX)
H.R. 4597 Rangel O-NY)
H.R. 3995 Neal ()'MA)
H.R. 3151 Thune R-SO)
H.R. 3620 Gephardt ()'MO)
H.R. 3734 (Weller R-IL)

XX

X
X

XX"
XX'
XX
105'" CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (1998)

XX
XX •

XX
X
X
X

X
X

X
106'" CONGRESS, I" SESSION (1999)

H.R. 6 (Weller R-IL)
H.R.2350 (S.Johnson R-TX)
H.R.2414 (Taneredo R-CO)
H.R. 767 (Thune R-SO)
H.R.2.J88 (Archer R.TX)
H.R.2085 (Hooley ()'OR)
H.R.l08 (Knollenberg R-MI)
H.R. 725 (Kleczka ()'WI)
H.R.2020 (N.Johnson R·CT)
H.R.2646 (C.McCarthy O·NY)
H.R. 2574 (Maloney_ ()'CT)
H.R. 1453 (Lampson ().TX)
HR. 2488 (EHB) m
HR. 2488 (vetoed bill)

XX
XX
XX

XX' •
XX
XX
X "

X •

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X •

cc·

CC

.

X'
C •

X

C·

• Bills identified by word searches on THOMAS and LEXIS Bill Tracking; number of sponsors from THOMAS
Bill Summary data base. Multiple co-sponsorships by a member in a given session have not been eliminated. Bills
introduced by Chairman of Ways and Means Committee in italics. C denotes Conference bill.
b Amending I.R.C. § 63(c), (1999); would reduce taxable income only; phaseout penalties unaffected.
, Amending I.R.C. § 62 (a) (1999), reducing AGI and phaseout penalties.
d Proposal with most co-sponsors (271) in the House in 1997: optional combined return of individual incomes .
• 1997 House marriage penalty relief bill with most co-sponsors (238). H.R. 2593 had second most (189).
fProposal with most co-sponsors (145) in the House in 1998: doubled standard deduction as only general relief.
• House Ways and Means Committee bill, 1998 Tax Relief Act; passed in House, no action in Senate.
h Only lowest bracket doubled for joint returns.
i 1998 House marriage penalty relief bill with the most co-sponsors (59).
j 1999 House marriage penalty relief bill with the most co-sponsors (232).
k Proposal with most co-sponsors (294) in the House in 1999: structural income splitting.
I Dual eamer deduction phased out at joint return AGI of $60,000; EITC relief for dual earner only.
m Enrolled House Bill, Financial Freedom Act of 1999, as passed in the House.
"Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999. Enrolled Bill; vetoed by President, September 23,1999.
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Appendix - Table 2

Income Tax Marriage Penalty Relief Bills Introduced in the U.S. Senate, 1997-1999
(I05th Congress and I06th Congress, 1st Session)
Bill number (sponsor, party and state).
Bill with most co-sponsors in session
in bold; proposal with most cosponsors indicated by 1 I: ~ passed
in either chamber marked with
asterix(1·'

INCOME TAX MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS

Structural income
splitting
Standard
Tax
deducfn
bo'ackets
doubled
doubled
tor joint
for joint
retumsC

Income
splitting
combined
return

ElTe
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Dual

phaseout
relief for
joint
retums

tax

bracket
widened
overall

earner

deducfn

or credit'

Optional
combined
retum of
individual
incomes

(§ 32)

returns

105 m CONGRESS, lIT SESSION (1997

S. 1285 (Faircloth R.NC)
S. 1314 (Hutchinson R-TXl

I""

1

I

m

105

S.Amdt.2436 (Gramm R.AZ) ,
S.Amdt.2686 (Gramm R-AZ) ,
S.Amdt.2688 (Daschle 0-50)'
S. 1989 (Ford D-KYI
S. 1569 (Coverdeli R-GAl
S. 2147 (Daschle D-SDI
S. 1999 (Hutchinson R-TX)
S. 1711 (Hutchinson R·TX)

1

1

I

I
-I

-1-1 ."
-1-1 n'

-I '

,[1

,[

,[1

-I

.,

U
-I'
,[

..[

CONGRESS, 2'0 SESSION(1998)
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-"-I

106m CONGRESS, 1n SESSION (1999

S.12 (Hutchinson R·TX)
S.15 (Hutchinson R-TX)
S. 284 (McCain R-AZI
S. 1160 (GrassleylFeinsteinl
S. 1379 (Donimici R-NM)
S. 8 (Daschle D-SDI
S. 799 (Nighthorse R-GOI

.[

-I
-I

-I
,[
,[

-1-1

-I

-I

S. J.l29 (Roth R-D/')

S.Amdll384 (MoY!1ihan O.NY) n
S.Amdt. 1442 (Breaux D-LAI n
S.Amdt 1472 (Hutchinson R-TXI'
H.R. ].188 (ESA) "
H..R. ].188 (I'etoed bill)
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,[,[1

.,.

-I '
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,m
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-1-1

C •
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• Bills identified by word searches on THOMAS and LEXIS Bill Tracking; number of sponsors from THOMAS
Bill Summary data base. Multiple co-sponsorships by a member in a given session have not been eliminated. Bills
introduced by Chairman of Committee on Finance in italic.,'. C denotes conference bill.
b Amending IRC § 62(a), reducing AGI and phaseout penalties. Dual earner deduction to phased out at joint return
AGI of $60,000 (Daschle proposals) or $95,000 (Moynihan).
, Amending IRC § 63(c), would reduce taxable income only; phaseout penalties unaffected.
d 1997 Senate marriage penalty relief bill and proposal with most co-sponsors (40).
e Senate floor amendment to S. 1415, the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act.
f Increase in joint return deduction phased out at joint return AGI of $50,000 in both Gramm proposals.
• Proposal with most co-sponsors (8) in Senate in 1998: increase joint return standard deduction to at least double.
h Joint return standard deduction more than doubled.
; Only lowest bracket doubled.
j Tied with S.Amdt.2686 for 1998 Senate maniage penalty relief bill with most co-sponsors (4).
• 1999 Senate marriage penalty relief bill with most co-sponsors (18).
1 ElTe phaseout relieffor dual earners only.
m Proposal with most co-sponsors (28) in the Senate in 1999: EITC phaseout relief (not all limited to dual earners).
n Senate floor amendment to S. 1429.
o Engrossed Senate Amendment, amended version of S. 1429, passed by Senate; renumbered and renamed.
P Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, Enrolled Bill; vetoed by President; September 23,1999.
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Appendix - Table 3
Income Tax Marriage Penalty Relief Bills Introduced in the IOS Ih Congress, 1997-1998
Bill number (sponsor. party and
sta1e). Bill with most co-sponsors in
chamber in session in bold;
proposal with most co-sponsors
indicated by XX or.f.f; Kpassed in
ehher chamber marl<ed with
aslerix (') .•

INCOME TAX MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS

Structural income splitting
Standard
Tax
deduction
brackets
doubled for
doubled
joint
lor jOint
returnsC
returns

Income
splitting
combined
return

Lowest

ElTe

tax

phaseout
relief for
joint
returns
(§ 32)

bracket
widened'
overall·

Dual
earner
deduction
or credh b

Optional
combined
return of
individual
incomes

105 m CONGRESS, In SESSION (1997)

H.R. 2718 (Knolienbe!QR-MI)
H.R.1584 (S.Johnson R-TXI
H.R. 2593 (Herger R-GAI
H.R. 3059 (Jackson-Lee O-TX)
H_R_ 2456 (Weller R·IL)
H.R. 2462 (Kasich R-OHI
S. 1285 (Faircloth R·NC)
S. 1314 (Hutchinson R-TXI

X
X
X·

XX'
XX
XX

"" .

J

IOSn. CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (1998
H.R.3524 (McDermott D-WAI
H.R.4542 (N. Johnson R·eTI
H.R. 4r9 (Archer R·TX)
H.R. 4597 (Rangel D-NYI
H.R. 3995 (Neal D-MA)
H.R. 3151 (Thune R-SD)
H.R. 3620 (Gephardt D-MOI
H.R. 3734 (Weller R·ILI
S.. Amdt. 2436 (Gramm R-AZ) •
S.Amelt. 2686 (Gramm R·AZ)
S.Amdt. 2688 (Daschle D-SO)
S. 1569 (Coverdell R-GAI
S. 1989 (Ford D-KY)
S. 1999 (Hutchinson R-TXI
S. 1711 (Hutchinson R·TXI
S. 2147 (Daschle D-SD)

XX"
XX
XY'
XX
X
X

Xl

JJ,mn
'!" m.

X
X

X
.f

'!.
"

.f-[
.[

"
.[

D

"

P

"
"

"

""

• Bills identified by word searches on THOMAS and LEXIS Bill Tracking; number of sponsors from THOMAS
Bill Summary data base. Multiple co-sponsorships by a member in a given session have not been eliminated.
Bills introduced by Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee or Senate Finance Committee in italic.\'.
Introduction ofpanicular proposal indicated by X (House) or.f (Senate).
b Amending I.R.C. § 62(a), reducing AGI and phaseout penallies.
, Amending I.R.C. § 63(c), would reduce taxable income only; phaseouts unaffected.
d 1997 House marriage penalty relief bill with second most co-sponsors (189).
_
, Proposal with the most co-sponsors (27 I) in the House in 1997: optional combined return of individual incomes.
f 1997 House marriage penally relief bill with the most co-sponsors (238).
• 1997 Senaie marriage penalty relief bill and proposal with the most co·sponsors (40).
h Proposal with the most co-sponsors (145) in the House in 1998: doubled standard deduction as only general relief.
; Only lowest bracket doubled for joint returns.
j 1998 House marriage penally relief bill with the most co-sponsors (59).
k Senate floor amendment to S.1415, the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act.
, Increase in standard deduction phased out at joint return AGI of $50,000 in both Gramm proposals.
m Joint return standard deduction to be more than double the unmarried individual amount.
" Proposal with most co-sponsors (8) in Senate in 1998: increase joint return standard deduction to at least double.
D EITC phaseout relief for dual earners only.
P Dual eamer deduction phased out at joint return AGI of $60,000. _
q Tied with S. Arndt. 2686 for 1998 Senate relief bill With most co-sponsors (4).

APRlMER

1999]

117

Appendix - Table 4
g

Income Tax Marriage Penalty Relief Bills Introduced in the I06 th Congress, I Session (1999)
Bill number (sponsor, party and state).
Bin with most co-sponsors in chamber in
session in bold; proposal with most cosponsors indicated by XX or U; ~
passed in eithtlr chamber marl<ed with

asterix (') .•

INCOME TAX MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS
SlJuc:Iuraiincome
Income
ElTe
Dual
solittina
Lowest
spritting
earner
phaseout
Standard
Tax
tax
combined
deducfn
bracket
relief for
deducfn
brackets
orcredrt b
return
doubled
widened
joint
doubled
returns
for joint
overall
for joint
returns C
(§ 32)
returns

Optional
combined
return of
individual
incomes

106'" CONGRESS, In SESSION (1999

H,R,6 (Weller R-ILI •
H.R.2350 (S. Johnson R· TXI
H.R. 2414 (Tancredo R-COl
H.R. 767 (Thune, R-SOI

XX
XX

XX

n'
XX
XX
X

H.R.U88 (Archer, R-TX)

X"

H.R.20a5IHoolev, D-ORI
H.R.l0a (KnolienberQ,R-MII
H.R.725 (Kleczka D-WI)
H.R.2020 IN.Johnson R-CTl
H.R.2646 IC.McCarthy, D-NYI
H.R. 2574 (Maloney, D-CTI
H.R. 1453 (lamoson, D-TXl

X
X
X
X
X
X

H.R. U88 (EHB)

X·

S,12 (Hutchinson, R-TX) ,
S.15lHutchinson R-TXI
S. 284 (McCain R-AZl
S. 1160 (Grassley I Feinsteinl
S. 1379 lOonimici, R-NMI
S. a rDaschle D-SO)
S. 799 (NiQhthorse, R-COI
S. J.l29 (Roth, R-DE)
S. Arndt. 1472 (Hutchinson R-TX)
S.Amdt.1384(Moynihan, D-NY)
S.Amdt. 1442 (Breaux, ()-LA)
H.R.24BB (ESA) n
H.R. 2488 (vetoed bill)
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• Bills identified by word searches on THOMAS and LEXIS Bill Tracking; number of sponsors from THOMAS
Bill Summary data base. Multiple co-sponsorships by a member in a given session have not been eliminated. Bills
introduced by Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee or Senate Finance Committee in itulic>'.
Introduction of particular proposal indicated by X (House) or {(Senate). C denotes conference bill.
b Amending I.R.C. § 62(a), reducing AGI and phaseout penalties.
, Amending I.R.C. § 63(c), would reduce taxable income only; phaseouts unaffected.
d 1999 House marriage penalty relief bill with most co-sponsors (232).
'Proposal with most co-sponsors (294) in House in 1999: structural income splitting:
r Only lowest bracket doubled for joint 'returns.
• Dual earner deduction phased out at joint return AGI of $60,000 (H.R.1435 and S.8) or $95,000 (S.Amdt.l384).
h Enrolled House Bill, Financial Freedom Act of 1999, as passed in the House.
i 1999 Senate marriage penalty relief bill with most co-sponsors (18).
j EITC phaseout relief only for dual earners.
k Proposal with most co-sponsors (28) in Senate in 1999: EITC phaseout relief (not all limited to dual earners).
I Senate floor amendment to S. 1429.
m Standard deduction for joint return more than doubled.
• Engrossed Senate Amendment, amended version ofS. 1429, passed by Senate; renumbered and renamed.
• Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, Enrolled Bill; vetoed by President, September 23, 1999.

